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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an exercise to apply macro-economic analysis
to the Japanese National Pension Scheme. Though this treats the
effect of the National Pension Scheme on the national economy,
the analysis is limited to its impact on national expenditure
and on economic growth. Other important aspects, such as in¬
come redistribution, are not considered, though a short
reference is made to the built-in stabilizing effectiveness of
the pension scheme.
I have concentrated on the problem of growth because of its
importance in the case of the Japanese economy. I shall try to
demonstrate the impact of the new National Pension Scheme on
future economic growth and this requires me to examine the
special features of the institutional framework of the Japanese
National Pension Scheme in so far as it may affect the structure
of government investment.
In analysing the effect of the Scheme, some of the analytical
tools of macro-economics, such as the Keynesian income determina¬
tion model, a growth model of a Harrod-Domar type, etc., are used.
In analysing the effects on national expenditure only the
direction of changes in expenditure produced by the Scheme are
indicated. Given present information,an econometric model would
not seem to be appropriate.
In essence, this is an analysis of the pension scheme, yet
several important traditional topics of social security are
considered because they form the background to a study of pensions.
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Although a short statistical and historical description of
the place of social services in the economy is given, historical
details are not the main concern of the present thesis. Adminis¬
trative details of the financing of the Scheme are not provided, al¬
though considerable space is given in the analysis to the
structural framework of the Japanese pension scheme.
It was fortunate for me that, in the midst of the research,
the new National Pension Scheme was enforced (in April, 1961),
thus facilitating accessibility to information; and that
furthermore, the Japanese economy itself has continued to show
a remarkable rate of growth, attracting wide attention; and
that, thirdly, the main concerns of the government policy have
consequently become clearer than before - partly because of
the appointment of the new Prime Minister, Mr. Ikeda (whose
professed main policy objective lies in a high rate of economic
growth), and partly with the formulation of the "Doubling
National Income in Ten Years Plan, 1961-1970)."
In carrying out the analysis, I am indebted to two previous
studies. The first is 'The Economics of the National Insurance
by A«T. Peacock.1 Its thorough analysis on the structure and
the economic effect of the British National Insurance Scheme has
been of very great help in presenting an analysis of the
Japanese case. The first t\^o chapters of this thesis very closely
follow the methods developed in that study.
The second is the study, by a group of graduates in the
^
Peacock, A.T., The Bconomics of National Insurance. William
Hodge and Co., Ltd., 1957.
Economics Department of Tokyo University, on the economic effect
2
of the National Pension Scheme, supervised by Professor Kimura.'
This is an intermediate report of the result of the research carried
out at the request of the Ministry of Welfare for their adminis¬
trative purposes. It is mainly an econometric analysis, composed
of model building, magnitudal calculations, and some discussions.
It has been a very useful guide, although I have had to deviate
rather sharply both in methodology and conceptual approach, as I
demonstrate in my criticism of Professor Kimura in Chapter VI,
In the composition of this thesis, I am very greatly indebt¬
ed to Professor Peacock for his extensive guidance, his continuous
help and encouragement, valuable suggestions, criticisms and
advice. Without his guidance and help, no single part of interest
in the thesis would have been possible. My debt to him is
inexpressible. I am grateful to the United Nations who have given
me fellowships which have made me financially able to carry out
this research, I am also grateful to the Japanese Government,
who have given me leave of absence to accomplish this work. I
was supplied with statistical material by many government officials
in the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Welfare, Economic Planning
Agency, etc. Particularly am I very much indebted to Mr, Kitada
of the Ministry of Finance. He has supplied me with a large
amount of internal statistics and has also so kindly answered
every enquiry in each item of my questionnaires concerning very
detailed administrative procedures. Without these, the analysis
of Chapter II would have been almost impossible. I am also much
Kimura, K, and Others. The Bconoroic Effect of the National
Pension System. (Interim paper internally printed in
Ministry of Welfare, July, 1958.)
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indebted to Mr. Fuchiwaki of the Ministry of Welfare for his help.
I have been assisted by many who have kindly read the drafts
of my thesis and have helped me to express myself in the English
language. I am also grateful to members of Staffs and Post¬
graduate Seminars of the Department, who have encouraged me in
ray research. Some of the discussions with them were very valuable.
Finally, through my father I was able very quickly to receive the
statistics for which I asked, or replies to my letters of enquiry
to Government Departments.
Though I owe so much to these many people, I am, of course,
entirely responsible for any errors which may still remain in
the treatment or the analyses.
CHAPTER I. PLACE OF FINANCE OP SOCIAL SERVICES IN THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY OP JAPAN
Section 1 introduction
The object of this chapter is to analyse the place of the
finance of the social services in the national economy with a
special reference to the pension insurance schemes.
Section 2 is concerned with preparatory discussions.
Removal of misunderstandings, functions which the social insurance
may have on the economy, and the economic problems and the main
government policy objectives of Japan, are stated. Our main
analytical concern is clarified in this Section.
Section 3 is concerned with clarifying the place of the
finance of social service in the national economy. Three
categories of social services, their development records, and
their financial signxficances are mentioned, with the aid of
statistics.
Section 4 is concerned with clarifying the place of the
finance of social insurance in the social services, and the
place of the finance of pension insurance in social insurance,
with the aid of statistics.
Section 2 Preparatory Discussions
The object of this section is to clarify some of the
important points of the social insurance finance and also to
introduce the main policy objective of the government to be
kept in mind in the following analysis.
6
First of all, we have to clear up a misunderstanding that
social insurance is always the sole, or the most important, or
the most efficient method of securing the minimum standard of
life for all citizens.1 This kind of misapprehension is apt
to bring about a biased opinion, which is often too impetuous
on the expansion of social insurance, to the neglecting of all
other social services and also other economic factors of the
nation's development programme. We cannot deny that at the
present stage of the economy, we cannot get rid of the problems
of poverty completely. A certain degree of inequality of in¬
come distribution is unavoidable. We cannot expect everyone
in society to be able to prepare for their old age, unemploy¬
ment, sickness and other unforeseeable eventualities. More¬
over many of these misfortunes may closely relate to the
deficits of the economic mechanism of the society as a whole.
At this stage of the economy, social insurance and other kinds
of state social ervices cannot lose their social and political
significance in their primary objective as means to protect
individuals in times of poverty and/or of need. However, it
is usually thought to be more desirable to achieve a high rate of
economic growth, preferable without causing a serious imbalance
in the economic structure, and with a maintenance of stability,
1. This is pointed out by Peacock, A.T., in The Economics of
National Insurance, William Hodge and Co., Ltd., 1952,pp.33-34.
more equalizing income distribution, or maintenance of full
employment; so that each component of society can prepare
for itself for old age or unforeseeable eventualities. But
there arises the question: will social insurance lose its
2
raison d'etre at that time? it may have another reason
for its existence which is more positive than the primary
objective. it may bring stability in the matured economy,
it may increase effective demand in a depressed economy.
We have to analyse the function of the scheme. This urges
us to suspect that even in the process of a rapid economic
development, or even in the foreground of largely extended
poverty and misery, social insurance may have another reason
for its existence which is far more significant than that of
its primary objective. i'hough it may not be generally under¬
stood, nor be approved, social insurance may help the develop¬
ment of the economy.
kven if we come back to the Japanese economy, its standard
of life has still been lower than that of developed countries.
There has existed a considerable amount of unemployment, mostly
in the form of a disguised unemployment. Therefore, the
government has had to endeavour to achieve a high rate of
economic growth and, at the same time, to increase employment
opportunities. The rate of economic growth has been very high,
2. The question is raised by Peacock, A.T., in the Preface to
the Japanese translation of his book, ibid., in 1959.
and is expected, more or less, to continue in the future.
(See Chapter V Section 2). In this situation, a high rate
of economic growth has become a main object of the government
3
poli cies.
However, the dual structure of the economy, which is one
of the main economic and social problems in Japan, may not be
solved by a mere high rate of growth. This duality of the
economy owes much to the historical necessity levied on the
Japanese economy. That is, as she started to develop much
later than other developed western countries, she needed to
grow far more rapidly than other countries in order to follow
up and arrive at the level of their economies. For that
purpose, the government had to take steps to protect and
foster large scale key industries, and thus -there were founded
a group of modern, competitive large scale industries, with
high productivity. Because of this, a large number of medium
and small sized industries and the inefficient agricultural
sectors - these absorb a majority of excess labour - were left
behind. Moreover, partly because of the productivity and
partly because of the specific feature of the trade union
organizations, - namely, each union is organized within each
company - wage pressure has been much stronger in big
industries. necause of tnis, the dual structure of
3. The present government under Prime Minister lkeda, H.,
is considered to base its fundamental long term economic
policy on the "Doubling National income in Ten Years1
Plan" presented by the Bconomic Advisory Committee,
.economic Planning Agency, Dec., I960.
industries also comes to mean the dual structure of wage levels
and the gap has sometimes shown a risky tendency to spread wider.
This is socially an undesirable feature. In this situation the
government is always urged to consider a way of solving and ad¬
justing this problem, while achieving a high rate of growth.
Therefore, we have also to be aware in our whole analysis of
the concern of government policy with the functions of social
insurance. We repeat: the policy of the government is
primarily that of achieving a high rate of growth, possibly
with, at the same time, a mutual adjustment of the economy's
dual structure.
We have also to be very careful of such criticisms that
confuse public with private insurance schemes and claim
profitability for the government social insurance schemes. We
have first to admit that these structures of social insurance
are not primarily regulated by the rule of private insurance schemes
The main stress is that it is one of government policy, funda¬
mentally rooted in and subsidized by the taxation revenue of
the Exchequer, guaranteed by the tax collecting authority of
the government and assisted by the power of the government to
enforce the scheme. The political, social or economic
pressure may sometimes lay down a certain direction of govern¬
ment policy related to the pension scheme, and consequently,
the interest revenue of the social insurance scheme may be
lower than that obtainable by the market rate. Pension
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reserves may be used in unprofitable ways. A part of it may be
used as a loan to local governments. But the crucial point does
not lie in its profitability, nor in the financial soundness of
the scheme. If we admit the nature of the contribution revenue
of social insurance as a kind of taxation, we come to see its
function as a vast income redistribution mechanism. Neverthe¬
less, if we proceed to analyse the present Japanese social in¬
surance mechanism, we shall come to realize that its function
does not necessarily lie in income redistribution in the normal
sense. That is, the redistribution is not necessarily from people
at work (or wealthy) to old people, or people out of work, or in
need; but the redistribution is rather from private households to
industry, government enterprises, etc.
Now we can clarify our main concern here. The main thing for
us is whether the introduction of the pension scheme will inter¬
vene in the rate of growth of the national economy or whether it
may increase the tempo of it. It may increase consumption by its
transfer mechanisms; it may increase savings through the funding
mechanism; and it may increase investment by utilizing the
thus furnished fund for the industrial development plan. The
introduction and enlargement of the social insurance scheme can¬
not fail to affect the growth paths of the national economy
through its impact on the planning aggregate of national income
analysis, i.e., consumption, savings and investment. This is
the point which fundamentally matters to us. Moreover these
effects on the economy will be greater as social insurance grows
at a more rapid rate than that of the growth rate of the national
economy.
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Section 3 Finance of Social Seivices
As we have already pointed out, social insurance is not the
only method of securing minimum standards of life for all
citizens. in a large complex body of government policies to
sustain and guarantee the minimum standard of life, we see three
categories of services different in nature.
Firstly, there exists a group of assistance services.
These are services rendered for those who are in need, without
requiring any counter-payment. The whole expenses are met from
the general revenue of the government, which is chiefly com¬
posed of the general taxation revenue. For example, such people
as are not covered by the present national insurance schemes, (or
being sick or unemployed and are not met by the insurance schemes)
are taken care of by the government in this category of services.
The key act is the Daily life Security Act, promulgated in 1946.
This Act aims at guaranteeing the minimum standard of living for
all the population. it furnishes seven kinds of assistance
services, i.e., livelihood assistance, education assistance,
housing assistance, medical assistance, maternity assistance,
occupational assistance and funeral assistance. The non-
contributory National Pension Scheme and several social welfare
legislations, such as the Child Welfare Act, Physically Handi¬
capped Persons' s Welfare Act, the Social '.elfare Service Act,
etc., also guarantee these services belonging to the category of
assistance services. By these separate and independent acts,
the protection of the livelihood of those who are in need, the
1. See Peacock, A.I.., ibid., p. 34.
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welfare of children, the security of families without fathers,
the welfare of physically handicapped persons and the protection
of the deprived, are guaranteed.
Secondly, there are a group of general community services.
These are those which are freely available to all citizens,
the services of which are regarded as the government
responsibility toward the community, and the cost of which is
borne mainly by public funds. Unemployment counteracts, hous¬
ing, environment hygiene, etc., are included in this category.
Education also should be included in this category, but because
of its comparative importance in its weight on the national bud¬
get and also its importance and uniqueness as a service, the
government has treated it as a separate item from other social
services. 1 will separate that item in the first place, and
will also show the consolidated figure in the second place.
Thirdly, there come a group of services which belong to the
category of social insurance services. These also are state
services, and thus necessity is laid down by political and
social demand in the community. The government uses a form
which resembles private insurance, i.e., a contribution and pay¬
ments system. But the point we have to be made aware of is
that the principles which rule this government scheme are com-
2
pletely different from those of private insurance. Nemely, the
2. For detailed analysis, Bee Peacock, A.X., ibid, pp. 41-50.
scheme is usually compulsory, the government has power to collect
contributions via the taxation authority, the finance is sub¬
sidized by the government funds in the form of the kxclequer
Supplement and is finally guaranteed by the government Exchequer,
whose ultimate guarantee lies in its taxation power. The
individual contribution has not a specific relation with the
individual benefit, i.e., there exists no risk adjustment in the
evaluation of the amount of the contribution. These three
categories of social services have developed separately and
independently in the history of the development of social
services and of the national economy of Japan.
The history of public assistance can be traced back to the
beginning of the Meiji Hra, even to 1874 when the first, but
restrictive public assistance regulation was promulgated. It
is, however, after the promulgation of the Daily life Security
Act in 1946 that the modern public assistance system was
established. The second category of social services can be
traced back to the end of the 19th century, but it is after the
Second World War that it was considerably enlarged.
The introduction of national insurance for employees is
embodied in the Health insurance Act of 1922, and for all
people in the Health Insurance Act of 1938. It was in 1941
that the Labourers' Pension Insurance Act was promulgated as a
first pension insurance scheme for general labourers: it
later developed into the Welfare Pension Insurance Act of 1944.
Since these different categories of social services have
developed separately and independently by many independent acts,
the social service structure became very complicated, and very
difficult to analyse. But these individual developments of
social services were a great forward push towards the establish¬
ment of the "Welfare State".
One point I have to mention here is the speciality of the
Governmental Pension Schemes in Japan. When Japan began a
modernization movement in the latter half of the 19th century,
one of the most urgent tasks which the state had to achieve was
the establishment of a very strong and highly centralized govern¬
ment organization, i.e., the construction of an efficient and
powerful civil service organization. For that purpose, the state
chose by state examinations a well qualified group of officials
and gave them specially favourable terms, e.gv in privileges,
power, and guarantee of status. One of tnese favourable treat¬
ments of the state for the qualified civil service has been this
very Governmental Pension Scheme, though the coverage has greatly
increased after the second World War. (However, a recent altera¬
tion of the Act has shifted these officials covered by the
Governmental Pensions to the Public Officials mutual Aid
Association, without affecting the rights of these qualified
to benefit.) in the Governmental Pensions, there exists a
kind of contribution, yet its amount is very low and the schemes
are chiefly financed by general taxation. it is sometimes dis¬
cussed as a part of deferred payments, but is not so clear in
its nature. Moreover, the majority of the expenditures are
annuity payments to ex-soldiers and their families. in
practice, this item is sometimes treated as a part of the social
services, and also its figure is used for comparative purposes
with other social services. In our analysis, because of its
speciality, we propose to treat it separately from social
services in the first place. But since it is more convenient
to see the separate magnitude of the government pension schemes,
and the total magnitude of the social services plus the govern¬
mental pension schemes, I will show the total figure later.
The trend of social services expenditures in the general
account of the national budget is shown in Table 1. The figures
show that it was after the second World War that the finance of
social services came to have a very significant place in the
national economy. A sbarp fall of the governmental pension
immediately after the War is due to a temporary stoppage of pay¬
ments to ex-soldiers. Before the end of the War, a large amount
of government expenditures had been spent on armaments, and very
little on social services, except on the governmental pensions
and on education. xhe xable shows that the social service
expenditures have increased not only in absolute amount but also
very rapidly in proportion to the total government expenditure,
xhe proportion of social service expenditure to the total
expenditure is over 14%, and becomes over 34/» i.e., over
one-third of total expenditure;if governmental pensions and
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9,647 86,1+05 104,717 122,687
1.0 3.5 7.9 7.8
116,812 224,302 301,062 343,648
12.5 22.1 20.9 21.9
36,215 127,244 134,173 203,187
3.9 12.6 12.2 12.9
153,027 351,546 485,235 546,835
16.4 34.7 33.1 34.8
932,535:1,013,314 1,512,095 1,569,675
100 .0 100.0 100.0 100.0
TABLE 1
1. Calender Year for 1884; Fiscal Year for 1900-196o. 2. Statistics in the second row show percentages to the total.
Source: Provisional Compilation of Government Expenditure and Tax Statistics, Research Section, Minister's
Secretariat, Ministry of Finance, September 1959, and Expenditures of General Account Classified by
Purposes; Budget Bureau, Ministry of Finance, and Statistics for 1884-1925 from the Budget Settlement
Papers, Ministry of Finance.
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education services are included. This is why in recent years
the problems of social services have come to be given increas¬
ing attention.
Changes in the composition of government expenditure are
shown in Table 2. Transitional expenditure of Termination of
the War amounting to 30%in 1947 represents occupation expenses.
A large increase in Industry Economy after the War mainly re¬
flects a large amount of expenditure for the adjustment of
prices in order to maintain low prices for important funda¬
mental goods against the overwhelming influence of inflation.
Apart from these transitional factors, a very low rate of
Defence Expenditure is noticeable. Moreover the rate is de¬
creasing in the short run. International comparison with some
western countries is shown in Table 3. The proportion of
i
defence expenditure to national income for the fiscal year 1959
is only 1.5% » compared with 8.2%for the United Kingdom, 12.7%
for the United States, 7.9% for France, 5.2%for West Germany
3
and 4.3% for Italy. The proportion of defence expenditure to
the total General Account expenditure of the national budget for
Japan is only about 10% and is even less than those of the under¬
developed countries in Asia, such as India, Burma, Pakistan,
4
Indonesia, etc., whose rates show 20 - 30%or more.
3. Public Finance of Japan for Fiscal Year 1961, (hereafter
referred to as Public Finance White Paper according to the
usual usage), Research Section, Ministry of Finance,
Toyoshimpo Co. Ltd., July, 1961, p. 295.
4. Public Finance White raper for 1959, ibid., p. 240.
General Account Expenditures Classified by Purposes,
1935 and 1947-1960
Unit 1,000 yen 1 m. yen
p
I terns " Year 1935 " 1947 1950 "1952 | 1955 1959 h-1 U- 8"
1. Social Services 32.Op 10.3 46.6
j <
1 107.2 137.9 196.3 221.0
1.42 4.3 7.0 11.5 ! 13.6 13.0 14.1
2. Governmental Pensions 173.5 0.4 5.7 9.6 | - 86.4 116.5 132.7
7.8 0.2 0.9 l.o ; 8.5 7.7 7.3
3 * Education Services 149.9 7.1 22.0 36.2 j 127.2 184.2 : 203.2
6.8 3.3 3.3 3.9 12. 6 12. 2 12.9
4. National Debt 339.5 7.6 83.3 31.3 44.2 54.9 27.4
17.6 3.5 12.5 3.4 4.4 3.6 1.8
5. External Debt 21.0 7.2 32.5 24.3
2.3 S 0.7 2.1 1.6
6. National 'territory Security Development 131.7 14.7 93.7 114.6 ; 147.0 260 .5 287.4
5.9 6.9 14.1 12.3 | 14.5 17.2 18.3
7. Industry Economy 81. b 58.5 121.4 169.5 ! 60.3 66.1 79.6
3.7 27.3 18.3 18.2 j 6.0 4.4 ' 5.1
8. Defence and Allied Expenditures 1,024.0 - 173.5 ! 135.3 156.7 157.9
46.2 — — 19.1 t 13. 5 10.4 10.1
9. Termination of the ,'lar 64.3 109.3 o.i ! 0.0 ~*
_ 30.0 16.4 0.0 ! 0.0•




— 0.0 11.7 16.3 j 15.6 j 15.8 ■ 17.2 18.3
11. General Administration 160 .4 11.7 71.6 j 106.5 S 92.7 130.7 141.9
-L__ 7.2 5.5 10.8 | 11.4 1 9.2 8.6 9.0
12. Reserves 3b.0 2.0 0.5 | 3.0 8.0 | 16.0 ' 8.0
1.5 0.9 0.1 0.3 ; 0.8 ; 1.1 0.5~
13. Others 38.3 12.5 2.0 9.7 !
« \
7.3 ; 37.4 3.4
1.7- 5.8 0.3 4- 1.0 , 0.7 j 2.5 0.5
14. Total 2,215,4 214.3 ; 664.6 932.5
' l
1,013.3 1,512.0 1,569.7
100.0 100.0 100.0 j 100.0 i 100.0
. . . .. A
100.0 100.0
1. For each item in the table the first row of statistics represents expenditure in absolute terms. 2. For each
item in the table the second row of statistics represents expenditure in absolute terras as a percentage of total
expenditure. SOURCE: As for Table 1. TABLE 2
Social Services and Defence Expenditures in the Budgets of Nations














United Kingdom"1" 1956 5,256.0 1,404.9 1,084.1 26.7 20.6 Health, Housing |
(£m.) 1957 5,704.0 1,525.1 1,213.3 26.7 21.3
National Insurance
etc.
United States1 1956 66,540 41,825 7,532 62.9 11.3 Expenditures for
of America
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Italy"1" 1956 2,877.4 459.6 398.2 15.9 13.8 expenditures for















1. United Nations Statistical Year Book, 1959.
2. As for Table 1.
3. Item in column (c) corresponding to -Japan represents social service expenditure in absolute terms
excluding governmental pensions and education.
4. Item in parenthesis represents expenditures in absolute terms including governmental pensions and education.
Secondly, expenditure on the National Debt is very small,
and is decreasing its ratio to the total expenditure. This con¬
trasts with the heavy burden before and during the War, which
amounted to an 16.8 % average from the fiscal year 1931 to the
5
fiscal year 1945. The decrease of the national debt expenses
is due chiefly to the rapid decrease in the money value caused
by a severe inflation afxer th« War which .lightened the pressure
of debt on the public finance. it is also due to the post-War
Government policy that strictly restricted its management of its
general expenditure by issuing a national debt. The ratio is
extremely low if compared with heavy ratios in the United
Kingdom and the United States of America, and much lower than
£
that for Italy and France.
The local Finance expenditure represents the state sub¬
sidy towards the general revenues of local governments. its
increase reflects an increasing demand for the expenditures of
local governments, and the increasing ratio of the state sub¬
sidy to the local governments. The problems of local finance
lies in the discrepancies in the financial power of different
local bodies, which reflect the regional imbalance in industrial
growth. The problem relates to the dual structure of the
economy, i .e#/disciepancies of productivity, of industrial sec¬
tors and of agricultural sectors, and also, among different
scales of industries. The roblem relates to the wider pro-
olems of fiscal policies to achieve a balanced growth of the
economy.
5, Public Finance vVhite rarer for 1961, ibid., p. 31&
6. xublic Finance ite Taper for 1pp9, ibid., p. 266.
The National Territory Security and Development chiefly
represents expenditure for public works, such as flood con¬
trol, road improvement, improvement of harbours, fishing
ports, and airports, etc. after the War until around the
fiscal year 1956, the majority of expense of public works was
devoted to the prevention of and rehabilitation after natural
disasters, but since then the improvement of roads, of har¬
bours and fishing ports, etc., are coming to have a more im¬
portant position. These public works are used to improve
the fundamental base of industries, and are also useful as a
method of compensatory fiscal policies. They also directly
furnish opportunities of work for unemployed or under¬
employed. in Japan, the roads and other industrial facilities
are not well developed, and their expansion will be needed in
the future. The industry iseonomy represents those expendi¬
tures on modernisation of agriculture, maintenance of sta¬
bility of priee of foodstuffs, modernisation of small and middle
sized industries, on promotion of economic co-operation and
exports, etc. These are mainly concerned with adjusting
economic structure, and the problems it holds. The point i
have clearly to mention here is that these expenditures,
especially that of public works are on a tremendously rising
trend and are expected to increase in.the future. The
interesting point is that these are the only expenditures which
showed as nearly as great a rate as the growth rate of expendi¬
tures for social services. Docial Services, as we have se a,
have more than one-third of the total exnendture, if we include
governmental pensions and education services. This means that
social service expenditures and the expenses of public works and
some other complementary expenses for industry and economy, take
up nearly 60 % of all public expense. The fact that both of
them are increasing rapidly suggests to us that it will become
the main issue of government expenditure policy whether to in¬
crease social services more, or whether to increase public works
more, and in what rate should the former be increased in com¬
parison with the latter.
We have so far analysed the weight of the social service
expenditure in the national budget. But if we look at the
actual mechanisms of the social service activities, especially
the social insurance services, we find that this is not the
full function of these services, nor the main function* be¬
cause there exists a large amount of contribution revenue which
comes directly from employers and employees and also the interest
revenue of the reserves though the nature of this we are not
going to discuss at the moment. These revenues, of course, do
not appear in the Exchequer General Account revenue. Pome of
these revenues go back to the benefit receivers in the form of
benefit payments. in other words, there exists a large amount
of social service expenditure which is financed by these con¬
tribution revenues and/or interest revenues which, though may
be very important, we cannot find in the analysis of the weight
of social service expenditure in the national budget. moreover,
social insurance is usually compulsory* the government has
ultimately a right to collect contributions through the
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taxation authority, its finance being guaranteed by the govern¬
ment. The Exchequer Supplement has an important part in its
finance, and also no risk adjustment exists. in view of these
we know that its contribution is a form of taxation. in view
of its vital importance we will consolidate these two accounts.
The consolidated account of the expenditure of the public
sector and social insurance is seen in Table 4 (1), while the
revenue side is seen in Table 4 (2). Thus the table shows that
the actual position of the finance of social services in the
national economy is far greater than the mere exchequer General
Account indicates. The table shows that if we try to see the
actual position of the social service expenditures in the whole
public expenditure, taking into consideration the important
function of contribution and payment processes, we find that
over one-fourth in the narrow sense (i .e #/excluding govern¬
mental pensions and education) and over one-third in the wide
sense (i.evincluding tnese two) of all public expenditure is
occupied by social services. This magnitude and this
importance is rarely understood in full, because of the veil¬
ing effect of insurance resemblance mechanisms. But these
figures, obtained after adjusting statistical figures for pur¬
poses of analysis, give us a clearcut idea of the importance of
the social services. in addition, this is the expenditure side
which does not include reserve mechanisms, the weight of which is
considerable. This means that the weight of actual social ser¬
vice activities is still bigger than we have seen here. More¬
over if we think of the inci easing trend of the growth of social
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1. Government Expenditure 1,137.5
2. Social Insurance Expenditure financed by
Contributions. 208.1
3. Total Expenditures (1 + 2) 1,345.6
4. Government Expenditures for Social Services 148.3
5. Total Social Service Expenditure (2+4) 356.4
6. 5 as percentage of 3 26.5




8. Total Social Service Expenditure including
Governmental Pensions (2+7) 454.3
9. 8 as percentage of 3 55.8
10. Government Expenditures for Social Services





11. Total social Service Expenditures including
Governmental Pensions and Education Services
/ |
610.5





Source: Compiled from Expenditures of General Account Classified by
Purposes, Budget Bureau, Ministry of Finance and Table 10.





I terns ~—— 1950 1955 1957 1958
1. Government Revenue 716.8 1,126.4 1,137.5 1,333.1
2. Social Insurance Contributions (etc.)"1" 96.5 289.7 334.9 388.3
3. Total Revenue of Public Sector (1 + 2) 813.3 1,416.1 1,472.4 1,721.4
4. Government Revenue for Social Services2^ 46.6 137.9 148.3 163.0
5.
i
Total Revenue for Social Services (2+4) 143.1 427.6 483.2 551.3
k 5 as percentage of 3 17.6 30.2 32.8 32.0
I7. Government Revenue for Social Servicesincluding Governmental Pensions2 52.2 224.3 246.2 267.7
8. Total Revenue for Social Services




9. 8 as percentage of 3 18.3 36.3 39.5 38.1
10. Government Revenue for Social Services
including Governmental Pensions and
Education Services2 74.2 351.5 402.4 434.7
11. Total Revenue for Social Services
including Governmental Pensions and
Education Services (2 + 10) 170.7 641.2 737.3 823.0
12. 11 as percentage of 3 21.0 45.3 50.1 47.8
1. Obtained by deducting Gover1aikl&$ J^ivinue for Social Insurance from total
Social Insurance burdens.
2. Obtained from the expenditure figures of the General Account.
services, particularly the enlargement of social insurance
according to the inauguration and the development of the
National Pension Scheme, then we expect that this importance
which seems to me already a vital magnitude in the national
economy, will increase and grow further in the future. It is
this vital importance and magnitude of its financial position
that will unavoidably affect the money flow of the economy
and, consequently, will have a considerable effect on the
growth trend of the national economy.
We have seen the proportion of the social service ex¬
penditure to the national oudget. But in order to see the
rate of growth of social service expenditure in the growth of
the national economy, the comparison wi"$h the growth rate of
national income will be of use to us. The comparison of the
rate of growth of social service expenditures with national
income is shown in Table 5. The rate of growth of the
national income of Japan after the second World War was very
high. Total national income was more than doubled in real
terms in the past decade and the government is planning to
repeat it in the coming decade. (Por a detailed analysis
of the post-war economic growth, see Chapter V). However,
the xable shows that during the period oetween 1950 to 1959
the social service expenditure has increased at a much
faster rate on the average than that of national income, in
spite of the latter's tremendous rise. The social service
expenditure, excluding governmental pensions and education,













Percentage (1950 = 100)
Social Services
Percentage (1950 * 100)
3 as percentage of 1
Social Services including Governmental Pensions
Percentage (1950 = 100)
6 as percentage of 1
Social Services including Governmental Pensions
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Source: National Income is from the Public Finance White Paper, 1961.
Other expenditure items from 1950-1955 aufl 1959 are obtainedOfrbm Table 2. _
ifios& for 1957 are compiled from the Expenditures of General Account Classified
by Purposes, Budget Bureau, Ministry of Finance.
has increased over 40% more than that of the rate of growth
of national income.
Last of all, the weight of transfers in personal income is
shown in Table 6. The Table shows that transfer income to
personal income corresponds to around 5 to 6^, and the ratio
is rapidly increasing. The rate of growth of transfer income
is showing a very rapid rate of 9 to over 13^. Thus the grow¬
ing significance of the transfer sector in the income structure
of the economy is observable.
Through all the analyses we see the significant position of
social services in the national economy, and the undeniable ten¬
dency towards an increase in its position, not only in its absolute
amount, but also in its relative significance. We see clearly a
growing significance of social services in a growing trend of
national economy.
Section 4 Social Insurance and Pension Insurance
This section deals with the place of the finance of social
insurance in the whole social service structure, and the place of
the finance of pension insurance in the social insurance structure.
First of all the trend of the composition of social ser¬
vices is shown in Table 7. The Table shows firstly, that each
item of assistance services, general community services, and
social insurance services is increasing in absolute amount;
secondly, the weight of community services is very great,
although decreasing in the percentages; and thirdly, the weight
of social insurance services has increased rapidly both in
Transfer Income and Personal Income, 1957-1959
-




1958 j 1959 1957 1958 1959 1957 J 1958 1959 J
1. Labour Income (origination)
; . . .1
U, 150
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3. Labour fncome (receipts) (=1 - 2) 3,939 U,153 U,Uo6 51.8 K-2,JJ • -i- 53.5 112.0 1C5.U 106.1
k. Personal business owners' income (origination)
i
2»83U 2,795 2,87U 37.3 35.7 3U.7
1
10U. 9 93.6 102.3
5.
I






Personal business owners' income (receipts)(=U -5)













261 279 313 3.U 3.6 3.8 119.5 107.1 112.2















11. Less: interest on debts of government and
consumers
... • • j
25 26 28 0.3 0.3 0.3 11U.0
12. Transfer income 382 U18 U75 5.0 5.3 J'7 109.0 109.3 113.6
13. Total (Personal Income) 7,59U 7,828 8,273 100 .0
. —. .
100.0 100.0 108.6 103.1 105.7 |
'1
106.1Ik. Personal tax and burdens other than tax kl9 Ull U36 5.5 5.3 5.3
t i
I 93.1 ; 98.2
! 15
I ^ Personal consumption expenditure 5,877 6,170 6,510 77. k 78.8 78.7 108.1 10 5.0 105.5
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7,176 7,U17 7.337 1U.5 9U.7 r\ ) , -7 109.7 1C3.U 105.7 '
i
Table £
1. " %, of Previous Year" shows a comparison with the Previous Year, and not */c increase of the Previous Year.
Source: Economic Outlooi for the Fiscal Year, 1959 - Unpublished Reference Material, The Economic Planning Agency.







































6. Education^ 108,088 118,194 179,112
7. General Community Service







8. Governmental Pension^ 57,094 79,714 115,450
166,823
(35.0)
















1* Throughout the table the figures in the parenthesis are
percentages of the total.
2. Social service excluding governmental pensions and education
service.
3. Social service including governmental pensions and education
service.
Source: Compiled from the expenditures of General Account
Classified by Purposes, Budget Bureau, Ministry of Finance*
and A Handbook for Budget Administration, 1959#
absolute amount and in its proportions to the whole social
service expenditures. In only 5 years from 195k to 1959,
the social insurance expenditure was slightly more than
doubled and increased by more than 9%>ln its percentages to
the whole social service expenditures. (See item 3 in Table
7). The weight of social insurance services in the whole
social service expenditures is considerably large, though not
so large as the general community services. Yet the social
insurance services are most remarkably increasing, both in
absolute amount and in comparative percentages. In view of
the present Japanese status, this trend is likely to continue
from now on.
Now let us consolidate these statistics with those of
contribution and benefit payment of social insurance, because,
so long as we acknowledge that the contribution revenue of
social insurance is a kind of tax, there is no reason why we
should separate these figures from the others and discuss only
expenditure items on the national budget. By so doing, we can
see the place of social insurance much clearer than we are now
able to do. This is shown in Table 8. If we consolidate the
contribution and payment account into the whole government
expenditure structure, we find that the total expenditure
for social services in the narrow sense, i.e., excluding
governmental pensions and education, is over tripled, and in
the wide sense, i.e., including these two, is nearly doubled.
This simply reflects the fact that the con-




1. Assistance Service 59,028*
(10.7)




5. Social Insurance financed by the Exchequer
(Excluding Governmental Pension)
37,721
4, Social Insurance financed by Contribution and
Interest Revenue 388,265
5. Social Insuranoe Expenditure in total(3 + 4) 425,9862
(77.3)




7. Assistance Service (*1) 59,028,
(7.2)
8. Education 166,981,(28.3l3
9. General Community Service (Inoluding Education) 233,201
10. Governmental Pension 104,717
11. Social Insurance Expenditure in total
(Including Governmental Pension) (5 + 10)
530,703,
(64.5) 5
12. Social Service (Including Governmental Pension




1. For each item in the table the first row of statistics represents
expenditure in absolute terms.
2. For items 1, 2, and 5, in the table, the second row of statistics
in parenthesis represents expenditure in absolute terms as a
percentage of total social service expenditure excluding
Governmental Pension and Education, i.e. Item 6.
3. For items 7, 8, and 11, in the table, the second row of statistics
in parenthesis represents expenditure in absolute terms as a
percentage of item 12 of total social service expenditure
including Governmental Pensions and Education, i.e. Item 12.
Source: Compiled from the Social Security Statistical Year Book, 1958, and
the Expenditures of General Account Classified by Purposes,
ibid.
tribution and payment amount has a decisive weight in the place
of social service expenditures. in this consolidated account,
expenditures for assistance services correspond to about 10% ,
that of general community services 12% , and more than 77% >
i.e., more than three quarters of the social service expendi¬
tures, are occupied by social insurance expenditures. This is
the magnitude of the finance of social insurance in the social
services, that affects the growth of the economy.
Last of all we will analyse the place of the finance of
the pension insurance in the whole social insurance structure.
Social insurance services are classified into four
different categories. First is the medical insurance:
which guarantees against illness, injuries and death. The
second category is the unemployment insurance; third, the
accidents compensation insurance against industrial injury.
The fourth category is the pension insurance against old age,
survivors and disabled; the first of which is the most important
in the pension insurance.
We have to mention here the special difficulty which con¬
fronts us in our analysis. This is the complexity of the
schemes, of their regulations and of their accounts. It is this
complexity that prevented the development of the study of the
social insurance in the field of economics and that also makes
our analysis difficult.
Fourteen Public Pension insur nee schemes exist now, which
are controlled by eight government departments, independently.
The main schemes are the National Pension Schemes for people
at large, who are not covered by existing public pension schemes,
which have Just started collecting contributions in April, 1961,
and the Welfare Pension insurance Scheme for general employees
working in firms where five employees or more are constantly
employed. (The number of people insured by the present Ael-
Insurance
fare Pension/Scheme is 10.4 million, which means 72 Ye out of
14.5 million insured by one of the other of the public pension
schemes in 1959; which also corresponds to 11# of the 92.5
million population.1 The number of people who are supposed to
be covered by the new National Pension Scheme is about 26
millions.^' Therefore, most of the finance of the public
pension scheme is focussed on these schemes. The
National Pension Scneme is regulated by the National Pension
Act of 19591 "the 'welfare Pension insurance Scheme by the Welfare
Pension Insurance Act of 1941. The financial management of the
Welfare Pension Scheme is carried out by the Welfare insurance
Special Account with two other health insurances' accounts. We
have to get the figures to classify them according to their
function. Yet, because of the practical difficulty of obtain¬
ing suitable statistics, the work also is very restricted. The
Seamen's Insurance Act is an all-in-one regulation for seamen
which guarantees not only pension payments, but also medical
care, unemployment and accident compensation. In order to
1. Social Security Almanac. 1960. Table 16.
2. Welfare White Paper, 1959. p. 79.
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compare the weight of pension insurance in social insurance
structure, we have to derive an adequate figure from an obscure
paper of the account of the scheme. The same difficulty is
applicable to other four Mutual Aid Associations, i.e#/ National
Public Service mutual Aid Associations, Public Corporation
Employees (etc.) Mutual Aid Associations, Mutual Aid Association
for Staffs of City, Town and Village, and that for Teachers and
Employees in private schools. Because these schemes supply not
only pension payments for old age, disabled and survivors, but
also medical benefits and so forth, we have to distinguish the
one figure from the other.
The next category is the six governmental pension schemes.
These are the National Public Service Governmental Pension, Local
Public Service Governmental Pension, Governmental Pension Society
for Staffs of Town and Village and some other transitional small
schemes. as we have already seen that the governmental pensions
have speciality in nature and also have a significant magnitude,
we will treat them separately from other public pension schemes in
the first place.
If we take the expenditure account of the social insurance
schemes of the fiscal year 19?7» (Gee Table 9)» vve know that the
pension insurance, excluding governmental pensions, occupies about
10 °/o of the total social insurance expenditure. The weight of it
is much smaller compared with the Health Insurance expendtures,
which represent over 70 °/» of all expendi tures, yet is bigger than
the Unemployment insurance and Accidents Compensation Insurance,
which represents about 10 and 8% respectively. Moreover if we
36






















2. Pension Insurance 31,493 10.7 129,394 33.0
3. Health Insurance 209,147 70.9 209,147 53.3
4. Unemployment
Insurance
29,399 10.0 29,399 7.5
5. Accidents Compen¬
sation Insurance
24,736 8.4 24,736 6.3
TABLE 9
Source! Compiled from Table 10.
include Governmental Pensions in social insurance the weight of
the pension insurance rises to a little over 33f» i.e., just about
one third of all social insurance expenditures. The weight of the
Health Insurance decreases to 53*3$, still representing the
majority of expenses, and Unemployment and Accidents Compensation
insurance to 8 and 6$ respectively.
We have to bear in mind that this is only the expenditure figure
and does not represent the revenue figure. In other words it
does not show the excess of revenue over expenditure, i.e., the
reserves which occupy a considerably important part in the pension
insurance schemes. For example, the total revenue of the Welfare
Pension Insurance shows ¥ 57.5 thousand million compared with
thousand
¥ 9.^/millions of benefit payment, creating ¥ 48.2 thousand
million in excess of revenue. We can easily imagine that the
weight of the pension insurance is much bigger on the revenue
side than is seen on the expenditure side. Moreover the
pension insurance started much later than health insurance. For
example, the Welfare Pension Insurance started in 1941, compared
with the health insurance, which started in 1922. This implies
that so far as the pension insurance is concerned, the payments
are not yet fully operational.
The number of the insured by the pension insurance differs
greatly from that of the health insurance. In 1959, the pension
insurance was 14,454 thousand, representing 69.2$ of employees,
and only 15.6$ of the total population, but those covered by the
health Insurance was 75.9 million, composed of 15.5 million
employees, 23.0 million of their families and 37.3 million of general
citizens covered by the National Health Insurance, which represents
82.1$ of the total population. This is chiefly the result of the
government's efforts to enlarge the number of the insured of the
health insurance for recent years and it is planned to achieve
100$ coverage before 1970. Because of these movements, and the
enlargement of the number of the insured, the cost of the health
insurance is increasing and has shown the above mentioned figures.
However, the government has started a new National Pension
Scheme. This covers nearly all those who are not covered by the
other existing public schemes. The finance of the scheme is
expected to grow rapidly within a decade or two. Although the
health insurance occupies the most important place in the whole
social insurance expenditure at present, the pension insurance,
which already is considerably important at present, may become
one of the main financial problems in the social insurance
services as is the case in many other developed countries. The
position of pension insurance and other social schemes are seen
in Table 9» while the composition of social insurance expenditure
is shown in Table 10.
Composition of Social Insurance Expenditures Classified by Schemes
















• Welfare Tension Insurance 9,363 - - — 9,363
2. Seamen's Insurance 652 3,000 232 - 3,886
3. National Public Service, I.utual
Aid Association I 6,633 21,085 — _ 25,718
6. Public Corporation etc. Employ
Mutual Aid Association
ses
16,256 16,037 - - 32,291
5. Mutual Aid Associations for
Staffs of City, Town and
'Tillage 370 3,762 6,132
o. Mutual Aid Association for
Teachers and Employees in
Private School 236 69 6
7. Schemes which include pension
insurance ( excluding Governinei
pension) (1+2+3+6+5+6)
ital
31,688 66,5o0 232 76,300
8. Governmental pension (for Civilians}17,636 - - - 17,636
9. Governments, pension (for Soldiej
Survivors , etc.)
rs, 79,195 - - - 79,195
j 10. Governmental Pension (others) 1,272 - - - 1,272
11. Total Governmental Pension
(8+9+10) 97,901 97,901
12. Schemes relating to pension
insurance ( including Govern¬
mental Pension) (7+ll) 129,389 66,560 232 176,201
13. Health Insurance - 65,267 - - 65,267
16. Day Labourers' Health Insuranci=> _ 6,157 - - 6,157
15. National Health Insurance - 60,268 - - 60,268
16. Unemployment Insurance - - °7,952 - 27,952
17. Day Labourers' Unemployment
Insurance . 1,215 1,215





19. TOTAL (excluding Governmental
Pension) (7+13 or 18) 31,688 15^,2p2 29,369 26,736 239,875
I
1 20. GRAND TOTAL (including Govern¬
mental Pension) (11 + 19) 129,389 156,252 pc. zeea > , j j j 26,736 i J I j ( / ^
Source:
T.-ib' L.ie iu
Compiled from the Social security Statistical Tear Sock, 19p5. e Also Appendix.
'
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I
1, Techniques and Assumptions In Table 10.
The techniques and assumptions adopted to derive the figure in
Table 10 are as follows. So far as I know there exist no compre¬
hensive statistics which show clearly the financial position of the
pension insurance with other social insurance services, except very
simple figures in the budget or the very complicated financial
accounts of each individual scheme, of which there are no less than
ten. The trouble exists fundamentally with the complicacy of social
insurance schemes themselves, secondly with the complicacy in their
accounting systems and the failure of the government departments
concerned to offer adequate statistics suitable for the purpose of
economic analysis of the social insurance.
The main problem is that in many independent schemes, the finance
of these three or four types of social insurance services are mixedly
managed and we have to make some assumptions to divide them one from
the other. For that purpose the figure of the "Expenditure for Pension"
of the Seaman's Insurance Is taken from the expenses for the pension
payment and the expenses for the Welfare Facilities and Management
Cost, the latter of which was assumed to be divided proportional to
the expenditure for pension payment against the expenditure for other
social insurance benefit payments.56 The expenditure for the health
Calculation Example.
A = Pension expenditure = ¥ 602m,
B = Expenditure for sickness benefit and unemployment benefit =
C = Total benefit payment = A + B = Y 3,587m. ¥ 2»?85m»
D = Expenses for the Welfare Facilities and Management Cost = ¥ 297m.
E = Expenditure assumed to be used for the interest of the pension
beneficiaries = A ^... 602 v /^ ...
A + Dx £• = 6C2 + 297 x = x
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insurance and the unemployment insurance were obtained by the same
method.
The pension figure for the National Public Mutual Aid Association
is taken from the figure for the pension payment obtained in the long
term payment (pension) account plus a part of the management account
expenditures. The latter was divided in proportion to the expendi¬
ture amount of the long teim payment (pension) account and the short
term payment (medical care) account. In obtaining the figures for
the Public Corporation Employees (etc.) Mutual Aid Associations, the
same assumption to assign the expenditure of the management account
in proportion to the expenditure amount of the pension payment is
adopted.
As to the figures of the governmental pensions, because of the
difficulty of getting figures for several transitional schemes and
of the smallness of these figures, we classified them into main
"governmental pensions" for qualified civil service and also that
for the ex-soldiers and survivors etc., and the rest we listed ;just
as "others".
By these assumptions and method we obtain Table 10, which shows
the position of each social insurance expenditure in much more
detail than the former table (i.e., Table 9) from which our simplified
Table 9 was acquired.
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Chapter II. WBhFABh PEN SiOh INSURANCE GHEkfi
ANi) NaTIONaL PEj. oi Oh SCHEhB
Section 1. introauction
The object of this chapter is to analyse the place of
the finance of the 'Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme ana the
National Pension Scheme, ana the mechanisms by which they
affect the growth paths of the national economy.
Section 2 is concerned with preparatory explanations. The
significance of the Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme and the
National Pension Scheme in the whole pension insurance schemes
is shown in the number ana nature of the insured, and in the
financial magnitudes both from the revenue siue and the
expenditure side.
Section 3 is concernea with clarifying the financial
mechanism of the Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme with special
reference to its relation with the Special Accounts system.
A brief outline of the Scheme, an outline of the Special
Accounts system, and the analysis of the Welfare Insurance
Special Account ana its Sub-Accounts are given and illustrated
by flow of funas diagrams. The importance of the surplus
formation at the present stage of the Scheme and the urgent
necessity of tracing the surplus fund transferred to the
Trust Fund Bureau Special Account is stated.
Section 4 deals with the analysis of the surplus fund
supplied by the Scheme. The surplus fund is deposited in
the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account ana is invested with
other funds according to tne Fiscal Investment aid Loan
Programme. Therefore, first, trie source aid the use of the
funds /
funas of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme, with
the past trend and its economic implications, are mentioned.
Special reference is made to the relation between tne Trust
Fuuid Bureau Special Account ana the Fiscal Investment and
Loan Prograaime. Then the source of the Trust Fund Bureau
Special Account funds is analysed. The trend towards
increasing importances of the Welfare Pension Insurance
Scheme reserves in the revenue of the same Special Account
is noted. An explanation of the utilization of a certain
proportion of the Welfare Pension insurance Scheme Surplus
for welfare facilities is given. Then an assumption is
adopted that the surplus fund is, excepting the specially
decided part above mentioned, allocated proportionally to
several industrial sectors (etc.) as the total allocation of
tne Trust Puna Bureau funas indicate. The financial
mechanism of the Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme in relation
with the Trust Puna Bureau Special Account ana the Fiscal
Investment and Loan Programme, ana also with several
industrial sectors, fete., is shown with the aia of flow of
funds aiagrams and tables used for explanatory purposes.
In addition, a consolidation of the financial mechanism
of the Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme into tne wider
relation between the Trust Puna Bureau Special Account and
the private ana the public sectors, which are the receivers
ana payers of tne loan and interest payments, is maae with
tne aid of a flow of funds diagram. The result is
classified in a social accounting representation.
Section S aeals witn the analysis of tne finance of the
National /
National Pension Scneme. A brief outline of the Scneme, its
financial administration, its revenue ana expenditure, and a
comparison of its financial magnitudes witn those of the
Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme are given. A future function
of the Scheme i3 explained with the aid of a flow of funds
diagram. Following the introduction of tne future revenues
adequacy of the assumptions adopted in the estimates. Last
of all, an abstract flow of funds diagram is presented
connecting the analysis of the present chapter to the demand
analysis of the next chapter.
An additional explanation of the Accounts and the
interest revenue of the Welfare Insurance Special Account is
given in Appendices to this Chapter.
Section 2. Preparatory Explanations.
In this chapter, we will restrict ourselves more
narrowly to the study of the Welfare Pension Insurance
Scheme and of the newly started National Pension Scheme.
Before going into an advanced discussion, we must again
show the place and the significance of the Welfare Pension
Insurance and the Naxional Pension Schemes in the pension
insurance structure. The most convenient way is to look
at the numbers of the insured covered by these public
pension /
Scheme, analysis is made of the
pension insurance schemes.
If we take the figure for October 1958, we see that
the total of insured, population by the public pension
insurances is slightly over 12 millions, and nearly
11 million or more than 85 per cent of these are covered
by the Welfare Pension Scheme. The next largest item is
the Public Corporation Cetc. ) Employees Mutual Aid
Association, which has only 754 thousand ana which
represents only 6 per cent of tne total. The others are
still smaller and are of negligible significance. If we
take governmental pensions into account, the total number
of the insured reaches 14 million which is about 76 per cent
of the total working population of 20 millions. Even in
this case the 'Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme represents
nearly 75 per cent of the total, far bigger than any other
single scheme and also the total of all otxier schemes. As
to tue National Pension Scheme, which has just started in
April 1961, approximately 26 million people were expected
to be covered by the new scheme. This figure is more than
double the number insured by the Welfare Pension Insurance
and also tne total number of all other schemes. Thus from
the point of view of the number of the insured, it is clear
tnat the Welfare Pension Insurance and especially the
National Pension Scheme occupies the most important
position in the whole pension insurance structure. The
figures of the number of the insured ana t: eir percentages
are /
are shown in Table 1.
Before looking at the financial significance of the
scheme, we must Iook ai the operational differences of the
Welfare Pension Insurance, the National Pension Scheme
and other schemes.
The Welfare Pension Insurance is the pension scheme
for general workers employed by firms (or working places)
regularly employing a total of five persons or rnore^ It
is restrictive in the sense thai, it does not cover all
employees universally, but restricts itself to those wno
are working in a certain size of firm. it is, nowever,
a general scheme in the sense that the insured are general
workers and not employees of any specific category.
The Seamen's Insurance is an all-in-one insurance scheme
specifically for seamen and employees in private shipping
enterprises. The National Public Service Mutual Aid
p
Association is for workers in the Central Government ana
the Public Corporation Employees( etc. )Mutual Aid Associatior
Social Security Almanac for I960, edited by Health
Insurance Association, Toyo Keiza Simpo Co., Peoruary, p. 67.
o
The application of the scheme was restricted to those who
were not qualified to receive governmental pensions.
However, oy the amendments of the Act in 195 9 > the long term
benefits part, (i.e. pensions, etc), came to be applied to
all government officials. The rights of the governmental
pension receivers are guaranteed.
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: Number of Insured in Pension Insurance








1. Welfare Pension Insurance 10,501 86.3 74.9
2. Seamen's Insurance 208 1.7 1.5
3. National Public berries Mutual
Aid Association 499 4.1 3.6
4. Public Corporation etc. Mutual
Aid Association 754 6.2 5.4
5. Mutual Aid Associations for
Staffs of City, Town and.
Village.
129 1.1 0.9
6. Mutual Aid Association for
Teachers and Employers in
Private School
76 0.6 0.5
7. Total Pension Insurance
(Excluding Governmental
Pensi ons) (l~ 6)
12,167 100.0 86.8
8. Governmental Pension Union for











10. Grand Total (7+8+9) 14,020 100.0
11. Number of Employees 19,830
12. Percentage (10/11) 71.6JT
1. Statistics are at the enJ^of^ct., 1958.
SouTMj Number of Insured from Public Finance White Paper
1959. p. 192.
is specifically for those employed in the three Public
Corporations, i.e., the National Railway, the Telegram and
Telephone, and the Monopoly Corporations, also partly (i.e.,
short term benefit part) for the enterprise sectors of the
government, e.g.^Printing Bureau, Mint Bureau, etc. Other
mutual aid associations and governmental pension schemes are
the same in this sense, that they are the schemes for only
a specified category of people.
As to the National Pension Scheme, it is expected to
cover all citizens who are not covered by the existing public
pension schemes, except those who are too old to be covered
by the contributory schemes. It is the most general scheme.
Prom this consideration of the nature of the insured
we conclude that the Welfare Pension Insurance ana the
National Pension - Scheme e are by far the most important,
not only by the mere number of the insured, but also by the
fact tnat these schemes are general in their nature, ana do
not confine themselves to a special category of occupations
as do the other schemes.
To see the significance of the scheme we must next look
at the magnitude of its finance. If we take the fiscal
year 1957, we find that the total revenue of the Welfare
Pension Insurance was over ¥57 thousand million of the
total of^90 thousand million&r all pension insurance
schemes, /
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schemes, (excluding Governmental Pensions), representing
more than 60 per cent of all.
If we look at the contribution revenue, the percentage
of the Welfare Pension Insurance rises to 80 per cent of the
total, comprising ¥43 thousand million out of ¥54 thousand
million. The second biggest item is that of the Public
Corporation (etc. ) Employees Mutual Aid Association, which
represents only 10 per cent. Other items are negligible.
This figure indicates that the scope ana coverage of the
Welfare Pension Insurance is much bigger than others.
If we take the interest revenue of the Welfare Pension
Insurance, it also represents nearly 70 per cent or ¥12
thousand million out of a total of ¥18 thousand million.
The second ana third item is that of Public Corporation(etc.)
Employees Mutual Aid Association and the National Public
Service Mutual Aid Association, which represent 16 ana 14
per cent respectively, i.e. much less than that of the
'Welfare Pension Insurance. Other items are negligibly
small. This shows the scale and iiaportance of the Welfare
Pension Insurance Reserves, the balance of which reached
¥328 thousand million in 1957.
But if we take the figure of the Exchequer Supplement,
we finu that the Welfare Pension Insurance aoes not have
so /
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so big a portion, representing only about 12 per cent of
all and less than that of the Public Corporation (etc.)
Employees Mutual Aid Association which occupies about half
of all, and also less than that of trie National Public
Service Mutual Aid Association, which represents slightly
over one quarter of all.
But we must mention here that a large part of the item
for the Exchequer Supplement of the National Public Service
Mutual Aia Association and the Public Corporation Employees
(etc. ) Mutual Aid Association in this table is composed of
the payment by the government as employers, partly because of
the difficulty of obtaining statistics of net Government
Supplement, excluding state's contribution as employers,
anu partly because we can understand inflow and outflow of
money from government to private sector.
We have also to draw attention to the fact that the
rate of the Excnequer Supplement is decided as a proportion
of the expenditure of the benefit payment and not of the
contribution revenue. The Welfare Pension Insurance
started'in 1941. The full insurance period for the old
age pension is, in general, twency years. Therefore
the present pension payment by the same scheme is much
lower than that expected in the future, when the benefit
payment will become fully operational. When we take these
factors /
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factors into consideration, we can see that the position of
the Welfare Pension Insurance is more important than the past
statistics alone would indicate.
On the expenditure side, we find that the total
expenditure by the Welfare Pension Insurance is slightly
over ¥9 thousand million, representing more than 40 per
cent of total expenditures of ¥22 thousand million, in
spite of the above mentioned fact that the scheme is not
in full operation.
If we take the figure for Reserves, we find that the
reserve accumulation by the Welfare Pension Insurance is
more than ¥48 thousand million, representing 70 per cent of
all reserves of ¥69 thousand million. The second item
is ¥12 thousand million by the Public Corporation Employee
(etc.) Mutual Aid Association, i.e. less than 18 per cent.
The third item is ¥6 thousand million by the National
Public Service Mutual Aid Association, - only about 8 per cent.
If we consider the importance of the reserves of the
pension insurance in the whole national economy, which we
will analyse later in detail, along with all other factors
we have examined so far, we must admit that the Welfare
Pension Insurance is by far the most important of all
existing public pension insurances,(at this examined year.}
As to the National Pension Scheme, which started in
April /
April, 1^61, it is estimated that the contribution revenue
will be ¥25 thousand million per annum. Interest
revenue ¥1 thousand million per annum, Exchequer Supplement
¥13 thousand million per annu., totalling ¥39 thousand
million, which represents total reserve for the initial
year, the fiscal year 1961. This figure implies that of
contribution revenue, total revenue, and also reserves,
it is by far the second biggest item, next to Welfare
Pension Insurance, and as to the Exchequer Supplement, it
is by far the biggest item in all. Moreover the figure
will grow rapidly; in the next decade annual revenue will
double, while holdings of reserves will be fourteen times
as great. Government estimates show that it will reach
3.6 billion yen in forty years time. This may nave a
fundamental importance on the Japanese economy.
It goes without saying that the Welfare Pension
Insurance and the National Pension Scheme are by far the
most important public pension insurance schemes, not only
in coverage ana nature, but also in magnitude and financial
significance. This is the reason why we concentrate on
the study of the finance of the Welfare Pension Insurance
and tne National Pension Scheme. The statistical figures
"5 * See Section 5 of the present Chapter.
representing tnese relations are listed in Table 2.
Section 3* Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme and Special
Account System.
We will now consider the financial mechanism of the
Welfare Pension Insurance, its position in the national
economy of Japan and the impact it has on the economy*
Before going into txie analysis of the place of the
scheme in the economy, we must introduce a brief outline
of the scheme itself. The scheme was established in 1941,
for tnose workers who are employed in working places
where five or more workers are employed. Public officials,
seamen, and others covered by other public insurance schemes
are excluded. Types of benefits are the old age pension,
invalidity pension, invalidity allowance, survivors' pension
and retirement pension, of which the old age pension is
the most important.
The payments period for the old age pension is 20 years,
15 years in the case of underground miners. The
pensionable age is 60 years, 55 years in tne case of
underground miners and females. The amount of the old
age pension benefit consists of ¥24 thousand p.a. of flat
rate basic pension, plus 0.5 per cent of the average monthly
slanaard /
Current Account of Revenue and Expenditure of the Public Pension Insurance
3 cherries, 1957.
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5. Mutual Aid Associations for
Staffs of City, Town and
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916
6. Mutual Aid Association for
Teachers and Employees in
Private ;chooi
617 11+2 161+ 7 930 236 930
7. Total Pension Insurance
(Excluding Government Pension)53»988
i l
17,531+ 17,960 761 90,272 21,556 68,91+7
..n
TABLE 2
1. Obtained by dividing total interest revenue of the Seaman's Insurance according to the proportion of the
contribution revenue for the pensions as against the whole contribution revenue.
2. Obtained by dividing the Exchequer Supplement for the total expenses of administration and welfare facilities
by the proportion of the Exchequer Supplement for the pension as against the while Exchequer Supplement.
3. Obtained from the Long Term Payment (Pension) Account, and not including the Business Management rtccount,.
S ourcefUI*ComnL&ef?S£°?ge*0So§!H<,S8§3&^ aj^ gercentage to the total 7. These are signi¬ficant items in magnitude.
* 55
standard, emoluments multiplied by the number of montns
of the insured term of coverage. As to the monthly
standard emoluments, the maximum is decided as ¥18
thousand, the minimum ¥3 thousand. Here we see a very
interesting feature that the scheme is primarily an income
proportional benefit payment system. In addition to
these, ¥4.8 thousand is granted on behalf of the spouse
and/or each child under eighteen, and/or each physically
or mentally handicapped child, irrespective of age."*"
If we turn to the revenue side, we know that the
scheme is financed firstly by the contribution of 3 per
cent of the monthly standard emoluments equally shared
by the employers and the employees; and secondly by the
Exchequer Supplement which bears all the administrative
cost and 15 per cent of the total pension payment. In
the case of underground miners, the ratio of contribution
amounts to 3»5 per cent, and the ratio of the Exchequer
Supplement to 20 per cent. Here we again find a very
interesting feature of the Scheme, i.e., that the revenue
of it is also income proportional.
Thirdly, as to the reserves of the scheme, we find,
as we have seen in the previous paragraph, that nearly all
of the revenue of the scheme at present is left as reserves.
Social Security Almanac for 1:;60. ibid., p. 68.
Taking the available recent figures for the accumulation
of reserves, we see ¥287 thousand, million in the end
of the Fiscal Year 1958. The net increase of the reserve
is ¥54 thousand million, ana ¥7.5 thousand million or
14 per cent of this has been utxlized for the welfare
of the insured as loans for tne construction of hospitals,
p
dwelling houses and other welfare facilities. The net
increase of the reserves is transferred ana is deposited to
the Ministry of Finance Trust Fund Bureau Special Accounts,
which is one of the Government Special Accounts established
to facilitate and illuminate government accounting. It
is operated in the form of loans to key industries, loans
to local government, and an aia to small ana middle-sized
inaustries, etc. Funds are allocated according to the
Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme decided each year
by the government with other public funas. The interest
rate of the Deposit to the Trust Fund Bureau is about
6.5 per cent a year at present. Here we see the third
feature of the Welfare Pension Scheme: that it adopts tne
reserve system and the fund is operated through government
special accounts as a Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme
to firms engaged in industry, agriculture etc., while a
' Welfare White Paper. 1959. Ministry of
Welfare, Printing Bureau of the Ministry of Finance,
January I960, p. 84.
certain amount is used, for the welfare of the people.
As we see later in detail, the reserve fund of the
Welfare Pension insurance is deposited to the Trust Fund
Bureau Special Account and managed with other state funds.
Table 3 shows the growing significance of fund accumulation
of the Welfare Pension Insurance in the whole fund of the
Trust Fund Bureau. Table 4 shows an estimation of the
future trend in income and expenditure of the Welfare
Pension Insurance Scheme.
As we have the outline of the Welfare Pension
Insurance, we can proceed to analyse its significance or
its position in the national economy.
One of the quickest, simplest and clearest ways to
show the place of the scheme in the economy will be to show
it in a simplified diagram where we can trace the flows of
income ana expenditure of various sectors composing the
scheme. We are utilizing this diagrammatical method simply
to illustrate the financial mechanism clearer than by a
mere explanation. We are concerned here with the
mechanism by which money is taken from the Private Sector
to the Public Sector and by which it goes back from one to
the other, and by that process how the fund is reserved."
"'The following analysis is based on the method shown in
the flow of funds analysis of the British National
Insurance Scheme by Peacock, A.T., in The Economics of
National Insurance, ibid., p. 37.
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Accumulated Reserves of the Welfare Pension Insurance












1952 492.2 64.9 13.2*
1953 636.3 80.5 12.7#
1954 772.4 109.7 14.2#
1955 901.2 141.1 15.7#
1956 1,095.4 180.8 16.5#
1957 1,298.7 233.5 18.0#
1958 1,516.6 287.1 18.9#
3nd of January,
1959 1,665.4 326.2 19.6#
TABLE 3
Source? Financial Bureau, Ministry of Finance.
Estimation of Future Trends in the Income and Expenditure of Welfare Pension Insurance
(1,000 m. yen)
1. Interest is assumed to be 5.5 a year
Source - Ministry of Welfare.
We divide the Private Sector into "Firms" and "Households",
and the Public Sector into "Exchequer" and "Welfare Pension
Insurance Scheme". The separation of Insurance Scheme
from Exchequer is of course artificial, but this enables
us to see clearly how the Scheme functions. Nevertheless,
the formation of this diagram accompanies a serious difficulty
in obtaining the figures corresponding to the scheme. This
is because the Welfare Pension Insurance does not take a
form of an independent fund in Japan, but, instead, is
managed in one of the Government Special Accounts, with the
funds of two other health insurance schemes. The Special
Account is divided into four Sub-Accounts and a part of the
finance is shown as corresponds to each scheme, while a
part is mixed among three schemes. Namely, in the Business
Sub-Account - which deals administration of three insurances
and the management of their welfare facilities - funds are
mixed with the funds of other health insurances. However,
the main part of the pension financings is managed by the
Pension Sub-Account within the Welfare Insurance Special
Account. Therefore, we will show, at the moment, how the
scheme looks if it is seen from the government budget paper
of the Pension Sub-Account. (We will show later how this




Moreover, even showing the function of the Pension
Sub-Account alone accompanies some difficulties. This is
because the government account which has been formed
according to tradition and administrative conveniences
includes some ambiguous items. Particularly, the treatment
of miscellaneous revenue, receipts from the Seamens' insurance
Special Account, and miscellaneous expenditure may involve
some difficulty. How we treated them are shown in the
Ll
Appendix to this chapter . Then we can obtain the following
diagram (Diagram 1).
Accou-nrs QF WELFARE pea{s/oa/ schemeCO
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+* We could only do this with the aid of internal statistics
and information supplied from the Ministry of Finance from
Mr. Kitada, since, even the most detailed publication,
(Budget of the State. 1959. Budget Bureau. Ministry of
Finance, Doyu-Shobo Co* Ltd., November 1959) does not give
sufficient information to clarify these ambiguities.
We may be over simplifying by erasing all the
complicated financial mechanisms between the government's
Special Accounts relating the scheme. Nevertheless, the
Diagram shows an approximate relationship between payments
and receipts between the Pension Scheme and the Exchequer,
and between the private sector and the public sector.
Investment of the reserve is, however, not shown in the
diagram nor how the interest revenue is financed. One
feature of the Japanese system which differs from that of the
United Kingdom is that we can trace on a certain assumption
and at a certain level, the investment of these reserves.
We have to consider this point later.
The commonly accepted prime object of national insurance
is, of course, its function as a transfer mechanism, tidng
funds from private households and firms and giving them to
those in need in the community, thus securing minimum
standards of living to all components of the society and by
doing so, maintaining a stable welfare state. But this
diagram (1) shows that it is not the main function of the
Welfare Pension Insurance at the present stage of the scheme.
The figures for the Transfers to Beneficiaries and
Administration occupy a very small proportion of the whole
contribution and taxation revenue, and the main part is
contained in the Surplus on Current Account, i.e. Reserves.
Moreover /
Moreover this part of the fund goes back to the Exchequer
in the form of a Deposit and is utilized for industrial
purposes, etc. The key economic importance of the scheme
at the present stage lies not in its transfer mechanism from
firms and households to those people who are in need,
temporarily or semi-permanently, but in its function of
transfer from firms and households of private sector
through government to those sectors as government
enterprises and industry, the maintenance and development
of which has come to be considered as political necessities
of the nation. we will consider later the real meaning of
this flow of funds to industrial sectors, etc.
Though interesting it may be, the previous analysis was
over simplified in the sense that it did not show the
complicated government Special Accounts mechanism in relation
to the scheme. The Special Accounts mechanism is one of the
features of the Japanese budgetary system; and in fact there
exist intricate relationships between several Special Accounts
in that some of the money comes into one Special Account and
goes out to the other Special Account, etc. Because of
these complicated mechanisms, the function of the scheme is
very difficult to grasp and can be easily concealed from the
eyes of the public.
The Special Account system did not start for that
purpose. /
purpose. Contrarily it started in order to show the
financial mechanises more lucidly. The following is a
very rough outline of the Special Accounts system.
The present Finance Act, which regulates the main rule
on the management of state financing, remarks that "the
state can establish a Special Account by an Act only
1) when the state does a specific enterprise
2) when the state holds certain funds to operate
3) and when the state finances a specific expenditure
out of a specific revenue, so that it is necessary to manage
it separately from general revenues and expenditures."^
Because of the ambiguity of the expression of the Act, it
does not show clearly what is the Special Account, and, in
consequence, it allows governments to establish new Special
Accounts rather easily whenever there occurs political
necessity, or pressure from certain sectors of the community
It is convenient for the government if politically necessary
to separate a certain item of expenditure, because, by so
doing, it could be taken out of the General Account, (which
undergoes a far more strict check by the Treasury, by
Parliament and also by the general public opinion).
Public Finance Act, Article 13, Item 2, 19by.
Without going further into criticisms of the Special
Account system as a whole, the present status can be
indicated. If we take the budget figure for the fiscal
year 1959> we know the expenditure of the General Account
is ¥1,570 thousand million, whereas that of the total
Special Accounts amounts to ¥3,5^9 thousand million. The
same figure for the Government Affiliated Organization,
which represents 13 Government organizations, including
3 Public Corporations of National Railway, Telegram and
Telephone and Monopoly, and other 10 Government Affiliated
Organizations, is ¥1,383 thousand million.^ Though we
admit these figures include a certain amount of double
counting, this can be reasonably taken as showing the
financial significance of the Special Accounts system.
The numbers of the Special Accounts for the Fiscal Year 1959
n
reached l+0, representing the significance of the government
sector and also the necessity of bigger intervention of
the government in the national economy, directly or indirectly
Existing Special Accounts can be divided into five groups
if we classify them according to the nature of the accounts
or the main objectives they are expected to accomplish.
Firstly there exists a group of Special Accounts, by which
'
Explanation of Budget for, the Fiscal Year 1959» Budget
Bureau, Ministry of Finance, January I960, pp. 5 and 7•
The figures indicate original rojections.
'
Public Finance White Paper for 1959» ibid., p. 67.
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the state carries out a business. The National Hospital,
The Post Office Savings, etc., belong to this category
and there exist 11 of these.
Secondly there exists a group of Special Accounts,
where the State controls the demand and su ply of certain
goods, etc. The Foodstuffs Control, Foreign Exchange
Control and Precious Metals Control are examples. There
are 6 of these Accounts. Thirdly there exist Special
Accounts to manage government related insurances. The
state either has public insurance or re-insurance against
the danger of certain types of private insurance. The
Welfare Insurance and Unemployment Insurance are examples.
There are 12 of these.
Fourthly, there exist those groups where the state
invests public funds and loan them. The Trust Fund Bureau
Special Account is a typical example. There are 5 of these.
Fifthly, and lastly, there exist accounts to clarify the
accounts of funds. These are the accounts which exist solely
to clarify the receipts and expenditures of certain funds and





This classification is the one adopted by the government.
More detailed explanations are given in Public Finance White
Paoer. ibid., pp. 67 - 71. The explanation of treating
social insurance in the same category as the re-insurance by
the state of the private insurance may not be adequate.
However, this is simply to have a rough idea of the kind of
Special Accounts, and therefore, criticism will not be
mentioned.
By these methods of the Special Accounts system, the
state can intervene and control or help, and sometimes lead,
the economic development of the nation.
The Welfare Insurance Special Account belongs to the
third category, where the state operates three of the public
insurance schemes and makes clear the receipts and payments
of the scheme. This Welfare Insurance Special Account is
composed of four different Sub-Accounts. The first is
the Health Sub-Account of the Health Insurance, which shows
the revenue and expenditure of the Health Insurance, its
relation with the General Account of the Exchequer and also
with the business account of the sane Welfare Insurance
Special Account. The second is the Day Labourers' Health
Insurance Sub-Account which shows its receipts and payments,
including those from the General Accounts of the Exchequer
and the Reserve Fund and its payments to the business account
of the same.
The third, and the most important for us is the Pension
Sub-Account. This is the account corresponding to the
Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme though the administration
as well as the management of welfare facilities are financed
by the Business Sub-Account. On the one hand it receives
revenue by contributions, by an Exchequer Supplement from the
General Account (from general taxation), by receipts from the
Seamens' Insurance Special Account, by interest revenue on the
deposit /
deposit to the Trust Puna Bureau Special Account and. by-
mi scellaneous revenues. On tne otner hana, it pays tne
benefit payments, the transfer to tne business account
of tne same Special Account, miscellaneous expenditures,
and also tne emergency reserve. We have analysed this
Account in Diagram 1.
The fourth ana last is tne Business Suo-Account. This
account deals with the administration of the three social
insurance schemes and also with the management of welfare
facilities. It receives revenue fro the three Sub-Accounts
above mentioned of the same Special Account, Central Account,
reserve fun,, etc., and spending on the ad;.inistration
expenses, the construction of new offices, tne expenses of
nouses and facilities for civil service (engaged in the
administration), health facilities, welfare facilities, and
other emergency reserves. If we isolate tne items wnich
clearly correspond to the finance of the Welfare Pension
Insurance Scheme and if we classify the ite. s, which cannot
be diviued distinctly, by dividing them proportional,to the
scale of the benefit payments of the three Sub-Accounts, and
give necessary adjustments, we can .erive tne following
diagram corresponding to the finance of the Welfare Pension
Insurance Scheme? (Diagram 2).
Q
For detailed treatments, see Appendix to this Chapter.
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The complexity of the government system makes it very
difficult to analyse and grasp the position of the scheme
as it is. The inter-relation with tne otrier Special Account,
trie revenue of which is also composed of the contribution,
tne Exchequer Supplement, Interest, Miscellaneous etc.,
(though trie amount is negligible), makes it extremely
difficult to trace the origin of the revenue of the scheme.
Interchange of several Special Accounts obscures the function
being achieved by the Welfare Pension Insurance. However,
if we ask ourselves wnat is the economic function of the
scheme, and what is trie function Which matters, much of the
technical vagueness and complexity may be cleared. As to
the inter Sub-Accounts relations, we may be able to reduce
the complication and explain that tne actual transactions
of the scheme within the Government Sector, are carried out
cniefly /
chiefly between the General Account of the Exchequer (which
is the Revenue Account of general taxation of the Exchequer),
the Welfare insurance Special Account (whicn is the managing
account of the Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme (as well as
Health Insurance Schemes)), and. the Trust Fund Bureau Special
Account (wnich is the investing, loaning and fund operating
account of the Exchequer). Furthermore, if we taxe away
all the complication of the inter Exchequer Accounts transfers
we come to see that the transfer mechanism in the normal
sense, i.e., the function of taking the private sector ana
of giving it to households of those who are in need, is
inaeed very little; ana that, as a financial impact, the
part shown as the Surplus on Current Account, is vitally
important in all. This is exactly what our new diagram (2)
shows, obtained after taking into consideration the
corresponding parts of tne Business Sub-Account, as the
old diagram aid as well. This item witn a ruling
importance is transferred to and deposited in the Trust
Fund Bureau Special Account. This is the reason why we
nave to trace the use of the surplus funu in aetail, and
go on to the analysis of the Trust Fund Bureau Special
Account in the next section.
Section 4. Trust Fund Bureau Special Account ana Fiscal
Investment and Loan Programme.
The Trust Fund Bureau Special Account is one of the
government /
government accounts for the investment and. loan of public funas.
The importance of public investments and loans has been recently
realised, partly because of their magnitude and partly because
of the economic necessity of the nation to achieve a high rate
of, possibly balanced, growth of national economy. Since 1953,
all these activities have been combined in one scheme, called
the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme. So in order to
describe the economic meaning of the Trust Fund Bureau Special
Account and the place of the Welfare Pension Insurance Reserves
in the investment and loan plan, we have to describe a rough
outline of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme itself.
The Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme is the combination
of the financial investment activities of the state, namely the
government activities to supply investment funds in the form of
fiscal investments and loans. These are the government activit
ies to supply investment fund to the government or to government
enterprises, to local governments and to the private sector,
(industries, etc.), mostly via government financial organizations
in the form of fiscal investment and loan. They, however, do
not include those expenditure items of the Exchequer General
Account listed as Public Work."*" The source and the use of
funds of the Programme will be expounded in detail hereafter.
These financial activities of the state do not need the
approval of parliament as is the case of the Budget, but the
collection of the fund and its operation plan is submitted
to the Houses of Parliament, together with a Budget, as
See S,u;uki, T. edit., Public Finance of Japan. Shiseido Co.
Ltd., May, 1961. p. 296.
information for Parliamentary discussion.
The purpose of the Programme, together with those of other
methods of fiscal policies, is to help the national economy to
acnieve a high rate of economic growth and other objectives.
The Programme helps develop industries, to improve industrial
fundamental facilities, to improve the housing situation and to
develop small ana middle sized industries. If those needs are
met by private financing, the necessity of the state's inter¬
vention may be reduced. However, some need a large amount of
fund (such as electricity), some accompany risk in collection
(such as small sized industries), and usually long-term credit
and low interest rates are required. This makes it very
difficult to expect all the necessary fund to come through
private financial organizations whose primary interest is in
profitability. Because of these circumstances, the state
justifies itself in utilizing funds which come through the
Post Office Savings, taxation and even social security
contributions, and in supplementing the private finance in
quantity, and qualitatively by supplying funds where it is
2
difficult to expect enough private money.
_ ________________________________________________
'The explanation of this paragraph is based on the government
explanation in Public Finance v/hite Paper for 1959, ibid.,
p. 92. The analysis here is limited to the introduction of
tne outline of the Programme. For criticisms on the working
of xhe Programme, See Chapter V, Section 4.
Let us begin by looking at the mechanism of the
Programme, how it collects funas ana to which sector it
supplies them.
The source of the Fiscal Investment and Loan is
primarily the fund collected in the Industrial Investment
Special Account, the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account ana
the Post Office Life Insurance Fund in the form of
taxation, Post Office Savings and contributions, etc.
The source is mostly that of the savings of people in one
form or another, and the fiscal fund collected in the
above mentioned three bodies is the primary source of the
Scheme. In these three, the majority is occupied by the
Trust Fund Bureau Special Account which collects the Post
Office Savings, the Welfare Pension Insurance Reserve Fund,
and also the Post Office Life Insurance Fund. As the
statistics show, the proportion of the Trust Fund Bureau
Special Account to the total Programme has somewhat
increased xo around 60 per cent in recent years (see Table
The percentage of the Post Office Life Insurance Funa nas
increased from around 6 per cent in the fiscal year 1953
to aoout 20 per cent between the fiscal years 1957 and
1959. On the other hand, the ratio of the Industrial
Investment Special Account decreased from 16 per cent in
the fiscal year 1953 to round about 7 per cent in the
fiscal year 1959.
Apart /
COMPOSITION OP THE SOURCES OP THE FISCAL INVESTMENT AND LOAN PROGRAMME, 1953 - 1959
(1,000 m. yen)
Year
1955 1954 1955 1956 1957 1 1958 1959
I tems
I. Trust Fund Bureau
Special Account 174.6 168.5 152.9 159.7 255.8 270.0
!
292.8
(Percentage) (52.1) (58.4) (51.2) (51.5) (59.7) (61.4) (56.3) j
i
II. Post Office Life
Insurance Fund Special
Account
20.1 45.4 48.2 56.4 78.0 89.5
j
100.0












(Percentage) (16.5) (7.1) (6.0) (4.2) (9.6) (8.7) (7.4):
IV. Funds accruing from
Purchases of U.S.
Agricultural Commodities





(Percentages) - (6.0) (5.1)







VI. Public Loan 58.5 54.5 50.4 70.5 45.7 42.3 88.8 1


















1. The Collateral Fund was a separate account before 195-3. The amount for 1953 was 17*8
TABLE ?.
Apart from the fiscal fund above mentioned, there
exist funds raised by Public Corporation Bonds, Local
Bonds and the Government Guaranteed Borrowings. The
Public Corporation Bonus and the Borrowings are issued or
borrowed, being guaranteed by the government, ana the
Local Bonds are issued on the approval of the govenui ent
according to its plan. So, though these funds are private
funds, they are closely related to the fiscal fund and are
3
also operated as one boay with trie fiscal funas. The
statistical figures showing the magnitude of sources of
these funds and their historical development are listed in
Table 15.
Now let us look at the operation of the fund thus
collected, i.e. to what sectors it supplies the fund. The
first is the supply of fund to the private sector. This
group can be divided into two. The first is the supply of
funds directly to the enterprise itself which actually
carries out the investment schemes, like the loans to the
Electric Power .Development Company. The second is the
supply of funas to the government financial organizations ana
through them funds are supplied indirectly to the private
sector, like the loan to industries through the Japan
Development Bank. 4 The latter category is the more usual.
3
Public Finance vVhite Paper for 1959, ibid., p. 95.
4# Ibid.
There exist twenty nine items in fiscal year 1959 of the
supply of the fund, to the private sector. The second
group is the supply of the fund to the enterprises of
the government or the government affiliated organizations.
In the budget account, these are listed as the Construction
Investment in G-ovemment Enterprises. These include the
investment of the Japan National Railway, the Japan
Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, and also road
improvements, specific port and harbour works, multi¬
purpose dam construction, etc. The third is the
loan to the local governments for their enterprises.
If we take statistical figures for them, we find that
the first group, namely, the supply of the fund to the
private sector has occupied about 50 per cent of all from
fiscal year 1953 to fiscal year 195b, and has increased
considerably since then to about63 per cent in 1959* The
secona group of the Construction Investment in (Government
Enterprises has occupied only about 10 per cent since the
fiscal year 1953 till very recently, but in the fiscal year
1959 it increased to nearly 15 per cent. The third item,
the loans to Local Government has shown nearly 40 per cent
its*;
in the fiscal years 195 3» A1955 and 1956, but has uecreased
Fiscal and Financial Statistical monthly, edit,
ministry of Finance, Printing Bureau of Ministry of
Finance, April, I960, No. 105, p> 48. Table 6.
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decreased considerably to about22 per cent in the fiscal
year* 1959. Thus we can understand that trie Fiscal
Investment and Loan Programme is of primary importance
in functioning to supply public funds to private sector in
industries etc. The statistical figures are listed in
Table G.
It must be mentioned here tnat two slight adjustments
are made in the statistical figures obtainable from the
government budget papers (Budget of the State, Explanation
of Budget, etc.). Firstly, the government is slightly
inaccurate in treating trie item called "Workers Y/elfare"
totally as the loans to the private sector (e.g. ¥8.5 million
for 1959). This is because a part of the fund (¥3.9 million)
is actually a loan to the local governments. From the
internal statistical paper supplied from the Ministry of
Finance on tne classification of the loan for tne welfare
facilities of trie Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme surplus,
I could find this point. These adjustments are included
from 1956 onwards, since the figures of the subdivision
loaned to tne local government are not obtainable before 1955.
(The magnitude is mostly negligible before 1955). Secondly,
though the item of the loan to the Local Government
Enterprises Finance Corporation is treated as the loan to the
° 9
Supplied from Mr. Kitada. My point was confirmed by
his letter, April, 1961.











































































1. Adjustments are given for items 1 and 3 for 1956 r> 1959. Explanations are given in the text.
Source: Financial Efureau,Ministry of Finance.
private sector in tine budget paper, since this is the
loan to the local government enterprises, we included
it in the loan to the Local Government, (though the
amount is very small, i.e. ¥ 500 million 1957 onwards).
The same adjustments are made in other Taoles as well.
If we classify the fund thus supplied directly or
indirectly to the public or to the government, we can
trace its trend after the war and see the policy implications
of the programme.
Firstly there exists a group of funds which is
supplied to the general industrial sector at large for
general economic development purposes, such as trie
reinforcement of the fundamental industries like the iron
and steel industry and the shipbuilding industry through
the Japan development Bank, for the exploitation and
development of elecoric power to the Electric Power
Development Company directly and also indirectly through
the Japan development Bank, and for some other purposes.
The Statistical figures show that this item hau a very
big weight, representing nearly 30 per cent in the fiscal
year 1955 in the whole programme, but since then it has
decreased considerably to 17 per cent in the fiscal year
1960. This reflects the fact that after the War until
about 1955 to 1955, the stress of the government policy on
the /
the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme was put on the
quantitative supplement for the key industries,
represented in the above mentioned examples. Since it
was essentially necessary to reconstruct industries as
rapidly as possible in order to reconstruct national
economy, the government triea to induce the investments by
private sector, by furnishing the fiscal funus to these
industries.
Secondly, a certain amount of fund is furnished to
export industries through the Japan Export and Import
Bank specially for the encouragement of exports. As the
increase in export is one of the main factors for the
economic development of Japan, a special effort is made
and this item is large enough to treat as an independent
item in the classification. The figures indicate that this
item has also increased from less than 2 per cent in the
fiscal year 1954 to between 6-7 per cent in the fiscal
years 1959 and I960.
Thirdly the fund is supplied to the medium ana small
sized industries. This is designed so as to overcome
the commonly accepted fundamental deficits of the economy,
namely the widespread discrepancies in efficiencies of
production between big sized industries and medium and
small sized industries, and also the discrepancies in the
wage rates. Socially this is regarded as undesirable.
Economically, /
Economically, if the wage rates in these medium and small
sized industries are increased, these industries will have
to face a serious difficulty. This, however, has had
an important function in adsorbing excess labour supply,
which has strictly restricted the nature of the Japanese
economy. So far as the government is keen in achieving
a full employment economy, and particularly a balanced
economic growth, it can never neglect to foster or to take
all necessary steps for the medium and small sized industries.
This item also showed a considerable increase from less than
8 per cent in the fiscal year 1953 and reaching slightly
over 11 per cent in the fiscal year I960. Nevertheless,
this item is much smaller than the item to the big
industries, shown as Industrial Development and also
included in the Encouragement of Exports.
Fourthly, the fund is supplied to the Agriculture,
Forestry and Fishery sector. This also is in line with
the government policies to adjust the imbalance of the
economy which now exists between economic sectors. The
agriculture sector is far lower in its productivity
compared with that of the industrial sector, out here
again it is absorbing excess labour power. Thi3
percentage shows a comparatively even trend from 9 per cent
in the fiscal year 1953 to around 8 per cent in the fiscal
years 1959 and 1960.
Fifthly the fund is supplied to the Transportation
and Communication sector. This showed about 10 to 11 per
cent /
cent in trie fiscal years 1953 ana 1954 but rapialy
increased to over 17 per cent in the fiscal year 1959
and 19 per cent in the fiscal year I960.
Sixthly, the fund is also supplxed to trie Construction
of Houses. This showed a very low rate of 5 to 6 per cent
in tne fiscal years 1953 and 1954, because construction
of houses was initially given second place to the
reconstruction of key industries. But since tne fiscal
year 1955, the economy has recovered and grown, and the
neeas have also mounted up, so the percentage was doublea
to 12 per cent in the fiscal year 1955 and 13 per cent to
14 per cent in trie fiscal years 1959 and I960. The loan
to the local Government has lost most of its importance
in these six years, namely from 38 per cent in the
fiscal year 1953 to 26 per cent in the fiscal year I960.
These figures explain the changes of the government
policy through the Fiscal Investment and loan Programme.
Namely, after about 1955, the weight of the supply of
fund for the reconstruction of key industries decreased
ana trie weight of qualitative supplements toward economy
increased, i.e. the improvement of fundamental inaustrial
facilities, such as road and harbour improvements, the
settlement of livelihooa by construction of houses etc.,
the protection and fostering of the economically weak
medium /
medium and small 3ized industries etc. ^
This can most clearly be seen if we compare the rate
of growth of items of the programme. luring the seven
years between the fiscal years 1953 to I960, trie total
expenditure of tne programme increased by 77 per cent,
wnile the Industrial Development item rose by 5 per cent,
snowing nearly no growth at all, thus decreasing rapidly
ixs relative weignt. On the other hand the Medium and
Small-sizea Industries increased by 249.2 per cent, the
Transportation and Communication by 207.1 per cent,
•! Aand the Construction of Houses by 350.0 per cent.
These comparisons clearly show the change of stress of the
government policies.
Another point which these comparisons teach us is that
the Fiscal Investment ana Loan Programme acted, ana also
can act, very elastically and flexibly according to tne
changing pattern of tne economy, according to the judgement
of the government on the condition and necessity of the
national economy. This implies the effectiveness of the
Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme as a compensatory
fiscal policy. The government can adjust this investment
according to the market conditions much more flexibly than
1 * This qualitative change around 1955 is pointed out inj-ublio Finance .Vhite Paper for 1959. ibid., p. 92.
3D
Suzuki, Y. Outline of the Fiscal Investment and Loan
Programme for the Fiscal Year, I960. Fiscal and Financial
statistical Monthly, Ho. 105, ibid., pp. 19-20. Since
recalculation was possible only after 1956, the above quoted
ratios are based on the government classifications.
it can the General Account Budget. The latter is not so
flexible, because the majority is more or less fixed by
obligatory expenses, administrative costs, continuing
expenditure, etc. The government can adjust not only the
scale of the plan itself, but can more easily quicken or
9
slow down tne tempo of the investment. Actually the
Programme has acted as one of the most important parts of
the fiscal policies in Japan.
The statistical figures showing the trend of the
programme are listed in the following Table ( /).
Now we have seen what is the Fiscal Investment and
Loan Programme, how it is financed and how it operates.
It is essentially necessary to see the mechanism and the
operation of the Programme, for the Programme is financed
mainly by the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account which
collects its money in part through the Welfare Pension
Insurance Scheme. The new National Pension Scheme will
also furnish a large amount of industrial fund through
its funding mechanism. Without going further into
appraisal or criticism of tne Fiscal Investment and Loan
irogramine, we shall come back to the study of the mechanism
and the operation of the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account.
The Trust Fund Bureau Special Account is furnishing
Public Finance White Paper for 1959, ibid, p. 93»
This process of adjustment of enforcing time is always
carried out whenever a strong lead of economic activities
by the government is required.
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335.2 288.7 298.6 311.5 395.3 440.1 j 519.8
i
i_. __ i 1
594.1
TABLE 7.
1. Throughout the table figures in parenthesis represent percentage to
the total.
SOURCE: Financial Bureau, Ministry of Finance.
nearly 60 per cent of all the fund utilized in the Fiscal
Investment and Loan Programme in the above mentioned line
of government policies.
The biggest item of the financial source of the Trust
Fund Bureau Special Account is the Post Office Savings,
representing about two thirds of the annual increase of the
total source of the Account. The feature of the Post
Office Savings lies in the guarantee of the state on the
repayment of the principal ana also the payment of the
interest, on the deposited money, by the Post Office Savings
10
Act. The credit stands on the guarantee of the state,
whose ultimate safeguard lies in i us tax collection power.
It does not rest on the effectiveness of the deposited
fund as a profit creative capital. Tnis feature of the
Post Office Savings explains the subsiaiary transfer of the
fund from the Exchequer, i.e. from the General Account or
the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account, to the Postal
Services Special Account, which is established for the
management of the postal services as a government business
account. (This amounted to ¥4.1 thousand million in the
budget of the fiscal year 1957). Needless to say,
these funds thus collected through the deposits of the
government guaranteed Post Office Savings, represent a vast
number of extremely small deposits of people at large. The
■L0'* Post Office Savings Act, 1947.
relatively high cost of the collection of the small deposits
from the general public, characterized by a high rate of
interest, vastness of the area of the deposit collection,
and consequently the relative greatness of its running
costs, yet the extreiae smallness of the individual deposits,
are covered by the fiscal fund through taxation and
guaranteed by the state resting on the taxation, and come
to work as a long term low rate of interest industrial fund,
which may well be called in most cases a "Subsidy".
Moreover it comes to be realised that the weight of
social insurance as a means of a collection of fiscal fund
has been considerably increased. And here we see that
the next greatest item of the source of the Trust Fund
Bureau is the Welfare Pension Insurance Reserves, which
occupies just one third of the annual increase in the
deposit of the Account, and also about 20 per cent of the
total annual increase of the Account. Moreover if we
take the historical tendency, we find thatthe increase of
the deposits by the Welfare Pension Insurance Reserves
has increased rapidly since the fiscal year 1953, from
less than 10 per cent in its percentage overall 0-6 per cent
to the increase in deposits) in the fiscal year 1953 to
about 20 per cent overall, (33 per cent to the increase in
deposits; in the fiscal year 1959. The annual surplus
of the Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme has increased
from /
from ¥16.2 thousand million in the fiscal year 1953 to
¥56.5 thousand million in 1959, amounting to 350 per cent.
This tendency of the latter will be intensified by the
development of a social security programme, whicn was
rather late in starting compared with the western developed
countries, but whicn is developing at a rather rapid pace.
Moreover, as the National Pension Scheme has come to deposit
its reserves by the collection of contributions, etc. the
significance of the social insurance schemes in the supply
of fiscal funds will increase greatly. And the fund thus
furnished through the social insurance mechanism, though
it is taken out from a certain category of people named
as social insurance contributors including many numbers
of low income receivers, may work as an effective machine
for the industrial development. The social insurance
mechanism furnishes industries with low rate of long-term
credit, which more substantially resembles a state
subsidy. Moreover, this is carried out in the name of
increasing social welfare services. Here we see clearly
the working of the social insurance scheme and the position
of the Welfare Pension Insurance in the financial mechanisms
of the Special Accounting system of the government sector,
and its role in the development of the national economy.
The statistical figures representing these are listed in
the Table ( 8).
We /
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1. Throughout the table the first row is the absolute amount, the
second is the percentage of the total Fiscal Investment and Loan
Programme, and the third, in parenthesis, is the percentage of
the Trust Fund Bureau.
SOURCE: Compiled from papers supplied by the Financial Bureau,
Ministry of Finance.
We have so far learned tnat more than half of the
fund in the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme is
supplied through the Trust Fund. Bureau Special Account
and a considerable amount, around 20 per cent, of this
is supplied by the annual increase of deposits by the
'Welfare Insurance Special Accounts, which represent the
annual reserves of the Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme.
We also have learned that the fund thus supplied is
operated in tne several industrial sectors, government
sectors etc. Now if we combine these mechanisms of the
Trust Fund Bureau Special Account and the Fiscal Investment
and Loan Programme with the functions of the Welfare
Pension Insurance, we can get the diagram which shows
clearly the flow of funds from the Welfare Pension Insurance,
to the Trust Fund Bureau and, via the Fiscal Investment and
Loan Programme, to several industrial sectors, local
government, etc. (Diagram 3).
Not only have we shown the flow of funds of tne
total Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme, how it is
allocated among several industrial sectors, etc., but also
we have shown the flow of funds corresponding to the
Trust Fund Bureau Special Account by the part drawn by
oblique lines. The classification of the total Fiscal
Investment arid Loan Programme according to purposes is
11
shown by tne government. We adopt this figure with
Fiscal and Financial Statistical Monthly, No. 105»
ibid., p. 49.
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two slight adjustments related to the Loans to the Local
Governments previously mentioned. However, so far as I
IP
know, and at least before 1961," the government has not
snown the corresponding classification of the Trust Fund
Bureau Special Account funds. Nevertheless we have a
Table on the Fiscal Invest and Loan Fund Programme for the
Fiscal Year 1959 obtained from the Ministry of Finance;
this shows the relation between the individual Accounts,
(i.e. a large classification, such as the Trust Puna
Bureau Special Account, ana not a sub-division, as the
Welfare Insurance Special Account, which is the composing
factor of the former), and the individual institutions
which receive loans from these Accounts. By analysing
the nature of these institutions, we classify these 38
items according to their economic nature, (e.g. the loan
of ¥18.5 thousand million from the Trust Fund Bureau
Special Account to the Medina and Small-sized Enterprises
Financial Corporation is classified as Medium and Small-sized
Industries, etc.) in the same way as the Treasury officials
do the total Fiscal Invest and Loan Programme; with the
exception of the necessary adjustmentsrelated to the Loans
to Local Government. With these preparations, and also
with a due adjustment due to a specific nature of a part
of the Trust Fund Bureau fund, i.e. corresponding to about
1?"*
As to the new treatment from the 1961 budget see Chapter
V, Section 4.
15 per cent of the annual Welfare Pension Insurance
surplus, the previous Diagram has been obtained. The
latter treatment we will now discuss.
As we can see very clearly in the diagram, about
20 per cent of the whole Trust Puna Bureau Special Account
is supplied through the reserve mechanism of the Welfare
Pension Insurance Scheme, and the fund is operated by the
same Account together with other funds in the industrial
sectors, agricultural sectors, local governments, etc.,
according to each year's Fiscal Investment and Loan
Programme. Though we can trace how the Trust Fund Bureau
Specxal Account fund is allocated, as we have done above,
we are not informed how the fund corresponds to the Welfare
Pension Insurance Scheme. This is because the fund is
ope.ated in the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account together
with other funds as one account. Nevertheless, a part
of the Welfare Pension Insurance surplus, i.e., 15 per cent
in 1959 is operated in the construction investment of
welfare facilities, and workers' houses. This decision
of specific allocation of funds is carried out by political
considerations, in order to show the public that the pension
13
funds are utilized for the welfare of the insured.
Therefore, though this part is included in tne operation of
trie total Trust Fund Bureau fund, we have to treat it
THy .
The definition of the welfare of the insured, and the
adequacy of these government policies, may involve a serious
problem. See Chapter V, Section 4.
separately from other funds. From the internal
14
statistics of the Ministry of Finance, we gather that
a part of the fund goes to the local government (¥3.9
thousand million for 1959), while the rest goes to the
entrepreneurs in the private sector (¥4.6 thousand million),
(though as a formality through local governments). If
we adjust this part, we know the actual allocation of the
Trust Fund Bureau fund. As the fund supplied through the
Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme is operated as one body
with other funds in the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account,
and as the interest is paid from the same Account to the
Welfare Insurance Special Account, the most reasonable
assumption will be that the fund supplied from the Welfare
Pension Insurance surplus is, except the specially decided
part above mentioned, allocated proportionally to the
industrial sectors, agricultural sectors, local
governments, etc., as the total allocation of the Trust
Fund Bureau fund indicates. Then we can get the
investment figure for each sector wnich is financed by
the Welfare Pension Insurance scheme. The main process
is shown in the following Table 9("±y. The allocation of the
total "Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme surplus shows the
importance and magnitude of the Welfare Pension Insurance
scheme in the government investment plan in each of the
*
From Fund Section of Financial Bureau of Ministry
of Finance. Supplied from Mr. Kitada.
Classification of the Welfare Pension Insurance Surplus, the Trust Fund Bureau fund, and the










































i ; 86.o 30.2 : 14.5 14.5 71 5 86.0 16.3 102.3'
2 ■ 29.0 10.2 | 4.9 4.9 24.1 29.O 7.0
21.2
36.0
3 37.0 13.0 | 6.2 6.2 30.8 37.0 58.2
4 ■ 7>~> ? 8.2 3.9 3.9 19.3 23.2 1 20.C . 43.2
. 5 | 43.5 15.3 7.4 7.4 36.1 43.5 i 46.2 89.7
6 j 18.4 6.5 3.1 4.6 7.7 15.3 23.0 49.8 72.8
7 | 45.0 15.8 7.6 3.9 H.5 37.4 48.9 65.5 114. 4
(V.C\JCO 0.8 .4 .4 1.8 2.2 1.0 3.2
Total ] 284.3
i_
100.0 48.0 8.5 56.5 236.3 292.8 227.0 519.8
TABLE 9(1)
1. Industrial Development. 2. Encouragement of Exports. 3. Medium,Small-Sized Industries.
4. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery. 5. Transportation and Communication.
6. Construction of Houses. 7. Local Government. 8. Others.
^
Special Part indicates the part of the supply of funds for welfare facilities which is decided
as a certain proportion of the Welfare Pension Surplus (8«5 k 56.6 x 0.15).
^ Item 3 is obtained by distributing the total (48.0) by the ratios found in Item 2.
3 Welfare Pension Insurance Surplus here represents the amount shown in the revenue of the Trust
Fund Bureau Special Account as receipts from the Welfare Insurance Snecial Account and does not
include the part transferred to other accounts, (e.g. to Seamen's Insurance Special Account).
SOURCE: Compiled and recalculated from statistics, Ministry of Finance.
96
industrial sectors, etc. The parts shown in diagonal shading
in diagram 3 indicate the allocation of the Welfare Pension
Insurance Scheme Surplus thus obtained.
By the same assumption, we obtain the allocation of the
Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme Surplus among the private sector
Central Government (including Government Affiliated Organisation^,
and Local Government (including Local Government Enterprises).
The mecnanism by which the funds flow from the Welfare Pension
Insurance Scheme and also from the Trust Fund Bureau Special
Account to these sectors is shown in Diagram 4, as well as in
Table 9 (2).
By similar processes we distribute the interest burden paid
from the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account to the Welfare
Insurance Special Account among sectors where the loan has been
supplied in the past. We do this with the aid of statistics,
pertaining to tne source of the interest revenue of the Trust
Fund Bureau Special Account for the fiscal year 1959, and the
recent record of supply of funds specifically decided as a
proportion of the annual reserve of the Welfare Pension Insurance
15
Scheme. In conclusion, the proportion of the interest burden
on the Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme fund3 borne by the
private sector as against the total interest burden is obtained
as 41.5 per cent'!
By these processes we have thus clarified how the surplus
of the Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme is operated, and how the
burden of the interest payments to the Scheme are distributed
__
internal Statistics supplied from 'the Ministry of Finance.
1 fii
"For detail, See Appendices to Chapter II, 2. Interest
Revenue of Welfare Insurance Special Account.
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TABLE 9. '
1. Special Pai't indicates the part of the supply of Fund for Welfare facilities which is
decided as a certain proportion of the Welfare Pension Surplus (8.5 =- 56.5 * 0.15 ).
2. Item 2 shows the normal ratio of the allocation of the Trust Fund Bureau Fund excluding
Special Part,
3. Item 3 is obtained on the assumption that the Welfare Pension Surplus is (except the
Special Part) allocated in the same proportion of the normal allocst&on ratio of the
Trust Fund Bureau Fund*.as shown in Item 2.
4. Welfare Pension Surplus here represents the amount shown in the revenue of the Trust
Fund Bureau Special Account as receipts from the Welfare Insurance Special Account and
does not include the part transferred to other accounts (e.g. transfers to Seamen's
Insurance Special Account).
SOURCE: Compiled and recalculated from statistics, Ministry of Finance.
between the private and the public sector. In the previous
section we have clarified the mechanism of the Welfare Pension
Insurance Scheme itself, how its revenue and expenditure are
composed of. Thus we could show tne whole mechanism of the
Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme in the national economy.
Before concluding tne section, we will try an additional
attempt to show distinctly, the economic function of the
Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme in the national economy,
admitting the difficulty associated with the Accounting
17
Period, and also admitting that the accuracy may be
reduced. Thus our attempt is to consolidate the
mechanism of the Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme into
the wider mechanism of the flow of funds between the Welfare
Insurance bpecial Account, the Trust Fund Bureau Special
Account, and the private and the public sectors which are the
receivers arid the payers of the loan and interest. We
will base our accounting period on tnat of the latter,
and assume that the proportion of the items of the revenue
17
For detail, See Further Explanations at the end of
the present Section.
100
and expenditure of the Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme
"JO
remains the same. J (diagram 5)* In the final diagram thus
obtained, we can see the whole mechanisans of the Welfare Pension
Insuranch Scheme which can rarely be understood in full
due to themany complicacies we have had to face in our
analysis. We see in the diagram how the Scheme is
affecting and altering the flow of funds of national
economy under the cover of those mysterious mechanisms
we have analysed. In this diagram we represent the whole
insurance function as the "Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme", and
all the Exchequer function carried out by the General
Account, other Special Account and Trust Fund Bureau Special
Account as the "Exchequer". The loan and the purchase of
goods and services to the private sector, and the interest
payments from the px'ivate sector, are shown in direct lines
oetween "Firms" anu "Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme". This
method is adopted since it will calrify the relation distinctly,
and since we are concerned with the economic function of the
Scheme rather than in institutional details.
We assume here that the interest payments from the
private sector come from undistributed profits of firms,
while the interest payments from the Local Governments,
Central Government, and their Enterprises, come through the
general taxation revenue.
_
For further details, see Further Explanations to this
Section.
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We can conclude tiiia section by summarising the
main points which the Diagram shows. First of all the
scheme helps the development of the economy through
a large proportion of supply of funds to the industries, etc.,
the funds of which are mostly collected through employers
and employees' contributions. Secondly, we see the
magnitude of net receipt of the Exchequer, which is used
in the public sector mostly in local governments and also
in the govern ent enterprises. A clear cut view of the
scheme is its tax collecting machinery for the management
of tne Exchequer. The thira small item is the pension
payment which is supposed to be the original purpose of the
scheme. We find it misleading if we understand the
Japanese old age pension scheme merely as a. mechanism
of transferring private fimds from people well off to
those in need, and if we try to pursue the effect of that
process, since the main function is not that at all.
Last of all we will classify them in a social accounting
representation. ^"9 (Diagram 6).
1 Qy This is based on the analysis of the British case, by
Peacock, A.T., ibid., p. 39.
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DIAGRAM 6
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The reason why we have to adopt an assumption that the
proportions of the items of the revenue and expenditure
of the Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme remain the same
is because there is a discrepancy in the accounting system
between two opecial Accounts with which we are concerned.
The revenue and expenditure of the Welfare Insurance
Special Account includes those in the Receipts and
.disbursement Adjustment Period. More precisely, Account
for the fiscal year 1959 includes those revenues and
expenditures which are legally due for the fiscal year 1959
and yet actual cash transactions are carried out within the
Adjustment Period. On the other hand, the Account does
not include those parts which are legally due for the
fiscal year 1958 and yet actual payments and receipts are
carried out in April or lay, 1959. (As the fiscal year
3tarts in April in Japan, April and May, 1959 belong as a
financial period to the fiscal year 1959). (The Adjustment
Period of Receipts and disbursement of the Exchequer is
until the end of April of the following year in the case of
transactions with the private sector, wriile it is until the
end of May in the case of transfers within the Exchequer).
On /
On the other hand, the deposit to the Trust Fund
Bureau Special Account is a cash deposit. Therefore,
the revenue and expenditure in the Adjustment Period for
the fiscal year 1959 are not included in this Account,
while a part of the revenue arid expenditure of the Pension
Account of the Welfare Insurance Special Account due for
the fiscal year 1958 are included in the Deposit Increase
in the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account for the fiscal
year 1959«
Because of this discrepancy in the accounting period
of the two Accounts, there inevitably occurs some
discrepancies oetween the surplus of the Welfare Pension
Insurance Scheme and the estimated increase in deposit
of the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account. Since no
further statistics are available* we had to introduce the
?0
assumption mentioned in the text.
Section 5. .National Pension Scheme.
We have so far discussed the place of the Welfare
Pension insurance in the national economy of Japan,
including the analysis of its function in supplying the
fiscal funds. We nave also mentioned tnat the new
National Pension Scheme will come to have a very important
place in the near future. Let us turn now to the National
20 *
Txiis explanation is based on the information supplied
from Ministry of Finance, Mr. Kitaaa, ibid.
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Pension Scheme and try to carve in relief the place of
its finance in the developing Japanese economy, and try
to get the magnitude of the role which it is likely to
carry.
The new Japanese National Pension Scheme, promulgated
in the Act of 1959» is composed of two diffex'ent schemes,
different in economic nature, i . e v one is a contributory
pension scheme, the other a non-contributory. The latter
belongs to the category of the national assistance services,
so tne former is our main interest. It is composed of
five kinds of schemes, namely, the old age pension, the
disabled pension, the mother and child family pension, the
orphans' pension, and the widows' pension; the first one
is the most fundamental and important scheme of all. The
insured are to be fundamentally those who are not covered by
the existing public pension schemes. The first item of the
revenue of the scheme is the contribution. But we have
to notice here that there exists no employers* contribution.
So it is the two partite system of contribution. The
contribution period is between 2C) to 59 years of age and
the pension age is 65. The contribution rate is ¥ 100 per
month between ages 20 to 34 and ¥150 between 35 to 59.
(For tnose between 20 arid 55 years in April, I960, the
contribution period is shortened and, consequently, the
pension /
pension amount is decreased). The contribution duty
can be exempted for low income receivers. The minimum
contribution period, as a rule, is 25 years - 10 years for
those who received contribution exemption.
The second revenue item is the Treasury Supplement,
which bears the sum equivalent to half of the contributions
paid in that fiscal year and all the administrative cost.
Re-adjustiuent and recalculations on the contribution amounts,
the benefit payments etc. will be carried out at least every
five years. The third revenue item is the interest
payment; on tne deposits in the Trust Fund Bureau Special
Account wnich:comes from the industrial sector, etc. and
which is expected to become the biggest revenue item within
15 years.
As to the expenditure side, the first item is the
transfer to private current account in the form of pensions
for old age, disabled, families without fathers, orphans
and widows. The pension amount is ¥3»500 a month for those
who have contributed for 40 years, and ¥2,000 for those for
25 years. The second item is the administrative expense
which is needed to carry out the scheme. The balance of
income and expenditure is made up by the surplus on current




As to the financial administration, it adopts a
funding system and the excess revenue over payment is paid
in to the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account under the
control of the Ministry of Finance ana utilized as a fiscal
fund as the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme. A certain
proportion of the fund, i.e. 25 per cent of the annual
surplus for 1961, is expected to be used for welfare
facilities for the benefit of the contributors.
This is a brief outline of the scheme, wnich will
become clearer when we try to show the place of the scheme
in the economy. One feature of the scheme is that it
adopts a funding system and the flat rate contribution and
payment system. As we saw, the Exchequer Supplement is
decided as a proportion of the contribution amount, not of
the benefit payment, as is the case of the Welfare Pension
Insurance Scheme. This implies that the Exchequer Supplement
will be considez^ably large from the starting year and will
increase gradually. On the other hand the benefit
payment will not start immediately; at least 10 years
later in the case of the transient old age pension
receivers and 40 years for full pension receivers. We
must, therefore realize that the main function of the new
National Pension Scheme during the coming 20 to 30 years
will not be the transfer of money from the rich to the poor,
or /
or the well off to those temporarily or permanently in need,
but the transfer of funas from public to the Exchequer and,
through the Exchequer, to the industries, etc. We will
see the chief economic effect of the scheme, as its reserve
creating function and thus furnishing industry etc. with the
fiscal fund3. The supply of funds seems to be the crucial
function it achieves.
Let us first look at the financial magnitude of the
National Pension Scheme, by comparison with each item of the
Welfare Pension Insurance scheme.
If we take the contribution figure, it corresponds
to about one third of that of the Welfare Pension Insurance.
This reflects the fact that the contribution is decided at
an extremely low rate in the National Pension Scheme, but
this amount will gradually increase in the future. Secondly,
if we take the Exchequer Supplement we find it far bigger,
more than 6 times as big as that of the Welfare Pension
Insurance, and if we add the Exchequer Supplement for the
deficit of the scheme, it amounts to nearly 7 times as much.
This shows that more taxation revenue is used in the new
scheme. Because the scheme is just starting, the interest
revenue is very low, representing only 5 per cent of that
of the Welfare Pension Insurance; but it will increase
rapidly in the future, reaching 70 per cent of the total
benefit payment. The net increase in reserves shows about
half /
half of the figure for the Welfare Pension Insurance from
the base year. The reserve will increase rapidly according
to the increase of the contribution, the Exchequer
Supplement and the interest revenue, and also owing to the
smallness of pension payment in the initial 15 to 20 years;
it will become one of the biggest items in the supply of
funds in the future.
We now have a rough iaea of the size of the National
Pension Scheme in its starting year in comparison with the
Welfare Pension Insurance. In order to examine the function
which the scheme is likely to nave in the future, we will
show its mechanisi in the flow of funds diagram by taking
the figure for the fiscal year 1975 when a certain amount of
fluid flows into Households in the Private Sector in the form
of pension payments (.Diagram 7). The figure we use here is a
mere forecast of the future financial condition and is subject
to considerable uncertainties. To evaae the arbitrariness
of assumptions, we will snow a surplus on a current account
• - «v< .■ ,,
simply in a line from the Scheme to Exchequer, and the
interest revenue in a simple line from Exchequer to the
Scheme. This is because we are not sure what will be the
future operation of the surplus of the Scheme between the
private and the public sector. The diagram shows that the
main function of the Scheme in 15 years' time will still be
a /
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a predominantly important surplus creation mechanism.
This is the reason why we have to consider the effect of
the surplus investment in the analysis of the National
Pension Scheme (See Chapter V). As is shown in the
diagram, it can be clearly seen, again, that the main
function of the scheme is a reserve creating machinery and
a supplier of a fiscal fund for industry, etc. It is
thus rather astonishing that this scheme is regarded as one
of the main political means of increasing and enlarging social
security, and of advancing the "Welfare State". The main
function even in 15 years* time is not at all the welfare
of tne insured.
Though we do not know for certain, if the present
financial mecnanism is maintained, the surplus of the
Scheme will in the future be deposited to the Trust Fund
Bureau Special Account and will be operated in the Fiscal
Investment and Loan Programme. The increasing trend of the
pension surplus will affect the policy considerations of the
Fiscal Investment and Loan Programmed A part of the surplus
may be utilized for the construction investment of welfare
facilities, workers houses, hospitals, etc. The ratio of
25 per cent of the surplus, adopted for the fiscal year 1961,
_
See also Chapter V, Section 4.
way continue for a considerable period, in view of political
2
conditions. Here we introduce an estimation of future
trends of revenue and expenditure of the National Pension
(Table 10)
Scheme calculated by the Ministry of Welfare./ The figures
in our previous diagram are obtained from this estimation.
As we see in the Table, the reserve accumulation of the
National Pension Scheme will increase at a very high rate
in the future. It will nearly amount to ¥1 billion in
1975# The annual surplus of the Scheme is also expected
to grow over the coming 30 years. The total revenue of the
Scheme will exceed double the expenditure during the same
period, thus making the reserve creation, i.e., the supply
of fiscal funds, greater than the total of transfer payments
to the beneficiaries. (As to the significance of this
magnitude in the national economy, and the comparison of
the reserve accumulation and the annual increase of reserve
of the Scheme with the scale of the total Piscal Investment
and Loan Programme etc. these are given in Chapter V, Section
3).
A 3hort explanation will be given on the assumptions
on which this estimate is based. The main assumptions of
3
this estimate are
1) Por compulsory entrants of the scheme, 70 per cent are
p
As to its criticisms, See Chapter V, Section 4 and also
Chapter VI.
The Reference Material issued in conjunction with the
National Pension Scheme Bill, 1959. Ministry of Welfare.

























1961 25.2 1.0 12.6 0.2 39.0 — — 39.0
1965 29.5 11.0 14.8 0.2 55.5 — 2.0 53.5 233.2
j 1970 35.5 27.7 17.a 0.2 81.2 - 8.5 72.7 554.5
1980 37.0 70.4 18.5 0.2 126.1 23.2 41.0 85.1 1,357.1
1990 37.7 118.5 18.8 0.2 175.2 61.1 82.5 92.8 2,260.0
2005 35.2 181.1 17.6 0.2 234.1 147.8 173.6 60.4 3,412.8
2025 31.9 176.2 15.9 0.2 224.2 230.3 253.7 29.5 3,276.1
TABLE 10
1. Assumptions are explained in the text.
SOURCE: Ministry of Welfare
able to contribute, and. 85 per cent of these contributions
due are collected.
2) For voluntary entrants, one third of these join in
the scheme arid the collection rate is 100 per cent.
3) The Exchequer Supplement contains 199 million yen of
the special supplement, in addition to the original amount
of one half of contribution revenues, fixed in the National
Pension Act, 1959.
4) The interest rate is 5.5 per cent.
5) Eighty-five per cent of the contributors are fully
qualified as beneficiaries, ana 70 per cent will actually
be paid.
6) Some other technical assumptions of minor interest are
omitted.
Apart from the general problem of the difficulty of
future estimates, on the whole these assumptions seem to be
underestimates. First of all, in item 1), only 70 per c:ent
of contributors are assumed to be able to contribute.
This is an underestimate, particularly as a long term estimate,
because a high rate of economic growth is more likely to make
the present contribution rate (¥100 (=2 shillings) or ¥150
a month) a negligible amount to the future income of
contributors.^ Even in the short run, the experience since
April, 1961 (i.e. the time when the collection of contributions
*
For furtner discussions, See Chapter V, Section 3«
started), tJaose incapable of contributing were only about
5
10 per cent of contributors. Secondly, in the same item
1), 85 per cent of those contributions uue are assumed to
be collected. This also seems to be too low as a long
term estimate. The actual figure obtained between the
1st April and the 31st October, 1961, is expected to be
already around 86.5 per cent.1 Thirdly, judged by past
experience, the interest rate will be higher than the
assumed rate of 5.5 per cent. The Special Exchequer
Supplement in item 3)> inserted conventionally for the sake
of calculation, will more likely not be required, tnough the
people engaged in the estimates were aware that the interest
7
revenue may be greater than the estimates. Expenditure
will not become fully operational for a long time, and as
a whole, the actual reserve is more likely to increase above
O
the figure of this estimate. Moreover, the scale of each
budget item of the Scheme, as well as the coverage, is more
likely to increase in the near future. Further discussions
are given in Chapter V, Section 3.
To bridge the analysis of this chapter to the demand
5
This information is supplied from Mr. Fuchiwaki, of the
Ministry of Welfare in his letter of November, 1961.
The research result of the Ministry of Welfare on the
31st October, 1961. Supplied from Mr. Fuchiwaki, See Note 5.
^' In the note of the estimates, this point is mentioned.
Q
* The actual result for the first year, however, will only
become clear in April, 1962.
analysis following we will show the expected future
financial impact of the National Pension Scheme in a flow
of funds diagram with algebraic figures. 'fhis is to evade
the arbitrariness in assuming magnitudes which are nearly
completely subject to temporal government policies, 3uch
as the distribuxive ratio of the fund between the private
and the public sectors,- and yet we can show the actual
mechanism of the flow of funas in the diagram. Above all,
this simplified diagram will make the following analysis
more easy to approach. (Diagram 8)
Having looked at the place of the finance of the Welfare
Pension Insurance and the National Pension Scheme in greater
detail than in any other previous study, we can proceed tc
theoretical analysis, ana the application of income
determination theory and growth theory to the Japanese case.
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aPPEBJIOES TO. CHAPTER II
1. Accounts of Welfare Insurance Special Account
Apart from the items which are self-evident, the
following items neeaed a special analysis:
1. Pension Sub-Account.
(ij Transfers to the Seamen's Insurance Special Account
(¥1 m) and one third of transfers to the National Public
Service Mutual Aid Association (about ¥ 22 m) are deposited(as re
to the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account. In view of their
economic function, these are included in Surplus on Current
Account.
(ii) The rest is used for the construction of welfare facilities
etc. for the benefit of the insured of certain Mutual Aid
Associations, and therefore, is included in Purchase of Goods am
Services, except repayment of contributions (¥ 7 m) which is
deducted from contributions.
2. Miscellaneous Revenues (¥5 m). The repayment of the
pensions by pensioners to the Pension Scheme and the unreceived
cheque for pension payments are deducted from Transfers to
Beneficiaries.
5. Transfer Payment from the Seamens* Insurance Special Account
(¥1 m): This comes from the general revenue of the Seamens'
Insurance Special Account. Since a predominant magnitude
of the contribution revenue is in the revenue account of the
same Special Account, this part is assumed to have come from
the contribution revenue.
2. Business Sub-Account
1. Expenditures for Welfare Facilities: The amount (¥498 m)
transferred from tne Pension Account is used for
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for the welfare facilities related to the Welfare
Pension Insurance Scheme. Therefore, this part is
included in the Purchase of Goods and Services.
Double accounting is evaded with the transfer to
Business Account from Pension Account.
(2) Administrative Expenses (¥2,962 m); Expenses
for the Construction of Offices (¥295 m); Expenses
for the Construction of Houses of Government Officials
(engaged in the administration of the three social
insurance schemes (¥11 m)); and Emergency Reserves
(¥40 m) are managed mixedly, and treated to be non-
1
divisable.
Moreover expenses for the Offices of the National
Pension Scheme (¥118 m) are deducted from the Expenditure
item of Expenses for the Construction of Offices
(¥295 m) since the latter includes the former, apart
2
from tne expenses for the other two health insurances.
Administrative Expenses directly supplied by a
transfer from Health Account (¥145 m) are deducted from
Administrative Expenses to be financed by general
revenues (¥2,962 m).^
J * The reply of the Ministry of Finance to the enquiry
of the divisibility of these items were, "it is non-
divisible" .
2 *
Budget of the State, ibid., p. 715 and p. 92.
Budget of the State, ibid., p. 715.
If we assume that the thus adjusted expenditure
items are distributed to the three Schemes proportional
to their benefit payment expenses, we can obtain the
figures corresponding to the Welfare Pension Insurance
Scheme, e.g.,Expenses for the Construction of Offices,
corresponding to the Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme
are obtained as, Budget Figure (¥295 m) - Other Purpose
(*118 m) a Actual Expenses for Three Social Insurances
(¥182).
A = Benefit Payments for Health Insurance ¥72,542 m.
B = " " for Daily Workers Health Insurance,
¥5,939 m.
C = " " for Welfare Pension Insurance,
¥10,575 m.
Q
The corresponding figure « ¥182 -—«—rj- = ¥22 m,A 4* J34* \j
This is included in the Purchases of Goods and Services
shown in a line from "Welfare Pension Insurance Scheme"
to "Firms" in the diagram.
(3) Miscellaneous Revenues (¥527 m): These are mostly
composed of late charge for contributions, and treated
as contributions;with a very small exception of taxation.
(4) Emergency reserves in both of the two Sub-Accounts
are conventionally incluued in administration.
Revenues are distributed in the same way as above.
TheBe are the additional explanations on the
treatment /
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treatment of figures of Welfare Insurance Special Account.
2. Interest Revenue of Welfare Insurance Special Account.
Interest payments from the pi-ivate sector and the public
sector to the Welfare Insurance Special Account are derived
in the following manner. (All for the fiscal year 1959,
unit: ¥ m).
(1) Total interest revenue of the Pension Sub-Account of
the Welfare Insurance Special Account paia through the Trust
Puna Bureau Special Account (A) is
A = 18,695 (Source: Budget of State, 1959, ibid., p. 712)
(2) Total interest revenue of the Trust Fund Bureau Special
Account (B) is
B = 103,044 (Source: Statistics of Financial Bureau,
Ministry of Finance).
(3) Total loan for welfare facilities specifically financed
by a certain proportion of the Welfare Pension Insurance
Scheme Surplus (G), (hereafter will be called simply welfare
facilities), is
C a 51,700 (Source: ibid, at the end of the fiscal
year 1959).
(4) Total of the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account funds (D) is
B = 1,711,230 (Source: ibid, at the end of the fiscal
year 1959).
(5) The proportion of C over 1), (E), - = E = 3.02$
(6) Interest revenue (of Welfare Insurance Special Account)
corresponding /
corresponding to loans to welfare facilities (F) is obtained
as P = B x E = 103,044 x 0.0302 = 3,113.
differences in interest rates are neglected.
(7) distribution of loans for welfare facilities (C) between
the public sector (G-) and the private sector (H).
G = 17,500
H = 34,200 (Source: ibid),
where G + H = G = 51,700.
(8) Proportion of the loans given to welfare facilities in the
public sector to the total loans given to welfare facilities (I)
and the proportion of loans given to welfare facilities in the
private sector to total loans given to welfare facilities (J).
T G G 17z500 . 33.851 = 3+R = = 517703 7
, H H 34,200 . 66.15J = ~c~ = 51,750 ? ""—;
(9) distribution ofthe interest revenue from loans for
welfare facilities between the public sector (K) and the
private sector (L).
K = F x I = 3,113 x 0.3385 £= 1,054
L = P x J = 3,113 x 0.6615 | 2,059
where K + L = P = 3,113.
(10) distribution of the total interest revenue of the
Trust Fund Bureau Special Account (B) between the public




N = 42,095 (Source: ibid).
(11) Distribution of the total interest revenue of the
Trust Fund Bureau Special Account after the deduction
of the loans for welfare facilities (P )between the public
sector (Q) ana the private sector (R).
P = B - F = 103,044 - 3,113 = 99,931
Q a M - K = 60,949 - 1,054 = 59,895
R = N - L a 42,095 ~ 2,059 = 40,036
where P a Q + R.
(12) Proportion of the loans to the public sector to the
total loans, excluding the loans to the welfare facilities,
(S) and the proportion of the loans to the private sector
to tne total loans, excluding the loans to the welfare facilities (T)
q Q Q 59*895 . qQ (S = = -g- = ? 59 *
rp R _ R 40*036 . Anf = q+R = P" = PP7P3I • 40 *
(13) distribution of the interest revenue of the Welfare
Insurance Special Account, excluding the interest revenue
on loans for the welfare facilities (I!) between the
public sector (V) and the private sector (W)
U = A - P = 18,695 - 3,113 - 15,582
V s U x S a 15,582 x 0.5994 = 9,340
W a U x T a 15,582 x 0.4006 = 6,242
where /
where U = V + W
(14) Distribution of the total interest revenue of the
Welfare Insurance Special Account between the public sector
(X) and tiie private sector (Y)
X = V + K = 9,340 + 1,054 = 10,394
Y = W + L = 6,242 + 2,059 = 8,301
where X + Y = B = 18,695.
(15) Surplus on current account of the Pension Sub-Account
of the Welfare Insurance Special Account (Z-^) and the
increase in deposit from the Welfare Insurance Special
Account in the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account (Zg).
Z1 = 65,569 (Source: Budget of the State, ibid. p.712)
Z2 = 56,500
The difference is caused by discrepancies of accounting periods
(16) Distribution of the total interest revenue of the
Welfare Insurance Special Account, corresponding to the
increase in deposit from the Welfare Insurance Special
Account in the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account, (B^"),
between the public sector (X^) and the private sector (Y"^).
XI = X x -|2 = 10,394 x * 8,956
Y1 « Y x -|2 « 8,301 x f
where B1 = X"*" + Y1 = 16,109 (See Diagram 7).
These analyses were obtained from information and
statistics supplied by the Ministry of Finance.
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CHAPTER III. TH5 KATIOBAL P8KS10F SCH^'S AND FATIOKAI, EXPENDITURE
Section 1. Introduction
The object of this chapter is to give a theoretical analysis of
the effect of the National Pension Scheme on national expenditure.
A statistical illustration of the model built in this chapter
follows in Chapter IV, Thus, these two chapters consider the effect
of the Scheme on demand.
Section 2 of the present chapter is concerned with preparatory
analysis. Following a brief indication that the scheme affects not
only demand, but also supply, the impact effect of the National
Pension Scheme on national expenditure is analysed with the aid of
simple social accounting representations and algebra. Starting from
the simplest case of contributions and pension payments, explanations
are given of the analytical complications caused by the introduction
of the Exchequer Supplement, the interest payments from the public
sector, the investment of the surplus, and the interest payments
from the private sector.
Section 3 deals with the building of a comparative static
income determination model which illustrates the effect of the
National Pension Scheme on national expenditure.
A comparative static model with a pay-as-you-go system of
contributions proportional to income is analysed in the Appendix
to this chapter.
Section 2. Preparatory Analysis
First of all, a pension scheme affects national expenditure by
causing changes in consumption and in investment via income redis¬
tribution among contributors, tax payers, business firms, the
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Government Sxchequer, and pensioners. The changes are also multiplied
through time. These are the effects on the aggregate demand.
Secondly, a scheme affects supply indirectly via the changes
in the aggregate demand, and sometimes directly via its effects on
the levels and the ratios of savings and investment. These are the
effects on the aggregate supply. We shall consider the supply side
in Chapter V.
The aggregate demand analysis concerns itself, first and fore¬
most, with the impact effect on national expenditure, i.e. ho\^
expenditure on consumption and investment are affected by the
scheme and how this effect varies according to the composition of
the financing of the scheme and of the expenditure structure. (So
as not to be involved in the problem as to whether or not full
employment is reached and whether supply automatically adjusts
itself to changes in demand in the short run, we shall be concerned
with changes in money national income.)
In the simplest case, changes in national expenditure are
caused by income redistribution between contributors and pensioners.
According to whether the decrease of consumption of contributors
due to the levy of contributions for the pension scheme is more,
the same, or less than the increase of consumption of pensioners
due to the pension receipts from the scheme, the changes in con¬
sumption take negative, zero, or positive values. The size of the
changes in expenditure is deteimined firstly by the size of con¬
tributions and pension payments, secondly, by the ratio of contribu¬
tions and pension payments, and thirdly, by the marginal propensities
to consume of contributions and of pensioners. The impact effect
differs according to the different methods of financing contributions ,
i.e., whether a flat rate or an income proportional contribution
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system is adopted. As a flat rate contribution system is adopted
in the National Pension Scheme of Japan, contributions are here
assumed to be determined independently of national income unless
otherwise stated. With the aid of social accounting and algebra,
the impact on expenditure can be analysed in the following ways.
Revenue Expenditure
Contributions Q Pension Payments P
Surplus S
Total Q Total P + S
Table 1.
A Y =* -c Q + c* P (l)1
where AY are the impact changes in income, Q are contributions,
P are pension payments, and c and c' are the marginal propensities
to consume of contributors and pensioners, respectively.
Contributions (Q) reduce the disposable income of contributors,
and hence decrease the consumption expenditure of contributors by
c Q and pension payments (P) increase the disposable income of
pensioners and hence increase the consumption expenditure of
pensioners by c'P. The impact effect is the summation of these two.
1
Formula (1) shows the impact changes in income due to the intro¬
duction of the pension scheme. It does not consider the case where
the contribution rate is raised in any existing scheme. Therefore,
the contribution (Q) is equal to the increase in contributions A Q,
since the contribution before the scheme is zero.
Q - 0 = A Q Q = A Q. (Similarly for pension payments).
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The marginal propensity to consume of pensioners is assumed to
be either greater than, or equal to, the marginal propensity to
consume of contributors, (c1 ^ c). The surplus of the scheme is
assumed not to be invested at the moment and the consequential
multiplier effect will be neglected.
The greater the ratio of P to Q, and the greater c' and the
smaller c, the greater will be A Y. If ~ ^ 4- , -a Y ^ 0. As
the balance of the revenue (contributions) and the expenditure
(pension payments) is surplus S,
S = Q - P (2)
By replacing P and S,
P = Q - S (3)
If formula (3) is inserted into formula (1),
AY = -c Q + c' (Q - s)
= Q c + c« (1 - §)] (4)
The smaller the ratio of S to Q, the greater the impact effect
due to a unit of contribution revenues.
If f. £ 1 - | , 41^0.
If no surplus is assumed,
S = 0 (5)
Then formula (1) is altered to
AY = -cQ + c'P
= Q(c' - c) , (6)
If c'>c, 4Y>0. c' = c,AY = 0.
Thus we find that if no surplus is formed, the introduction
of the pension scheme either increases national expenditure (when
the marginal propensity to consume of pensioners is greater than
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that of contributors) or has no effect on the expenditure level
(when the marginal propensity to consume of pensioners is equal to
that of contributors). In the former case the pension scheme has
an inflationary effect on the economy. However, if a surplus is
formed, the effect of the pension scheme may be deflationary.
Whether or not the scheme is deflationary depends on the ratio of
the marginal propensity to consume of pensioners to that of con¬
tributors, and the ratio of the surplus to contributions. If
these two marginal propensities to consume are equal, any surplus
formation will cause a deflationary effect. But if the marginal
propensity to consume of pensioners is sufficiently great compared
with that of contributors, the scheme may cause an increase in
consumption expenditure, in spite of the formation of a surplus.
More precisely, if the ratio of the marginal propensity to consume
of pensioners to that of contributors is greater than the ratio of
contributions to pension payments, the effect will be inflationary.
The first complications arise when the Exchequer Supplement is
introduced into the scheme. If the consumption expenditure side is
considered alone, the changes in income are caused by the income
redistribution among contributors, taxpayers and pensioners. The
effect differs according to whether the Exchequer Supplement is
financed out of an increase of taxation, by deficit financing, or
out of the yearly surplus, but here it is assumed to be financed
by a new Increase of general taxation. Even when the financing
method of the Exchequer Supplement is assumed to be an increase of
taxation, the effect of the scheme corresponding to a unit of the
size of budget differs according to the way in which the amount of
the Exchequer Supplement is decided.
Suppose that general taxation is proportional to national in¬
come. Then the tax rate is built in the formula of the coefficient
which stipulates the multiplier effect. In the same way, if the
amount of the Exchequer Supplement is decided as a fixed proportion
to national income, this rate is built in the formula of the
coefficient. But if the amount of the Exchequer Supplement is
decided as independent of the size of national income, then, even
although it is financed out of general taxation, its functional
relation to income is the same as a flat rate contribution.
In the case of the National Pension Scheme of Japan, the
amount of the Exchequer Supplement is decided as a fixed proportion
to the flat rate contribution revenues. So the Exchequer Supplement
is fixed as independent of national income. In this case, the
Exchequer Supplement causes a decrease in the multiplicand, i.e.
in the size of the impact effect, via a decrease of the consumption
expenditure of tax payers through a decrease of the disposable in¬
come of the same. Expressed in social accounting form, it is
written as,
Pievenue Expenditure
Contributions Q Pension Payments P
Exchequer Supplement E Surplus S
Total Q + S
i — —
Total P + S
Table 2.
AY = -cQ-cE+c'P
-c (Q + E) + c« P (7)
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where E is the Exchequer Supplement and other symbols are the same
as before. The marginal propensities to consume of contributors and
of tax payers are assumed to be the same here. So a unit of con¬
tributions and a unit of the Exchequer Supplement have the same
effect on the impact changes in income on these assumptions.
The second complication arises when interest payments from
the public sector are introduced. If it is assumed that the
Exchequer pays interest on the total fund, the interest amount is
decided by the interest rate and the surpluses of the present and
past periods. On the one hand, contributions, the Exchequer
Supplement, and pension payments are decided as independent of
national income. So each surplus, and consequently, the total
fund is decided as independent of national income. On the other
hand, the interest rate is assumed to be independent of income
level. Consequently, the interest payments from the public
sector are fixed independently of national income. If it is
assumed that these are all financed out of a new increase of
general taxation, the effect of these interest payments is exactly
the same as the effect of the Exchequer Supplement. Moreover, as
both the Exchequer Supplement and the interest payments from the
public sector are financed out of a new increase in general
taxation, and thus supplement the receipts of the pension scheme,
it may be more appropriate to regard both as an Exchequer Supple¬
ment, because the economic nature of these two are exactly the same.
The only difference is that the amount of the original Exchequer
Supplement Is decided as a fixed proportion to contribution
revenues (around ^ in the Japanese case), while the amount of the
Interest payments is decided as a proportion to the accumulation
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of reserves. So, while the former revenue remains considerably
stable, the latter increases rapidly in the later stages of the
scheme. At any rate, if these are listed in social accounting
form, (separately, at the moment), it becomes as follows:
Revenue Expenditure
Contributions Q Pension Payments P
Exchequer Supplement E Surplus S
Interest Payments
from the Public Sector U
Total Q + E + U Total P + S
TABLE
AY = - cQ - cS - cU + c'P
= - c(Q + E + U) + c'P (8)
where U are the interest payments from the public sector and other
symbols remain unchanged. The marginal propensities to consume of
contributors and tax payers are assumed to be the same. As can be
seen in formula (8), the effect of a unit of the Exchequer Supple¬
ment E and that of the interest payments from the public sector U,
are exactly the same as that of a unit of contributions Q on the
conditions and the assumptions adopted so far. So it is possible
to summarize these three revenue items into one social security
tax T. The relation can be written as
T = Q + E + U (9)
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So these three will he treated as one social security tax in the
following analysis, until it becomes necessary to isolate the
interest payments from the public sector U from the other two when
the numerical examination of the impact effect is attempted in the
next chapter. This will be necessary because the projected
figures for the interest payments from the public sector U are
lacking, and only the projection of the total interest revenue
which include a large amount of the interest payments from the
private sector, is known. Leaving this discussion to a later stage
of this thesis, if Table 3 is simplified by the summation of these
three revenue items,
Revenue Expenditure
Social Security Tax T Pension Payments P
Surplus S
Total T Total P + S
TABLE 4.
AY = -cT + c' P (10)
The result is exactly the same as formula (1) except that con¬
tributions Q are substituted by social security tax T in formula
(10). So the same explanations of the effect of the ratio of Q
and P on the size of the impact effect is applicable to that of
the ratio of T and P. The economic implications explained in that
context as inflationary and deflationary effects are applicable to
the above case.
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It has been assumed so far that surplus is accumulated and not
spent. However, if the assumption is altered to the effect that
the surplus of the fund is invested by the government, the impact
on the national expenditure is accordingly altered. An accounting
form and formula of an impact effect are altered as
Revenue Expenditure
Social Security Tax T Pension Payments P
s
Surplus Investment I
Total / T Total P + Is
TABLE 5.
AY = -cT + c • P + IS (11)
where Is is the surplus investment, i.e.^the investment financed
by the surplus fund, and other symbols remain unaltered. All the
2
surplus is assumed to be invested in the above formula. Then
Is = S, where S is the surplus. (For the sake of simplicity, the
distinction between revenue account and capital account is not
listed in the Table).
As from Table 5 T = P + Is and from the assumption c c1,
foiroula (11) is altered as
Ay = - c(P + Is) + c* P + Is
= P(c' - c) + Is(l - c)
As 1 2? c1 ^ c by the assumption, AYiO. (only when c' = c = 1,
A Y = 0).
2
For the case where the surplus is not assumed to be invested in its
orcM i;ofv Sflfl FtiiS+htfT 1 <rp+-1 nn<5 1
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If the above mathematical demonstrations are explained in more
general terms, these become as follows. Even if a surplus is
formed, yet if all the surplus is invested, then the effect of the
pension scheme is inflationary, so long as the marginal propensity
to consume of contributors is less than unity.
The last of the complications arises when the surplus fund is
not only invested in the public sector but also is partly loaned
to and invested in the private sector. If this happens, a part of
the interest payments comes from the private sector. In the
simplest social accounting representation, the relation can be
expressed as follows.
Revenue Expenditure
Social Security Tax T Pension Payments P
Interest Payments from
the Private Sector R
Surplus Investment Is
Total T + R Total P + Is
TABLE 6.
These interest payments from the private sector R cannot be treated
in the same way as the interest payments from the public sector
which are financed out of an increase in general taxation. The
simplest assumption will be that all the interest payments from
the private sector are financed out of the undistributed corporate
profits. This means that these interest payments cause the same
amount of decrease in the business savings. However, it may be
difficult to assume that no shift of incidence takes place at all.
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If the distributive ratio of business savings to personal income
is assumed to remain constant, then it may be appropriate to assume
that this new increase of burden to the business firms will finally
be borne in the same proportions as the distribution ratio of the
undistributed corporate profits to personal income. " If this
assumption is made, the interest payments from the private sector
cause a decrease of the private investment via the undistributed
corporate profits by the amount of b R, and, at the same time, a
decrease of consumption of personal income by the amount of
c(l - b)R. If these relations are inserted into the social
accounting representation, it is altered as:
Revenue Expenditure
Social Security Tax T Pension Payments P
Interest Payments from (l-b)R
Personal Income
Surplus Investment Is
Interest Payments from b R
Undistributed Corporate
Profits
Total T + R Total P + Is
TABLE 7.
The impact effect of the pension scheme on the national ex¬
penditure is written as
3 For alternate treatments of the interest payments from the
private sector relaxing the present assumptions, see
Further Complications 2.
AY = - c T - c (1-b) R + c' P + If - b R
c» P - c jjT + (1 - b) r] Is - b R (12)
where (1 - b) is the distributive ratio of personal income to
national income, (1 - b)R is the decrease of personal income due
to the interest payments from the private sector, b is the dis¬
tributive ratio of the undistributed corporate profits to
national income, b R is the decrease of investment via the undis¬
tributed corporate profits, and other symbols remain unaltered.
The marginal propensity to consume of contributors, of tax payers,
and of the personal income sector at large is assumed to be the
4
same, c. The decrease in investment out of the undistributed
corporate profits is assumed to be equal to the decrease in the
4
undistributed corporate profits.
The first part of formula (12) represents the impact changes
in consumption and the latter half represents the impact changes in
investment. The summation of them is the total impact effect which
is multiplied through the multiplier processes.
Surplus investment Is in formula (12) is obtained as the
difference between the total revenue (which is the summation of
social security tax and interest payments from the private sector)
and pension payments. That is I" = (T + R) - P.
Surplus investment in formula (11) is obtained as the
difference between social security tax and pension payments. That is
Is = T - P .
See footnote 3.
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So if social security tax minus pension payments (T - P) is
expressed as I|, surplus investment after the introduction of the
interest payments from the private sector, i.e., Is in foiroula (12)
becomes as Is = T - P + R = I-j- + R. If this is inserted into
formula (12),
AY = c1 P - c + (1 - b) r| + (I-. + R) - b R
= (c* P - c T + I1) + c(l - b) R + ( 1 - b) Ry
= (c,P-cT+I1) + (l- b) (1 - c) R (13)
The item in the first bracket of formula (13) represents the
changes in income due to the pension scheme without the interest
payments from the private sector. So this naturally corresponds
to formula (11) and takes, as a rule, a positive sign. This can
be demonstrated as follows. From Tables 6 and 7,
T + R = P + Is = P + I1 + R.
.*. T = p + Ii-
If this is inserted into the item in the first bracket of foimula
(13),
c' P - c T + Ix = c« P - c (P + I-j.) + I1
= (c• - c) P + (1 - c) I2
> 0 (V 1 ^ c« ^ c)
The latter item of formula (13) represents the changes in
income due to +*he introduction of the interest payments from the
private sector, c(l - b) R is the decrease in consumption in
personal income, b R is the decrease in investment via undistributed
corporate profits, and R is the increase in surplus investment via
interest revenue from the private sector. As is seen in formula (13),
this item can be rearranged in one item.
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As b < 1, 0^1, (1 - b) (1 - c) R >0.
This means that the introduction of the interest payments from the
private sector increases national expenditure, so long as the marginal
propensity to consume of contributors is less than unity. The total
impact effect of this type of scheme is the summation of these two.
Formula (13) becomes as
AY = (c* P - c T + I-j) + (1 - b) (1 - c) R
= (c* - c) P + (1 - c) Ij + (1 - b) (1 - c) R
> 0 .
This means in general terms that if all the surplus is invested, the
effect of the pension scheme with interest payments paid by the
private sector has an inflationary effect on the economy, so long
as the marginal propensity to consume of contributors is less than
unity.
If it is assumed that the same amount of revenue R is raised by
an increase in social security tax, instead of raising it in the form
of the interest payments from the private sector, the impact becomes
as
-cR+R = (l-c)R (14)
where c R is the decrease in consumption in personal income and R is
the increase in surplus investment. On the other hand, the impact
effect of the interest payments from the private sector R is
expressed as (as in formula (13))
- c(l - b) R + R - b R = (1-b) (l-c)R (1?)
In order to compare the impact effects of these two cases,
formula (14) minus formula (15) is obtained as
(1 - c) R - (1-b) (1 - c)R = (1 - c) b R ^ 0 (16)
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This implies that the impact effect of the financing by social
security tax is greater than that of the financing by the same amount
of the interest payments from the private sector.
In other words, the introduction of the interest payments from
t
the private sector causes an inflationary effect on the economy, but
a unit effect, i.e.,, an effect corresponding to a unit of the scale
of the budget, will be decreased. The less the proportion of the
interest payments from the private sector compared to social security
tax, the more will be a unit effect of the pension scheme.
From formula (16), the difference of the impact effects of the
two cases is
(1 - c) b R .
The greater b and the smaller c, the greater the difference of the
impact effects.
In general terms, this is such that the more the ratio of undis¬
tributed corporate profits to national income and the less the
marginal propensity to consume of tax payers, the more will be the
decrease of a unit effect by the interest payments from the private
sector.
The analysis so far has been an explanation of the impact
effect of the pension scheme on national expenditure. This is the
preparatory analysis to clarify the treatment of the components of
the income deteimination model and thus to pave the way for an
exercise in model building. The analysis has been limited to the
changes in the aggregate demand. It concerned itself with the
short run impact of the scheme. However, the actual effect of the
pension scheme is not limited to the demand side. Moreover, as has
been found in past years, the increase in investment may be the chief
function of the Rational Pension Scheme for a considerably long
period. As has been analysed previously, if the surplus of the
scheme is invested, the scheme will cause an increase in the total
investment of the economy if the investment in the private sector
is not reduced because of the pension scheme.
This causes an increase in investment demand as was analysed.
But the effect is not limited to this. The increase in investment
creates supply, as well as demand. The increase in supply may bring
about a higher rate of economic growth than would otherwise be the
case. If the ratio of the surplus investment is big, the economic
structure may be altered towards higher investment. This may cause
a higher growth rate, but some other problems may be generated.
These are the long term effects. The productivity may be different
according to the forms of investment.
Further Complications
1. The Surplus-Investment Ratio
If it is assumed that a part of the surplus is invested and a
part is kept behind as an accumulation of reserves, then the
relation is altered as,
Revenue Expenditure
Social Security Tax T Pension Payments P
Surplus Investment Is
Ret Surplus S*
Total T Total P + I6+ S'
TABLE 8
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AY = - c T + c» P + Is
= -cT + c'P+XS (17)
where Is Is the investment financed out of surplus, X is the ratio
of investment out of surplus, (Is = XS), and S is total surplus,
(S = Is + S').
As the net surplus is expressed as Sf, X can be obtained as follows,
s s
X = — = ~--
S IS+ S' .
The introduction of X may be appropriate when the surplus for¬
mation of the pension scheme is too large to be met by the invest¬
ment demand of the economy. If in the later stage of the pension
scheme the surplus formation becomes very large, while the rate of
economic growth becomes very small, then this introduction of X
may become appropriate.
However, so far as the present economic conditions and the near
future are concerned, the demand for the investment fund is very
strong. The present rate of interest on the fiscal funds is still
less than that on loans through private financial organisations.
Moreover, the investment opportunities of fiscal funds are much
affected by the government economic policy. The government can,
to a certain extent, create these opportunities according to the
supply of funds. The need to increase social indirect capital,
such as roads and harbours, to strengthen fundamental industries,
such as electricity and iron and steel, etc. will be increased still
further in the future. In view of these it may be appropriate to
assume that all the surplus is invested for the moment. This means
X = 1.
The introduction of X may become appropriate in a scheme
145
primarily designed so as to work against business fluctuations. That
is to say when the economy is "sagging" the government inserts in¬
vestment expenditures by utilizing the pension surplus, and when the
economy is inflationary the government damps down the excess demand
of the economy by putting aside a part or all of the surplus as an
accumulation of reserves. In these types of schemes, X becomes a
strategic variable against business fluctuations. However, there
are also many other weapons of fiscal policy to adjust business
fluctuations, apart from the complicated mechanism of the pension
scheme. It may not be necessaty to complicate the analysis by
inserting this variable X. In this chapter, as was assumed by
the legislators of the National Pension Act, 1959? all the surplus
is assumed to be invested.
2. The Interest Burden paid by the Private Sector
Broadly speaking there are three possible patterns by which the
burden of the interest payments from the private sector will be dis¬
tributed. Firstly, all may be financed out of undistributed cor¬
porate profits, secondly, a part may be financed out of undistributed
corporate profits and a part out of personal income, and thirdly,
all may be financed out of personal income.
Interest is paid on the government loans to industries - loaned
directly or indirectly through government financial organisations,
to industries. Private enterprises pay the interest. Suppose that
entrepreneurs paid interest out of undistributed corporate profits.
If entrepreneurs do not try to supplement this decrease of undis¬
tributed corporate profits, the burden of the interest payments will
be finally settled there. However, if entrepreneurs try to shift a
part or all of the interest burden to other factors so that they may
keep the balance of undistributed corporate profits, the problem of
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the shift of incidence arises. There are several factors .which need
to be taken into consideration in analysing the shift of incidence of
the burden of the interest payments paid by the private sector.
The first of these is the shift of a part or all of the burden
to wages and salaries. (Hereafter referred to as wages). In a
country where trade union pressures are not strong and the disguised
unemployment is wide spread, this shift of incidence of an extra
burden to wages may easily occur. If the proportion of self-
financing capital of companies in the investment source is low and
if both the government and entrepreneurs are endeavouring to in¬
crease this proportion, entrepreneurs may try hard to minimise the
decrease of undistributed corporate profits and to shift any extra
burden to other factors. These conditions are partly applicable
to the Japanese economy. So a part of the incidence of the interest
burden may thus be shifted to wage earners. This can either take the
form of an actual reduction of wages f* a stoppage or postponement
of an increase in wages, or reduction in the rate of an increase in
wqge bills than would otherwise be the case. Generally speaking,
because of the special nature of wages (in that they do not easily
decline), the shift will take the latter form. At any rate, if
the burden is shifted to wages, the final economic effect will be a
decrease in wages, and consequently a decrease in the consumption
of wage earners, instead of a decrease in investment via a decrease
in undistributed corporate profits.
Suppose that the ratio of the shift of the incidence of the
interest burden to wages is w;(0^w^l). If the marginal propensity
to consume of wage earners is c, then the decrease in consumption of
wage earners is c w R. (R is the total interest payments paid by
the private sector). If the remaining parts of the interest burden
are financed by the undistributed corporate profits, the total impact
effect due to the interest payment from the private sector is the
summation of the decrease in consumption of wage earners by c w R and
the decrease in investment of the undistributed corporate profits by
(1 - w) R. (The latter is altered to u* (1 - w) R, if an invest¬
ment ratio out of the undistributed corporate profits (u1) is inserted,
where o ^ u* 1)
If the difference in the marginal propensities to consume of
different income strata is introduced, and if the marginal propensity
to consume of the i strata is expressed as c i, and the distribution
ratio of the interest burden to the i strata is as wi, then the total
decrease in consumption becomes as ci.ui.wR. If the marginal pro-
pensity to consume of the high income strata is smaller than that of
the low income strata, and if the total amount of the shift of the
interest burden is assumed to be fixed, then the more the proportion
to the high income strata, the less the decrease in consumption, and
consequently, the more the total impact effect of the pension scheme
will be.
Secondly, a part of the burden of the interest payments may be
shifted to the dividend. Under conditions such that the rate of
industrial growth is small, the rate of profitability of firms is
low, and the rate of dividend is low, the shift to the dividends may
be difficult In view of the relation of the dividend and the interest
returns. On the other hand, under the circumstances where the
industrial growth is rapid, the rate of profitability of films is
big and the rate of dividend is much bigger than the interest rate
on deposit, this shift may emerge.
If the marginal propensity to consume of shareholders is cf
and the ratio of the shift of the interest burden to the dividend is
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f, the decrease of consumption becomes cf. f.R.If Cf is assumed to be
the same as the marginal propensity to consume of personal income at
large c, the decrease of consumption becomes c • f.12..
Thirdly, the shift of the incidence of the interest burden may
take the form of a reduction of returns to entrepreneurship. If the
enterprises obtaining loans from the government via the increased
fund supply of the pension scheme are profitable, the profit of the
enterprise may be greatly increased above that which would otherwise
be the case. Under these circumstances, this type of shift of in¬
cidence may be possible. However, in the case when the investment
is profitable in the long run but is not so in the short tun - there
seems to be many of these possibilities in the long terra loans of the
fiscal funds - this shift may not be likely to occur. At any rate,
if this shift occurs and if the marginal propensity to consume of
profit receivers is expressed as cp and the rate of the shift of the
interest burden to entrepreneurial profit as p, the decrease of con¬
sumption becomes cp. p R. If cp is equal to c (the marginal pro¬
pensity to consume of personal income at large), this becomes
c .p. R. However, in general cp is smaller than c, and consequently
cp.R than c.R. So the more the shift of the incidence of the interest
burden to entrepreneurial profit, for a given fixed amount of shift
to personal income, the less the decrease in consumption will be
and the more the total impact effect of the pension scheme will
become.
Fourthly, the interest burden may be shifted to consumers via
a rise in prices. If the consumption demand is inelastic and the
protection of consumers is not sufficient, entrepreneurs may try
to cover the burden by an increase in the prices of the consumption
goods. This may take the form of postponement or reduction in the
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rate of price reduction due to the reduction of cost by new invest¬
ment and technical development. Consumer reaction may be negligible
in this latter case. However, this shift may not easily occur if
competition in the market is very severe. Nevertheless, if this
shift does occur, the consumption function may alter unless consumers
simply maintain their consumption expenditure in money terms
(money illusion case). Saving may also be affected. Thus an attempt
by entrepreneurs to shift the interest burden to the prices of con¬
sumption goods may not result in a simple shift of the interest
burden to consumers.
Fifthly, however, there is an argument about disregarding the
negative effect of the interest payments in the income determination
model. The only possible explanation for this treatment may be,
though it has not been explained clearly in the previous studies in
Japan, that the interest payments are the cost elements. According
to this opinion, as the government loan is usually a reliable long
term, and cheap rate loan, this loan itself means a kind of pro¬
tection policy, so it is not necessary to treat the interest pay¬
ments as a negative element. By this argument, no negative sign of
the interest payments R appears in the model. This implies that the
degree of interest rates does not affect the income generation at all.
However, this view may cause an imbalance in the treatment in that
the interest payments from the government sector are treated as the
increase in taxation and those from the private sector are disre¬
garded in the analysis. Moreover, a fiscal loan is usually a long
term credit and the loan is reloaned again and again, so in sub¬
stance the fiscal loan can be understood, as it were, a government
subsidy accompanied by a negative element in the name of interest
payments.
If the fiscal loan can be thus understood, it seems to be
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correct to analyse the increase in investment due to the subsidy
as a positive effect on the one hand and the interest payments
from the private sector as a negative effect on the other hand
and to understand that the summation of these two are the real
impact of the interest payments from the private sector.
In the Kimura Study^ the negative effect of the interest pay¬
ments which we have analysed is totally neglected.' In this point
the Kimura Study does not analyse the difference in the utilization
of the fiscal funds supplied through the pension surplus, I.e., the
difference between the loan to the public sector and the loan to
the private sector.
So the Kimura Study does not consider that the interest pay¬
ments levied on the loan to the public sector may be financed out
of general taxation. The Kimura Study simply says, without these
analyses of the difference between the loans, that the surplus
causes an increase in investment, and no Interest burden in the
7
normal sense' appears in the model. So it may not be sufficient
J See Introduction, footnote 2.
^
More precisely^ the Kimura Study neglects all interest payments
except those required by the government to subsidize the pension
scheme. This subsidization Is due to the difference between the
interest rate foreseen in the tentative plan and the actual return
from the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account. This difference would
have been caused by the expected interest rate on the pension
reserves falling short of the actual return (7-5f per annum). The
Kimura Study analysed the subsidy suggested in the plan as a means
of bridging this gap. For further discussion of the Kimura Study,
see Chapter VI.
n
' See footnote 6,
just to point out the imbalance of the treatment of the interest
payments, if the analysis of the Kimura Study on this point is to
be criticised. However, more fundamentally, the fiscal investment
and loan are designed to fill the gaps which will emerge under free
enterprise conditions, if all the investment decisions are left to
the private entrepreneurs. The fiscal investment and loan supple¬
ment and strengthen these sectors where sufficient funds cannot be
expected from private investment alone, but also it is essentially
necessary to develop these sectors, if a balanced growth of the
national economy is to be sought after at all. These are investment
and loan which embody policy objectives of the government. Conse¬
quently, there are many investments and loans which are not primarily
profitable. These include the enlargement of social overhead capital
such as the improvements in roads and harbours, the key industries
which need a large amount of long term loans, such as electricity,
and investment with social policy objectives.
It also seems very clear that it is adequate to treat these
interest payments from the government affiliated organisations
such as the National Railway - which shows a large deficit each
year and receives a large amount of state subsidy via taxation
revenue - as, in reality, financings by an increase in taxation.
The same may be said as to the public works, such as land improve¬
ment, etc., which are carried through the government expenditures.
It seems not to be correct simply to neglect the effect of the
interest payments in the model and also it seems not to be adequate
to say that by neglecting this effect a part of the induced effects
are built into the analysis, by being taken into the production
effect.
® The Kimura Study, ibid., p. 78.
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So in the following analysis the interest payments from the private
sector will be built-in in the model.
Sixthly, a part or all of the burden of the interest payments
may be financed out of undistributed corporate profits. This means
that not all of the interest burden or no part of the burden will
be shifted to personal income . Suppose that the condition of perfect
competition obtains and that it is not possible to shift the interest
burden to consumers in the short run via an increase of prices.
Suppose that the pressure of trade unions for an increase in wages is
very strong and that the shift of the burden to wages cannot be ex¬
pected. Adding to these, suppose that the demand for funds is very
great so that the shift of the burden to dividends cannot be achieved.
If entrepreneurs do not part with the increased profits under these
conditions, the extra interest payments will be financed as a decrease
in undistributed corporate profits. If, in this case, undistributed
corporate profits generally generate new investment, then the above
decrease in the undistributed corporate profits causes the same
amount of decrease in investment. Algebraically, if all the interest
payments from the private sector R are financed by a decrease in
undistributed corporate profits, the decrease in investment is R.
If the ratio by which the interest burden is financed out of undis¬
tributed corporate profits is U, the decrease in investment due to
the interest payments from the private sector P becomes u R. (where
o < u 1). Furthermore, if the ratio of the investment realization
out of undistributed corporate profits is e, the above decrease in
investment due to the interest payments becomes e u R. A decrease
in investment due to a unit increase in interest burden is e u
in this context.
The ratio u by which the interest payments from the private
sector are financed by a decrease in undistributed corporate profits
is decided by several factors as was analysed above. The most
typical cases are the ones where u is unity ( u = 1) and the case
where u is equal to d (u = d). In this latter case, d is the ratio
of undistributed corporate profits to national income effected before
the introduction of the relation of the interest payments from the
private sector on the pension loan. The first one when u = 1 is
the case when all the interest payments from the private sector are
financed out of undistributed corporate profits and no shift of
incidence of the interest burden to personal income happens. As the
fiscal fund is generally reliable, long term, and cheap rate, the
profits of firms may increase considerably. If it is regarded as
necessary to finance the interest payments from the private sector
totally out of this newly increased corporate profits, the assumption
of u = 1 will follow. Under this assumption, the effect of the
interest payments from the private sector is decided by factors
such as, the scale of the surplus formation of the pension scheme,
the interest rate, and the ratio of the investment realisation out
of undistributed corporate profits, but not by the ratio of undis¬
tributed corporate profits to national income. This means that it is
not necessary to build in the finance of business savings into the
model. As no effect on personal income is involved, the impact
effect can be expressed very distinctly in the model. If the
decrease in undistributed corporate profits is assumed to cause an
equal amount of decrease in investment, the decrease in investment
by the interest payments from the private sector is R. If the
ratio of the investment realization of undistributed corporate
profits is A, this becomes \R. The total impact of the introduction
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of the pension scheme on national expenditure becomes as follows,
under the assumptions that all the surplus formation is invested
and the decrease of undistributed corporate profits causes the same
amount of decrease in investment.
Y = - cT + c'P + Is - R
= (c« P - c T) + (Is - B) (18)
(compare with formula (12) in the text).
However, the above assumption of u = 1 is based on the assump¬
tion that the interest payments from the private sector on the
pension fund alter the relative place of personal income and undis¬
tributed corporate profits. It may be difficult to expect no shift
of incidence of the interest burden to take place. The supply of
long term, and cheap rate investment funds by way of fiscal funds
may work favourably not only for business profits, but also for
other factors of personal income. It is possible to assume that
the interest burden is also borne in the same way both by personal
income and business savings. In an economy like Japan, where
pressure of trade unions for a higher share is not so strong,
where a large amount of concealed unemployment exists, and where
entrepreneurs are trying very hard to increase undistributed cor¬
porate profits, this shift of a part of the burden to personal
income is more likslyto occur. Suppose that the burden of the
interest payments from the private sector is borne by undistributed
corporate profits and personal income in proportion to their dis¬
tribution ratio. This means that the distribution ratio of the
undistributed corporate profits and personal income is assumed to
remain constant before and after the interest payments from the
private sector. Under this assumption, the investment by business
savings will be reduced from b Y to b(Y - P.), by the amount of b R.
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In the same way, the consumption by personal income will be reduced
fromC(l - b) Y to c(i _ b)(Y - R), by the amount ofc(l - b) R.
(where b is the ratio of undistributed corporate profits to national
income, (1 - b) is that of personal income, R are the interest pay¬
ments from the private sector, and Y is national income). The total
impact effect is the summation of the decrease in consumption of
tax payers via a social security tax (c t), the increase in con¬
sumption of pensioners (c'p), the increase in investment via
surplus formation (Is), and the decrease in investment (b R) and
in consuraptionC^(l - b)Rj- via interest payments from the private
sector.
AY = -cT + c'p + Is - b R -c(l - b) r
c'P - c |t + (1 - b) rJtJ + Jls - b rJ (19)
This is the relation obtained in formula (12) in the text.
The model building in the next section will follow this treatment.
Section 3» Building a Comparative Static Income Determination
Model"*"
The analysis of this section is limited to a flat rate con¬
tribution system. A model in the case of an income proportional
system is shown in the appendix.
An example is shown in Kimura, K. and others, ibid. As to its
appraisals and criticisms, see Introduction, Further Complications
2 of Section 2 of Chapter HI, and also Chapter VI.
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Assumptions.
(1) The surplus of the scheme is all invested.
(2) The distribution of national income between undistributed
corporate profit and personal income remains constant, before
and after interest payments from the private sector.
(3) The Exchequer Supplement and interest payment of Government
Exchequer are financed by an increase in taxation.
(4) Foreign trade is neglected.
(5) Induced Investment is neglected.
A Comparative Static Income Determination Model (all in period n)
Before the introduction of the pension scheme, national Income
may be represented as follows I
Yn = Cn + In + Gn (1)
where Yn is national income, Cn is consumption, In is investment
and Gn is Government expenditure.
One of the aims is to build undistributed corporate profits
Into the national income model.
Therefore Yn = On + Sn (2)
where On is personal income and Sn is undistributed corporate profits.
From assumption (3), Sn / On remains constant, so
Sn = bYn (3)
where b is a rate of undistributed corporate profits to national
income.
Cn = c (Yn - tYn - bYn) + Co (4)
where t is general tax rate, tYn is general taxation, bYn is
undistributed corporate profits, c is M.P.C. and Co is autonomous
consumption.
Vi -
In = I n + In
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where Ibn is private investment financed by undistributed corporate
profit, Tn is autonomous investment.
Ibn = bYn (6)
From formulae (1), (4), (5) and (6)
Yn = c (Yn - tYn - bYn) + Co + bYn+ In + Gn
Yn = — (In + Gn + Co) (7)
1 _ c(l - t - b) - b
Consider now the national income after the introduction of the
pension scheme;
Yn = Cn + In + Gn (8)
For the sake of simplicity, the social security tax, i.e., total
taxation revenue to finance the pension scheme is expressed as Tn
Qn + En + Un = Tn (9)
where Qn are contributions, En is taxation to finance Exchequer
Supplement, Un is taxation to finance interest payments of Government
Exchequer to pension scheme.
Sn = b Yn (10)
where Sn is undistributed profit. The decrease of personal income
caused by interest payments (Rn) of private sector to pension scheme
is Rn (1 - b), so
Cn = c ^Yn - tYn - b Yn - Rn(l-b) - Tn| + c* Pn + Co (11)
where c is M.P.C., c' is M.P.C. of pensioners, Pn is pension payments.
In = Ibn + Isn + In (12)
where I n is private investment financed by undistributed profits.
Isn is investment of the surplus of pension scheme and In is
autonomous investment.
Ibn = b (Yn - Rn) (13)
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Isn = Tn + Rn - Pn (14)
Yn = c ^Yn - tYn - b Yn - Rn(l-b) - TnJ + </pn + Co + b(Yn - Rn)
+ Tn + Rn - Pn + ?n + Gn
Yn - Tn (1-c) + Rn(l-b)(1-c) - Pn (1-/) + In + Gn + Co (15)
l-c(l-t-b)-b
Changes In national Income caused by pension scheme may be represented
as follows I
From the formula (15) - (7)
Tn(l - c) + Rn(l ~ b)(l - c) - Pn (1 - </)
Zn = Yn - Yn = —— KX J
l-c(l-t-b)-b
3xamlnatlon of Zn
On the conditions when both denominator (An) and numerator (Bn)
of formula (16) are positive, Zn becomes positive.
(denominator)
An=l-c(l-t-b)-b
= (1 - b) - c (1 - b) + ct
= (1 - b) (1 - c) + ct > 0
Because b < 1 and c ^ 1.
(numerator)
The M.P.C. of pensioners is bigger than, or at least the same
as, the M.P.C. of the economy as a whole.
So c ' ^ c, then
Bn = Tn(l-c) + Rn(l-b)(l-c) - Pn(l -c')^Tn(l-c) + Rn(l-b)U-c)
-Pn(l-c)
= (Tn - Pn) (1 - c) + Rn (1 - b) (1 - c)
If Tn Pn, then Bn^.0 (even if Tn < Pn, if p'nffirn' ^ 5^ then
Bn 2L 0)
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If c' = 1, then
Bn = Tn (1 - c) + Rn (1 - b)(l - c) ^,0
If c* = c, then
Bn = Tn (1 - c) + Rn (1 - b)(l - e) - Pn(l - c')
= Tn (1 - c) + Rn (l - b)(l - c) - Pn( 1 - e)
=|ln + Rn(l-b)-Pnj- (1 - c )
If Tn + Rn (1 - b) > Pn, then Bn > 0.
The alteration of the assumption ( 3)
If the Exchequer Supplement and the interest payments of the
Government Exchequer are financed by way of cutting down other govern¬
ment expenditures, the formula (15) is altered to
Yn = c {Yn - tYn - b Yn - Rn( 1 - b) - Qn} + c' Pn + 6o + b(Yn-Rn)
+ (Tn + Rn - Pn) + In + (Gn-En-Ur
(17)
where contribution Qn is the only increase of taxation to finance the
pension scheme and (Gn + En - Un) is the reduced government expenditure.
As Tn = Qn + En + Un,
Qn(l - c) + Rn (1 - b)(l - c) - Pn (l - c')
Zn = (18)
l-e(l-t-b) - b
(a deficit financing is not a practical assumption in the Japanese cas^l
The Implications of zn
The formula (16) can be written as
Zn = - j(c'Pn - cTn) - c (1 - b)Rnr + jfTn + Rn - Pn'-bRnj-
(l-o)(l-b) + ct (J- J I J,
(cfPn - cYn) is the change in consumption via pension payments and
taxation revenue and -c(l-b) Rn is the decrease in consumption via interes
payments of firms to the pension scheme. These two present primary
changes in consumption.
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(Tn + Rn » Pn) is the increase in investment via the surplus formation of
the pension scheme. It will ever "be increasing for the coming 30 years.
-bRn is the decrease in private investment via interest payments of "busi¬
ness firms to pension scheme. These two represent primary changes in
investment. Both consumption and investment are multiplied by the
multiplier.
If c' = c, then Bn = |(Tn + Rn - Pn) - bRn j(l - c)
Total effect of the pension scheme on the growth of national income may
increase as the first item increases in comparison with the second.
A detailed examination of the impact effect is dealt with in the next
chapter.
APPSNEIX TO CHAPTER III
A Comparative Static Income Determination Model in the Case of an
Income Proportional Contribution System
A pay-as-you-go plan is assumed, assumption (l) in the text is
removed, and other assumptions remain unchanged.
Then National income before the pension scheme is obtained as follows:
Yn = Cn + In + §-n (l)
where Yn is national income, Cn is consumption, In is investment and
Gn is Government expenditure.
For the purpose of comparison with the result of a flat rate
contribution system, undistributed corporate profits Sn is left in
the model. (Apart from that consideration, this model can be built
without introducing business savings).
Yn = On + 3n (2)
where On is personal income and Sn is undistributed corporate profits.
Sn = bYn (3)
where b is a rate of undistributed corporate profits to national
income.
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Cn = c (Yn - tYn - bYn) + Co (4)
where t is general tax rate, tYn is general taxation, bYn is
undistributed corporate profits, c is M.P.C. and Co is autonomous
consumption.
In = Ibn + In (5)
where Ibn is private investment financed by undistributed corporate
profits; In is autonomous investment.
Ibn = bYn (6)
From formula (1), (4), (5) and (6)
Yn = c (Yn - tYn - bYn) + to + bYn + In + Gn
Yn = — (In + Gn + Co) (7)
1 _ c(l - t - b) - b
National income after the pension scheme is obtained as follows:
Yn = Cn + In + £n (8)
The social security tax, i.e., total taxation revenue to finance
the pension scheme is expressed as Tn. There exists no interest
revenue.
Qn + En = Tn (9)
where Qn is income proportional contributions and En is taxation
to finance Exchequer Supplement. Assume that En is decided at a
fixed proportion to Qn.
Qn = a^ Yn, En = a2Qn = a^ Yn
Tn = a-^ Yn + a-, Yn = (a-^ + a,).Yn = aYn (10)
where a^, a2, and a are constant coefficients. As "pay-as-you-go"
plan is adopted,
Pn = Tn = aYn (11)
where Pn is pension payments.
Sn = bYn (12)
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where Sn is undistributed profit. (As no interest payment is paid,
there occur no changes in Sn.)
Cn = c (Yn - tYn - bYn - aYn) + c'.aYn + Co (13)
where c is M.P.C., c' is M.P.C. of pensioners and aYn on the right
is pension-payment s.
In = Ibn + In (14)
where In is private investment financed by undistributed profits and
In is autonomous investment.
Ibn = bYn ' (15)
From formula (8), (13), (14) and (15),
Yn = c(Yn - tYn - bYn - aYn) + c'aYn + Co + bYn + Tn + Gn
Yn = fn * °n + go (16)
1 - c(1 - t - b - a) - c'a - b
Changes in national income caused by the pension scheme are obtained
as follows:
From the foimula (16) - (7)
n = Yn - Yn = In + Gn Co Tn + Gn + Co
1-c (1-t-b-a) - c'a-b 1-c (1-t-b) - b
= a (c' ■ c)(In -f TTn + Co) ____ a7)
{l-c (1-t-b-a) - c'a - b^|l - c(1-t-b) -by
Examination of Zn
denominator An = {l - c(1-t-b-a) - c'a - t} {l-o (1-t-b) - b}
= {l-b-a-o (1-t-b-a) + a(l - c')}{(l-c)(l-b) + 0tj
= "[(l-c)U-b-a) + ct + a(l-c' )}{(!-c)(l-b) + ctj >0,
because l^c, l^b + a, l^c' and ct 0.
numerator Bn = a (c' - c) (Tn + Gn + Co)
If c1 c, then Bn )>0, if c' = c Bn = o.
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So long as M.P.G. of pensioners is Trigger than M.P.C. of the economy
as a whole, Zn is always positive.
The alteration of the assumption
If the Exchequer Supplement is financed "by way of cutting down
other government expenditures, formula (16) is altered to
Yn = c(Yn - tYn - bYn - a^Yn) + c'.aYn + Co + bYn + In + (Gn - a-^Yn) (18)
where a-jYn is the contribution which is the only increase of taxation
to finance the pension scheme, a^Yn is the Exchequer Supplement and
(Gn - a-jYn) is the reduced government expenditure.
In + Gn + Co (19)Yn =
l-cj(l-t-b- a-^) - c' a - b + a-
Zn = Yn - Yn = -{i-Sl- (Fn + On + Co) (2Q)
1 - e(l - t - b -a1) - c'a - b + aj-j l-c( 1-t-b) - bj
From definitions and assumptions, (1 > c' ^ c, 1 > t + b, and
a = a^ + a^), it can be proved that the denominator of formula (20)
is either greater than, or equal to, that of formula (17)» while
the numerator of the former is either smaller than, or equal to
that of the latter. (The calculation processes are omitted).
In consequence, the multiplier effect is reduced (in general) in
the case of financing via reducing other government expenditures
(Zn in formula(20)) in comparison with the financing via increas¬
ing taxation (zn in formula (17)). This is the other way of
expressing that the demand effect of the tax reduction is smaller
than that of the equal increase of government expenditure.
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The Implications of Zn
In both items of the denominator of Zn of formula (17)» the
foimula <1 - c(l -t-b)-b/is included. This is also the denominato:
in the case of a flat rate contribution system and the reverse of
this is a multiplier in the case of no pension scheme. If tax rate t
and corporate profits rate b are fixed, and also c is given, then
1 - c(l - t - b) - b| is a constant and can be expressed by K.
l-c(l-t-b)-b = K,
where K is a constant, then the formula (17) can be written as
From formula (21), Zn is an increasing function of three factors,
i.e., (1) a social security tax rate (proportion of contribution plus
Exchequer Supplement to national income) (a), (2) the difference
between M.P.C. of pensioners and M.P.C. of the economy (c* - c),
(3) and other autonomous factors fn, Gn, and Co which show the scale
of the economic activity of the nation. The difference between
the "pay-as-you-go" system and the "reserve-investment" system is
that the former has no increase in investment and the effect of the
pension scheme on the economic growth consists primarily and finally
of the changes in consumption.
The consumption increase is caused by an income redistribution
between different M.P.C. strata of pensioners and tax payers, the
magnitude of the effect depending both on the scale of the pension
scheme and the scale of the economy. Consequently the magnitude of
the effect on the growth rate of the economy depends on the scale of
the pension scheme, apart from M.P.C. difference. Needless to say,
Tn + Gn + Co
(21)
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if M.P.C.'s are the same, there will be no effect on the economic
growth.
A. Simplified Model V/ithout Business Savings.
(Before Pension Scheme) Yn = Cn + In + o"n
= c(Yn - tYn) + In + Gn + Co (22)
(After pension scheme) Yn = c(Yn - tYn - aYn) + c*.aYn + In + Gn + Co
(23)
(Changes in income) Zn = Yn - Yn - In + Gn t Co (24)
l-c(l-t-a)-c'a l-c(l-t)
_ a(cf -c) (Tn + Gn + Co) (24')
{l-c(l-t-a)-c'a}{l-c(l-t)j




The object of this chapter is to give a statistical
illustration of the impact effect of the National
Pension Scheme embodied in the model.
Section 2 develops the model of the impact effect
so as to aaapt it to the classification of the government
projection. It shows the projection figures in a simple
social account form; and analyses whether or not the
impact effect takes a positive sign, whether or not it
is greater in later years than in the base year, and
what is the trend of the effects throughout the years.
Section 3 analyses the composition of the impact
effect according to the changes in investment and in
consumption. Eacn analysis is carried out from the
three aspects above mentioned.
Section 4 analyses the trend of a unit effect from
the three aspects.
The results of the analyses of each Section are
f
shown in a simplified table.




Section 2. Total Impact Effect
The impact effect (An) of the National Pension
Scheme is obtained as the multiplicand, of formula
(16) of Section 3 of Chapter III.
An = Tn(l - c) + Rn(l - b) (1 - c) -Pn (1 - c) (1)
Where An is the impact effect, Tn is the social security tax,
Rn are tne interest payments from the private sector, Pn
are pension payments, c and c are the marginal
propensities to consume of the economy as a whole and of
pensioners, respectively, and b is the distributive ratio
of the undistributed corporate profits to national income.
Formula (1) is built up of three items of different
economic natures, i.e., the social security tax, the
interest payments from the private sector, and pension
payments. This is a suitable approach to a theoretical
analysis. However, the figures available in the
government projection may not necessarily concur with
this classification of factors suitable for theoretical
analysis. As a matter of fact though pension payments
(Pn) are available from the projection, tne social
security tax (Tn) and the interest payments from the
private sector (Rn) are not available as such. Instead
of which, contributions (Qn), the Exchequer Supplement
(En), and the total interest payments (Vn), which include
both /
168
both the interest payments from the public sector (Un)
and those from the private sector (Rn), are available,
bo formula (1) must be altered.
The social security tax (In) is by definition the
summation of contributions (Qn), the Exchequer
Supplement (Bn), and the interest payments from the
private sector (Rn).
Tn = Qn +En +Rn (2)
The total interest payments (Vn) are the summation
of the interest payments from the public sector (Un)
and those from the private sector (Rn).
Un +Rn =Vn (3)
If the ratio of the interest payments from the
private sector (Rn) to the total interest payments (Vn)
is assumed to be constant (d),
Rn =dVn (4)
Frem formulae (2), (3)> and (4), formula (1) is
altered to
An = (Qn +Bn +Un) (1 -c) +Rn(l -b)(l -c) -Pn(l -c)
= (Qn +En)(l -c)+(Un +Rn)(l -c)-Rnb(l -c) -Pn(l -c)
= (Qn +En)(l -c)+Vn(l -c) -dVn.b(l -c) -Pn(l -c/)
= |(Qn +En)(l -c) -Pn(l -d') j- +Vn(l -bd)(l -c) (5)
In order to obtain general conclusions, the trend of
formula (5) is examined with the aid of the projections,
without /
without committing ourselves to the specific magnitudes
of the coefficients, c, c, b ana d.
Before going into the statistical illustration, we
will show the projection figures in social accounting
form. We will also draw them in a diagram. This is
designed to show which factors of the revenue and the
expenditure of the pension scheme will, at any given
time, become important. The projection shows that
for the first twenty years after the introduction of
the Scheme, the most important function is surplus
formation. This will increase during the coming
thirty and more years, and then decrease so as to become
negative in about 50 years' time. Interest revenue is
negligible in the initial years, and then begins to
increase rapiuly. This will be the most important
single item after 1985 until 2015, (when pension payments
become most important). Contributions and the Exchequer
Supplement, though they are important during the initial
years, show relatively constant trends and sharply lose
their ratios to the total budget of the Scheme. Pension
payments are negligible in initial years, and will
gradually increase in the future.
Now that we have clarified the composing factors of
revenue /
Revenues and Expenditures of the National Pension Scheme, *1961 - 2025.
(1 million yen)
Revenue (Year) 1961 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2005
■ • * -
2015 2025
Q Contributions 25,183 29,548 35,546 35,660 37,027 37,933 37,692 37,154 35,182 31,937 31,868
E Exchequer Supplement 12,790 14,973 17,972 18,029 18,713 19,165 19,045 18,776 17,790 16,167 16,133
V Total Interest Revenue 1,030 11,018 27,719 48,040 70,367 93,701 118,503 142,241 181,103 193,540 176,225
Q+E+V Total Revenue -39,003 55,538 81,237 101,728 126,107 150,799 175,240 198,170 234,075 241,644 224,225
Expenditure (Year) 1961 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 . 1990 1995 2005 2015 202£
P Pension Payments 2,021 8,535 21,007 41,030 60,692 82,488 114,231 173,627 260,868 253,720
S, Surplus 39,003 53,517 72,702 80,721 85,077 90,106 92,752 83,939 60,397 A19,225 *29,497
P+S Total Expenditures 39,003 55,538 81,237 101,728 126,107 150,799 175,240 198,170 234,075 241,644 224,225
W Total Accumulation of
Reserve 39,003 233,191 554,481 938,010 1,257,053 1,795,553 2,26Q026 EM00*&CM 3A12,786 *604,650 3,27} 066
TA3EE t.
1. As to assumptions, See Chapter II Section 5.
Source: Rearranged from statistics found in Reference Material issued in conjunction with the National Pension
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revenue ana expenditure of the Scheme, we will go on to
analyse whether or not the impact effect, An, of the
previous formula (5) takes a positive sign in the future.
According to the definition, the distribution ratio of
the interest payments from the private sector to trie
total interest payments (d), the proportion of
undistributed corporate profits to national income (b),
and the marginal propensity to consume of the economy as
a whole (c) have the following natures. Namely,
o = d = 1 and o< b< 1, and o <" c = 1. So the coefficients
of the right hand side of formula (5) are expressed as
(1 -bd)(l -c) = 0. While Vn >o (available from the
projection), so Vn (1 -bd)(l -c) = o.
On the other hand, as c, so 1 -c" = 1 -c. From
the above two relations, formula (5) ia altered to
As c ^ 1, if (Qn +En) ^ Pn is satisfied, An ^ o is
always satisfied.
Starting from the impact effect for the fiscal year
1961, (the year wnen the scheme starts its operation),
the effects for the future years after 1965, at five or
An = j(Qn +£n)(l -c) -Pn(l -C) J- +Vn(l -bd)(l -c)
(for /
(for later years) ten year intervals, as were listed in
fable I, are examined. Then according to the projection,
it is observed that the condition Qn +En>Pn is always
satisfied until 1980. This means that so long as c <1
is satisfied, An >o is satisfied for these periods. In
other words, as c = c =" 1, if c< c^ then An>o. Even
when c = c, yet if c = c*<fl, then An>o. On the othex*
hand, if c = c* = 1, then An = o. However, this
condition of Qn +En k Pn is not satisfied in the later
years after 1985. Moreover, as both the total interest
payments (Vn) (whicn is the item with a positive sign)
and pension payments (Pn) (which is the item with a
negative sign) increase, whether or not the impact effect
(An) takes a positive sign is not obtainable without
imputing specific magnitudes to the coefficients. So
the general conclusion is obtained that the impact effect
of the pension scheme will take a positive sign when
c or c = c\1 is satisfied, and zero when c = c = 1, for
the years examined until 1980; while tnose of the years
after 1985 may take positive, zero, or negative signs,
according to the magnitudes of the coefficients.'*"
Next, whether or not the impact effects of later
years are greater compared to that of the base year is
For procedure, see Calculation Examples (1) in the
end of the present section.
t
examined. The impact effect of the base year (the
fiscal year 1961 is chosen for the present analysis)
is expressed as An, while that of the future year to
be compared is expressed as Am.
From formula (5),
An = |(Qn +En)(l -c) -Pn(l -c)| +Vn(l -bd)(l -c) (7)
From definition c £ c £ 1*
If c = 1 is inserted into formula (7), (this will be
expressed as An*"), this An"*" is either greater tnan or
equal to An.
An = An"*" = (Qn +En)(l -c) +Vn(l -bd)(l -c) (8)
In the same way from formula (5), Am is expressed as
Am = |(Qm +Em)(l -c) -Pm(l -c)i *Vm(l -bd)(l -c) (9)
If c = c is inserted into formula (9)> (this will be
expressed as A&), this aS is either smaller than or equal
to Am.
Am = Afi =j(Qm +Em) -Pmj (1 -c) +Vm(l -bd)(l -c) (10)
If An % AS i3 satisfied for any year of m, then from
formula (8) and (10), An = Am can be proved.
If the coefficients c, b and d are assumed to
remain constant, from formula (8) ana (10),
a£ -aA = m +Bm)-Pm\ —(Qn +En)j (1 -c)+i(Viu-Vn)L f (1 -bd) (1 -c)} (11)
If (Qm +.Em)-Pm ? Qn +En and Vm ^Vn are satisfied, aS = aA
and consequently Am Han are satisfied.
According /
According to the projection, the two conditions
of (Qm +Em) -Pm> Qn +En and Vm>Vn are satisfied for
the fiscal years 1965 and 1970. This means that if
c < c or c = c<l is satisfied, Am>An is satisfied for
these periods. If c = c = 1, it follows that Am = An.
For later years, however, though the second
condition Vm &Vn is always satisfied for over fifty
years, the first condition (Qm +Em) -Pm ^ Qn +En is
not satisfied. So again a general conclusion on the
comparison between the impact effects of these later
years and that of the base year is not available without
imputing specific magnitudes to the coefficients. The
general conclusion is obtained that the impact effects
of the fiscal years 1965 and 1970 are greater than, if
c r c or c = c 1, or equal to, if c = c =1, the impact
effect of the base year (the fiscal year 1961); while
those of future years after 1975 may be greater, equal to,
or smaller than, that of the case year, according to the
y 2
magnitudes„of the coefficients.
Next, the trend of the impact effects through the
years is examined. The same formulae as those of the
previous paragraph, of comparison of the effects between
two periods, are used. However, An is not this time fixed
2 * See Calculation Examples 2 in the end of the present
section.
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as that for the fiscal year 1961, hut as an effect
for the last examined year which immediately precedes
the year being compared (m). For example, if Am is
for 1965, then An is for 1961, if Am is for 1970,
then An is for 1965» etc. (Since five year intervals
are adopted as a rule in the examination, n refers
usually to the fifth year preceding m).
According to the projection, both the conditions of
(Qm +Em) -Pm/* Qn +Bn, and Vm^Vn are satisfied until 1970
for m, and until 1965 for n. This means that if c <c or
c = c<l, then Am>An is satisfied and that, if c = c = 1,
then Am =An follows. However, for later years, though
Vm as Vn is satisfied,as pension payments continue to
increase while contributions and the Exchequer Supplement
do not increase so rapidly, (Qm +Bm) -Pm = Qn +En is
not satisfied. Thus the general conclusion is derived
that the impact effect will be increased from 1961 to 1965»
and 1965 to 1970, if c <■ c or c = c 1, (but will not
change if c = c = 1), however, the trend of the effects
of years later than this cannot be obtained without
3
imputing specific magnitudes to the coefficients.
The conclusions obtained in the aoove three
analyses are shown in the following simplified table. The
cases are divided according to whether the marginal propensity
to consume of pensioners is greater than that of tax payers
(c c) or both are equal (c = c).
See Calculation Examples 3 in the end of the present
section.
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impact Effect Through Years
IFiscal
Year













































































Impact Effect Through Years
I Signs of the impact effects
+ the impact effect takes a positive sign
+0....the impact effect takes a positive sign
or zero. (Zero corresponds to c = c'= 1.)
+0-...the impact effect may take a positive sign,
zero, or a negative sign according to the magnitudes
of the coefficients.
II....A comparison of the impact effects of future
years to the impact effect of the base year (the fiscal
year 1961).
+.....the impact effect of the year of the column
is greater than that of the base year.
+0....the impact effect of the year of the column
is either greater than or equal to that of the base
year. (The latter case corresponds to c = c = 1.)
+0-...the impact effect of the year may be greater
than, equal to, or smaller than that of the base
year according to the magnitudes of the coefficients.
III...Trend of the impact effect through years
+.....the impact effect of the year is greater than
that of the year of the preceding column.
+0....the impact effect of the year is either
greater than or equal to that of the year of the
preceding column. (The latter corresponds to c = e" = 1).
+0-...the impact effect of the year may be greater
than, /
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than, equal to, or smaller than that of the year
in the preceding column, according to the magnitude
of the coefficients.
Calculation Examples
1975 is chosen as a sample year in the following
demonstration of calculation examples.
!• Sign of the Impact Effect
Prom fable I, we obtain the magnitudes of the revenue
ana expenditure items as
Q = 55.7, E = 18.0, V = 48.0, and P = 21.0. (The
unit is a thousand million yen, and the figure after the
point is obtained by counting fractions of 5 and over as
units and cutting away the rest. The same applies in
the following analyses of 2 and 5).
Formula (6) is ootained as
An £ {(On +En) - Pn \ (1 -c) (6)
Prom the above projection figures,
Qn +Bn = 35.7 + 18.0 = 52.7
Pn = 21.0
Therefore (Qn + En) -Pn = 52.7 - 21.0 = 31.7
> o
If c< 1 is assumed, 1 - c>o. From formula (6),
An £ {(Qn +En) -Pn \ (1 -c). > o.




On the other hand, as c/=i 1 is assumed, if c < c,
then c n1, and An > o always follows.
Even if c = c, yet if c = c 4l, then An >o.
However, if c = c = 1, then, from formula (5).,
An = j (Qn +En) (1 -c) -Pn (1 -cf)j +Vn (1 -bd)(l -c)«=o
The first two rows of Table 2 corresponding to 1975
are thus derived as + for c -< c (i.e., the effect
will be positive), and + 0 for c = c (i.e., positive
or zero), while 0 corresponds to c = c = 1.
2. Comparison of the Impact Effect with the Base Year
Prom Table 1, the revenue and expenditure of the
base year, i.e. ,1961, are obtained as
Qn = 25.2, En = 12.8, Vn = 1.0, and Pn = 0
Those of 1975 are the same as quoted in 1.
Qm = 35.7, Em = 18.0, Vm = 48.0 and Pm = 21.0
Prom formula (11),
A& - aA =['[(Qm +Em) -Pm j - (Qn +En) j (1 -c) +|(Vm -Vn)
(1 -bd)(1 —c)* (11)
By the above figures,
{(Qm +Em) -Pmj - (Qn +En) = -(35.7 +18.0) - 21.o} -
(25.2 + 12.8) = 32.7 - 38.0 = -5.3 <0.
If c < 1 is assumed, the left item of the right side
of formula (11) is obtained as
f{(Qm +Em) -Pm} -(Qn +En) 1 (1 -c) = -5.3 (1 - c)
<0
On /
On the other hand,
Vm - Vn = 48.0 - 1.0 = 47.0 >0
On the same assumption of c<-l, the right item of
the right sine of formula (11) is obtained as
(Vm - Vn) (1 - bd) (1 - c) = 47.0 (1 -bd) (1 - c)
>0
1 - bd > 0.
Thus we cannot derive thai. a£ - aA 5 0, without
imputing specific magnitudes to the coefficients. Therefore
we cannot derive any definite conclusion as to the
comparison of these two.
The third and fourth rows of Table 2, corresponding to
1975, are thus derived as +0-, implying that the impact
effect of 1975 ma,y be greater than, equal to, or smaller
than that of 1961.
If C = 1, as cic=rl..c = l.
Prom formula (5), An = Am = 0.
If, instead, aS * aA were proved, from Am £ A&
(formula (10)), and An £ An (formula (8)), Am £ An would
have been proved. (A® is Am when c e c, and aA is An
when c = 1, See text).
5« Comparison with the hast Examined Year
Prom Table 1, the revenue and expenditure of the
last examined year, (i.e.,1970), is obtained as
Qn = 35.5, En = 18.0, Vn = 27.7, and Pn = 8.5,
while those of 1975 (Qm, Em, Vm, and Pm) remain the
same. /
same .
In the same way as previous part 1, from formula (11),
[{(Qm +lim) -Pm}- (Qn +En)j (1 -c) =[{(35.7 +18.0) -21.oj
- (35.5 +18.0)j (1 -c) = (32.7 -53.5) (1 -c)
= -20.8 (1 -c)
£ 0.
On the other hand,
(Vm - Vn) (1 -bd) (1 -c) = (48.0 -27.7) (1 -c)
= 20.3 (1 -c)
0.
Thus whether or not A& = iJt is not obtainable
without imputing specific magnitudes to the coefficients.
The last two rows of Table 2 , corresponding to
1975 are thus derived as +0-, implying that the impact
effect of 1975 may be greater than, equal to, or smaller
than that of 1961.
Section 3. Compositioxi of the Impact hfi'ect
The impact effect readjusted according to the
economic functions is obtained as the multiplicand of
the formula (19) of the Section 3 of Chapter III. This
is
An = (cPn-cln)-c (1-b)Rn| + ■ (In+hn-Pn) -bKn^ (1)
while (6Pn-cTn) are the changes in consumption via
pension payments and social security tax, -c(l-b)Hn is the
decrease /
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decrease in consumption via the interest payments from
the private sector; and these two compose the changes
in consumption. The (Tn +Rn -Pn) are the increase
in investment via the surplus formation of the pension
scheme, - toHn is the decrease in private investment via
interest payments of business firms to the pension scheme;
and these two compose the changes in investment. For
the same reason as before, formula (1) must be altered to
be expressed by factors, Qn, En, Vn, ana Pn which are
available from the projection.
Prom formula (2), (5), ana (4) of the previous
section, i.e.,
Tn = Qn +En +Hn, Un + Hn = Vn, and Rn =dVn, formula (1)
is altered to
An = c1?h -c(Tn +Rn -bRn) +Tn +Rn -bRn -Pn
if the impact changes in investment are expressed as in,
then from formula (2),
-bRn -Pn
As Vn >o,
Vn £Vn (1 -bd) ; o. (4)
Prom /
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From the right part of formula (4), i.e.,Vn(l -bd) , o,
and also from formula (3),
If Qn +Bn i Pn is satisfied, In>o is always satisfied,
In the same way as in the previous analysis, starting in
1961, and after 1965 five or (for later years) ten year
intervals, as are shown in Table I, are examined.
According to the projection, the above condition
Qn +En s£Pn is always satisfied until 1980. So at least
until 1980, the impact changes in investment will take
positive signs. However, in the years following 1985,
the relation is altered to Qn +Sn<Pn, implying that the
first half of formula (3) takes a negative sign. On the
other hand, Vn continue to increase, implying that the latter
half of formula (3) takes a positive sign. A general
conclusion as to whether or not In takes a positive sign
cannot be obtained for most of these later years.
However, in the extreme future years, the negative
effect of Pn becomes decisive and makes In of formula (3)
negative regardless of the magnitudes of the coefficients.
This is proved as follows. From the left part of formula
(4), i.e. Vn ^ Vn (1 -bd), and also from formula (3),
= /
= {(Qn +En +Vn)^ -Pel (6)
The left part of the formula (6) is the total
revenue, and the right is the expenditure; consequently,
the difference between these is the surplus formation.
As has been explained before, according to the projection
the surplus formation takes a negative sign in 2015 and
2025. On the other hand, if (Qn +En +Vn) <■ Pn is
satisfied, In <o i3 satisfied. oo the general conclusion
is derived that the impact changes in investment will take
a negative sign in 2015 and 2025.
Next, whether or not the impact changes in investment
of later years are greater than those of tne base year
is examined. In a similar' way as in the analysis of the
previous section, Im is used for the former (i.e. later
years), and In for the latter (base year).
Prom the condition 1 = 1 - bd and formula (3)» the
same formula as formula (6) is written for In
In i (Qn +En +Vn) -Pn (7)
Prom the condition 1 -bd>o and formula (3)» the
same formula as formula (5) is written for Im
Im>(Qm +Em) -Pm (8)
If (Qm +Em) -Pm k (Qn +En +Vn) -Pn is satisfied
for any year, m, then Im>Inis satisfied. According
to the actuarial projection, this condition is satisfied,
for /
f
for m of 1965 and 1970. So the impact changes in
investment in 1965 and in 1970 are greater than those
in 1961. For the more distant years, the examination
must be carried out in the opposite way. In for the
hase year are expressed in the same way as in formula (8).
In^ (Qn +En) -Pn (9)
Im for later years are expressed as in formula (7).
Ira =? (Qm +-Em +Vm) -Pm (10).
v
According to the projection,
(Qm +Em +Vm) -Pm <(Qn +En) -Pn, and consequently
Im<In, are satisfied for 2015 and 2025. Thus the impact
changes in investment in 2015 and 2025 are less than those
.~>cj .vi ■ --u .. .
in the base year. (As In-^O,while lm<0 for these years,
it naturally follows Im<fln. The meaning of this result
is therefore more a negative one in that the general
relation Im <In cannot be found for any other years).
Next, if, in the same way as in the previous analysis,
the trend of the changes in investment is analysed, the
general conclusion is derived that- the impact char gas in
investment in 1965 are greater than those in 1961, but in
later years the trend may he positive, zero, or negative,
according to the magnitudes of the coefficients. (As the
method of analysis is the same, the procedures are omitted).
If the changes in consumption are expressed as On, then
from /
from formula (2),
Cn = cPn -c |(Qn +Sn) +Vn (1 -ba)j (H)
Pirst of all, whether or not On take a positive sign
is examined.
If Pn Qn +En +Vn is satisiied, it follows that
Cn^o. According to the projection, this condition is
sain. ofied for the years 2015 and 2025.
Next, whether or not the impacx changes in
consumption of later years (Cm) are greater than those
of the base year (Cn) is examined.
Prom formula (11),
Cm = c Pm - c |(Qm +Em) +Ym (1 -bd)j" (13)
As 1 -bd £ 1,
Cm £ c'Pm -c (Qm +Em +Vm) (14).
Prom formula (11),
Cn = c Pn -c | (Qn +En) +Vn (1 -bd)J (15)
As 1 -bd>o,
Cn <o" Pn -c (Qn +En) (16).
As Qm +Em +Vm Qn +En (See Talole I);and by definition
c it c, formula (17) can be altered as
Cm -Cn>c (Pm -Pn) -c ^(Qm +Em +Vm) - (Qn +En)l[
^c (Piq -Pn) -c |"(Qm +Em +Vm) - (Qn +En)|
= c (Pm -Pn) - jcQm +Sm +Vm) - (Qn +En)}J (18).
As Pn = o, for n = 1961 (See Table I),
Formula (18) can be altered as
Om -On >■€*» - |(Qm +Em +Ym) - (Qn +En)jj (19).
If the condition of Pm -^(Qm +Em +Vm) - (Qn +En)j- >o
is satisfied, Cm-Cn is always satisfied. The aoove
condition is satisfied only for the years 2015 and 2025
(See Table I). Therefore, the impact changes in
consumption in 2015 and 2025 are greater than those in
the base year.
We can try to analyse whether or not the impact
changes in consumption of the base year (On) are greater
than those of later years (Cm).-
In the sane way as formula (14), On are obtained as,
On c Pn -c (Qn +En +Yn) (20)
Cm are expressed in the same way as formula (16),
Cm <c Pm -c (Qm +Em) (21)
Cn -Cm >6 (Pn -Pm) -c|(Qn +En +Vn) - (Qm +Em)|'
= c^(Qm +Em) - (Qn +En +Vn)|-c (Pm -Pn) (22)
As Pn = o for n = 1961, formula (22) is obtained as
Cn /
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On -Cm>cj(Qm +Em) - (Qn +En +Vn)j-c Pm (23)
If c j(Qm +Em) - (Qn +En +Vn)^- 6 Pm ==o is satisfied
for any m, On - Cm can be proved. However, though we
can derive, from Table I, (Qm +Em) - (Qn +Bn +Vn) >o,but
as Pm >o, -6 Pm .Since by definition c £ c, we cannot
get any general solution of m for the case Cn Cm in formula
(23), unless we impute the magnitudes of the coefficients.
If we consider Cn of formula (19) as the changes in
consumption of the last examined year immediately
preceuing the year being compared (m), we can demonstrate
by similar reasoning, that :the changes in consumption will
show an increasing trend from the years 2005 to 2015,
and from 2015 to 2025, For other years we cannot derive
any general conclusion.
The conclusions obtained in the above analyses on the
impact changes in investment and in consumption are shown
in the following simplified table.
Impact Changes in Investment and in Consumption
Fiscal 1961 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2005 2015 2025
year
(1) + + + + + +0- +0- +0- +0- _
I (2) + + +0- +0- +0- +0- +0- +0- — —
(3) + +0- +0- +0- +0- +0- +0- +0- +0- +0-
(1) +0- dO- +0- +0— +0- +0- +0- +0- +0- + +
tl (2) +0- +0- +0- +0- +0- +0- +0- +0- + +
r (3, +0- +0- +0- +0- +0- +0- +0- +0- + +
TABLE 3.
I....The impact changes in investment
II...The impact changes in consumption.
en /
(1) Signs.
the impact effect takes a positive sign
- the impact effect takes a negative sign
+0-...the impact effect may take a positive, zero,
or negative sign according to the magnitudes of the
coefficients.
(2) A comparison of the impact changes a r; ,-.nt
of future years to those of the base year.
the impact effect of the year of the column
is greater than that of the base year.
- the impact effect of the year of the column is
smaller than that of the base year.
+0-...the former may be greater than, equal to, or
smaller than tne latter according to the magnitudes
of tne coefficients.
(3) Trend.
+ the impact effect of the year is greater than
that of the year of the preceding column.
+•©-•• .the former may be greater than, equal to, or
smaller thai that of the latter according to the
magnitudes of the coefficients.
Section 4. A Unit Effect
We have analysed in the preceding sections the signs
and the trends of the impact effect and its composition.
The /
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The total of the impact effect may naturally increase
according to the increase in the size of the budget.
However, a unit effect may not increase. Hence, the
latter depends on the structure of the revenue and
expenditure. Therefore, we will analyse in this section
a unit effect of the Scheme. A unit effect is defined
as the impact effect corresponding to a unit of the size
of the budget of the pension scheme.
The impact effect (An) is obtained from formula
(2) of Section 3 aha is altered to
An = (Qn +En)(l -c) -Pn(l -c) +Vn(l -bd)(l -c)
= (Qn +En + Vn)(l -c) -Pn(l -c) -Vn.ba(l -c) (1)
The size of the budget (Qn) is obtained as the total
revenue of zhe pension scheme.
Dn =Qn +En +Vn (2)
A unit effect (Bn) is obtained from formula (1) and (2)
An J tn ]f
Bn= dn =(1 -c) -|Qn+Bn+VnJjpL
As the size of the budget (jn) is always positive,
a unit effect (Bn) takes the same sign as the total impact
effect (An). (See column I of Table J2). A comparison
of unit effects of later years to that of the base year,
and the trena of a unit effect through years, will be
examined. Prom formula (3), it is the ratios of pension
payments and the total interest revenue to the total
revenue, /
J f Vn )
X- ^Qn+En+Vn ba(l -c)-J
Pn Vn
revenue, i.e. Qn+En+Vn and Qn+En+Vn, that decide the
magnitudes of a unit effect, assuming that the
coefficients remain constant. First of all, according
to the projection, both of these ratios of years after
1965 (chosen at five or, for later years, ten year
intervals (See Table I)), take greater magnitudes than
those of the ratios of the base year. As 1 %c" ^"c, o < b <
and o =d ^1, so it follows that 1 - cf ^o and bd(l -c) ^o.
This means from formula (3) that the greater these ratios,
the smaller will toe a unit effect. So the general
conclusion is derived that a unit effect, of the years
examined after 1965, takes a smaller magnitude than
that of the year 1961, as long as c>c or c = c<l. If,
instead, cf =c =1, then from formula (3) a unit effect is
always zero, and consequently, no change occurs in the
magnitude of the base year compared with those of later
years. Secondly, the above two ratios are increasing
for over fifty years, until 2015. This implies that
a unit effect is decreasing during all periods until
/ y /
2015, as long as c >c or c = c< 1. If c =c =1, no
change occurs. However, from 2015 to 2025, though the
S ( Pn )
ratio of pension payments to the total revenue (Qn+En+Vn)
continues to increase, tne ratio of the total interest
( Vn )
revenue to total revenue (Qn +En +Vn) slightly decreases.
So /
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So a general conclusion on the trend cannot be obtained
without imputing specific magnitudes to the coefficients.
The conclusions obtained in the above two analyses are
snown in the following table. The cases are diviued
according to whether the marginal propensity to consume
of pensioners is greater than that of tax payers, (cf> c),
or both are equal, (c =c).
A Unit Effect Through Years
Fiscal
year
1961 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990|1995 2005 2015 2025
1 i>a
c=c -5 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0
**
-0 -0 -0 +01
II °>°






I....A comparison of unit effects of future years to a
unit effect of the base year (the fiscal year 1961).
- a unit effect of the year of the column is
smaller than that of the base year.
-o....a unit effect of the year of the column is either
smaller than or equal to that of the base year. (The
latter case corresponds to c =c =1).
II...Trend of a unit effect through years.
- a unit effect of the year is smaller than that
of the year of the preceding column.
-o....a unit effect of the year is either smaller
than, /
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than, or equal to that of the year of the
preceding column. (She latter corresponds to
c =c = 1).
+o-...a unit effect of the year may be greater
than, equal to, or smaller than that of the year
in the preceding column, according to the magnitudes
of the coefficients.
Section 5. Tentative Conclusions
Now that we have analysed the impact effect of the
National Pension Scheme, we will summarize the tentative
conclusions which we may be able to derive from these
analyses.
Firstly we have to mention here that we are not
going to deal with the actual magnitude of the changes
in income which are likely to be generated in a particular
year in the future. We are strongly aware of the
i
difficulty involved in magnitudal analysis, at the present
stage of information on the nature of the forces which
determine economic activities. We are aware that there
exist so many difficult problems which we have to solve
before we could say anything reliable about the future in
magnitudal terms. It is in any case extremely dangerous
to /
to say anything on the possible effect of the pension
scheme in such a way. Actual transactions of the public
sector with the private sector via tne pension scheme
will take place in an uneven way, showing very variable
waves of receipts arid expenditures. The multiplier
process involves a complex problem of time lags. Mot
only are we not informed of the length of the time lags,
but we are not even sure whether the time lags of
pensioners are the same as those of contributors;
whether the way of the utilization of reserves of the
scheme may affect the way they are decided; etc.
The multiplier process in the actual economy may not
take place in such a way as is assumed in a simple
Keynesian model. Mot only are we not informed of the
general trend of the future economic activities, but also
we are not sure of the future values of the coefficients
of our model.
In order not to be involved with these difficulties,
we have intentionally evaded going into magnitudal
calculations, and have restricted ourselves strictly
to the examination of the impact effect, without
committing ourselves to the specific magnitudes of the
coefficients. /
coefficients. By so doing, we might be able to
reduce the difficulties relating to the treatment
of future changes. JMotwithstanding, we are still aware
that even our simplified analysis, and the conclusions
which might be derived, are under great limitations.
We are not even sure whether or not the assumptions
on which we have based our analyses will actually be
realized in the future. The Exchequer Supplement was
assumed to be financed out of the increase in general
taxation, yet we are not sure that the government is
still going to maintain a balanced budget policy in the
future. 'The government may adopt taxation policies
which may hit specific sectors of the population, or
may affect the distribution mechanisms via pricing
policies. These, in turn, may affect the pattern of
distribution of taxation, and thus the interest
payments from firms to the pension scheme. The
proportion of the undistributed profits to national
income may undergo a significant change. It is
extremely difficult to say whether or not the assumptions
will be realized. However, among many possibilities,
it might be possible to say that the assumptions
concerning the method of financing the Exchequer
Supplement, /
Supplement, and those concerning the interest payments
from the public sector, are not so unrealistic. There
is, tnerefore, a chance that they will prove to be
realised. We may be able, also, to add that the
political, administrative, and psychological factors
may be maintained, in the future, such that the
assumption of our financings by taxation, (rather than
red financings, etc.) may be realized. It is, however,
extremely difficult to tell anything exactly; yet so
far as the very near future is concerned, the government
is more likely to maintain the present line of strict
restriction on red financing policies. As to the
distribution of the interest burdens of the private
firms, the shift might take place differently from what
we have assumed. As we have rather carefully analysed
in Chapter III, Section 2, the shift to wages, the shift
to undistributed profits, the shift to shares, etc., may
take place at different times at different stages of the
economic development, and with different emphasis.
Nevertheless, our assumption of a proportional shift to
personal income may not be so unrealistic.
It goes without saying that the analysis is greatly
limited in the sense that foreign trade is neglected,
and induced investment is not considered; while the
changes /
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changes in expenditure, and not in income in real
s •
terms, are considered, etc.
With these limitations in mind, we have derived
some tentative conclusions. The analysis in Section 2
explains that the impact effect will be positive, end
will be increasing, in the future. It is extremely-
difficult to say whether or not the effect will be
positive at least for twenty years to come ana will be
increasing at least for ten years to come, as Table 2
snows. Nevertheless it might be more likely that the
national expenditure will be increased, at least for the
first decaae or two, and possibly for longer. We
simply do not know how much the actual change in income
will correspond to the probable national income level"}
However, since the magnitude of the scheme is growing
very rapidly, it may be more likely than not that the
significance of the pension scheme in the national
economy will be increased in the future.
The analysis of the composition of the eifect in
Sectxon 3 explains that the investment will be
increasea in the future 20 years or so. This also
is difficult to predict unless we know what is the reaction
of the private sector to the increase in public investment.
Nevertheless, in view of a strong demand for loanable
funds /
^"*For the weight of the pension investment in the Fiscal
Investment and Loan Programme, see Chapter V, Section 3»
See also Chapter II, Section 5.
funds in the past, it may be more likely that the
increase in fiscal funds via pension surplus is
going to work towards an increased investment in the
near future. In spite of all these, as Section 4
shows, a unit effect may be decreased. This is
because the Japanese National Pension Scheme is likely
to act in a more complicated way than as a mere transfer
mechanism of income, i.e., in a close relationship
with the private industrial sectors. The composition
of the budget of the pension scheme is undergoing a
change•
Though we cannot say for certain how great a
magnitude the total effect will have, or in what precise
way the impact effect will move, we might be able to
say that the introduction of the Scheme is more likely
to affect the level of national expenditure, and
possibly increase the investment of the economy. If
the investment of the economy as a whole is increased,
consequential increase in capacity might cause a higher
rate of growth in real terms.
Thus we will go on to the analysis of supply,
the effect of pension investment on output growth, and,
finally, investment policies of the pension scheme .
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CUAPT5R V. THS NATIONAL PENSION SCHEMA AND 3COKOMIC GRO'./TH
Section 1. Introduction
The object of this chapter is to analyse the effect of the
changes in investment due to the National Pension Scheme on the
economic growth of Japan.
I
Section 2 gives a short analysis of economic growth in
Japan and factors which governed this growth with the aid of
statistics.
Section 3 illustrates how the scheme raises the level of
investment and thus affects the rate of economic growth with the
aid of a simple Harrod-Domar type model.
Section 4 analyses the investment policies of the pension
scheme. The emphasis is attached to the intricate inter-relation
between the pension investment and the total Fiscal Investment and
Loan Programme.
Section 2. Economic Growth of Japan
The object of this chapter is to analyse the effect of the
changes in investment due to the National Pension Scheme on the
economic growth of Japan. This involves us a short analysis
of economic growth in Japan and factors which governed it.
First of all, the rate of economic growth (measured by gross
national product) in real terms has been very high. In several
years the annual increase exceeded 10^. (See Table 1.). However,
the pattern of the industrial development of different sectors
shows a sharp decrease in the proportion of the primary industries.
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19^6 V7I+.0 *+7^.0 100.0 -
19^7 1,308.7 521.6 110.0 10.0
19^8 2,666.1 607.3 128.1 16.»+
19^9 3,375.2 630.7 133.1 3.9
1950 3,9^6.7 707.9 1^9.3 12.2
1951 5,Wf.2 803.^ 169.5 13.5
1952 6,118.0 887.5 187.2 10.5
1953 7,08^.8 9V7.1* 199.9 6.7
195^ 7,^35.2 98^.3 207.7 3.9
1955 8,203.3 1,082.2 228.7 10.1
1956 9,21*9.8 1,172.9 2V7.1* 8.2
1957 10,025.1 1,255.6 26**. 9 7.1
1958 10,291.7 1,301.9 27^.7 3.7
TABLE 1.
1. Column 3 has been recalculated using 19^*6 prices instead
of 193^-36 prices.
Source: Long Term Forecast of Japanese Economy, Committee for
Long Term Economic Forecast, Economic Advisory Council,
Economic Planning Agency, August, i960, p. 51, Table 1.
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Comparison of Pre-and Post-War Rates of Growth of
Gross National Product at Constant Prices.
Classification period Rate of Growth {%)
Pre-War 1925 - 1939 b.6
Pre-War 1931 - 1939 6.9
Post-War 19^6 - 1952 11.0
Post-War 1952 - 1958 6.6
Post-War 19^6 - 1958 8.8
TABLE 2 .
Source: As for Table 1.
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Its share was reduced to less than half with the recent fourteen
years, i.e. from 38.8# in 1946 to 16.6$ in 1959. By contrast
secondary and tertiary industries, particularly the latter, have
shown a great increase. (See Table 3). As far as the utilization
of resources are concerned, a gradual decrease in the proportion
of consumption, in contrast to the increase in investment, is
observable. (See Table 4), Although the price has increased
rapidly immediately after the War, it has not shown a particularly
significant rise since 1952. (See Table 5). Population growth
has been high, exceeding 1$ per annum between 1951 to 1956. The
rate of increase in the labour force was very great, much exceeding
the rate of growth in total population (see Table 6), Neverthe¬
less, because of a high rate of growth, per capita national income
in real terms has increased at a very high rate. (See Table 9). On
the other hand, though the population growth was great in the past,
it is sharply decreasing. Moreover, the Table of Mortality and
Birth Bates indicates that the birth rate is decreasing very rapidly,
and togerher with the decrease in the mortality rate, the population
composition is undergoing a significant change. (See Table 7). The
industrial distribution of the working population is also changed;
we see that the proportion in primary industry is decreasing rapidly,
while there is a very rapid growth rate in tertiary industry (Table 8).
Table 10 shows that increase in the number of population bet\^een
the ages of 15 and 59 will continue. This implies that the growth
in output is not likely to be restricted by an insufficient supply
of labour, although there may be frictional problems associated
with the immobility of the labour. However, the annual increase
is estimated to become less than 1 million in 1966 and will con-
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(SOURCE: National Income White Paper, 1959 pp. 160-164-)
TABLE 3 .
1. For each year in the table the first row of statistics
represents income in absolute terms.
2. For each year in the table the seconu row of statistics
in parenthesis represents income in absolute terms as a
percentage of total national income.
3. Primary Industry represents agriculture, forestry and
fisheries; Secondary Industry represents mining, construction
and manufacturing; ana Tertiary Industry represents
whole sale, retail trace, finance, real estate trade,
transportation, communication, other public utilities,
services, public work, and others.
Total Supply


































































































































































































24.1 109.1 4.0 4.C 113.1 L —2.1 90.8
— 81.5 337.2 3.5 3.5 34-0.7 6' • - 92.3 191.8
_ 180.6 708.4 -3.9 -3.9 704.5 107 ^•*0| • | 242.9 3 3.9
— 326.8 633.6 4.3 4.3 637.9 157.8 278.8 701.3
- 364.3 551.7 13.9 13.5 :4 5.2 207.0 339.6
1 pi f->
_. 699.2 903.1 15.9 15.9 919.0 2'30.° 482.5 156.5
36.3 750.6 976.0 57.1 ,57a 1,033.1 359.4 575.9 97.8
44.4 928.9 1,265.7 71.4 71.4 1,337.1 -73.3 668.3 i P w
51.0 830.6 1,284.1 159.2 159.2 1,443.3 558.8 733.7 150.8
55.9 951.2 1,370.7 152.0 152.0 1,522.7 650.7 764.5 107.5
58.6 1,373.0 1,601.7 130.7 130.7 1,732.4 7. 8.8 873.4 70.2
63.6 1,439.8 1,751.9 125.6 125.6 1,379.5 O O• 964.9 -29.6
65.3 1,159.8 1,731.2 144.0 144.CL 1,875.2 1,050.5 lp48.9 -2D.. 2
66.1 1,501.9 2,354.6 176.6 176.6 2,931.2 1,263.0 . 1,183.0 85.2
SOURCE:
TABLE 4 (1)
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Private GovernmentPersonal Con6umption Expenditures Government Current Expenditures Producers' Dourable Equipment,(including Personal Residential Construction Government (Equipment)
191+6 1+98.1 1+66.5 387.9 333.1 51+. 8 73.9 1+7.7 26.1 1+.8 31.6 27.9
!
3.7
191+7 1,390.2 1,261+.!+ 1,017.3 915.1 102.2 219.1+ 116.6 102.8 27.7 125.8 82.5 1+3.3
191+8 2,856.7 2,56-7.6 2,023.1+ 1,71+1.1 282.3 1+1+3.1 258.1+ 181+.7 81.1 309.1 235.8 73.3
19U9 3,702.0 3,1+28.1 2,651+.9 2,261.1 393.8 556.7 321+.2 232.5 216.5 273.9 207.8 66.1
1930 1+,311.0 3,997.1+ 2,83l+.6 2,397.3 1+37.3 693.7 1+1+9.7 21+1+.0 1+69.1 313.6 368.1+ -51+. 8
1951 6,11+3.1+ 5,511+.1 3,571.0 3,018.2 552.8 l,03l+.5 681.1+ 353.1 908.6 629.3 570.7 58.6
1952 6,868.6 6,1+37.0 l+,360.5 3,679.0 681.5 1,21+6.1+ 808»6 1+37.8 830.1 1+31.6 595.1+ 36.2
1953 8,013.7 7,595.8 5,119.3 i+,351.5 767.8 1,560.1 927.5 632.6 916.1+ 1+17.9 1+0 7.7 10.2
19 5U 8,296.3 8,0l+l+.9 5,586.0 i+,71+0.2 81+5.8 1,1+98.1 892.9 605.2 960.8 251.U 261+.0 -12.6
1955 9,187.9 8,607.3 5,981+.!+ 5,118.5 865.9 1,530.1+ 919.9 610.5 1,092.5 580.6 1+52.9 127.7
1956 10,679.9 9,957.1+ 6,1+51+. 6 5,509.9 91+1+.7 2,230.5 1,51+8.9 661.6 1,272.3 722.5 691+.3 28.2
1957 11,536.7 11,069.0 6,956.5 5,969.0 986,9 2,727.0 1,891.7 835.3 1,385.5 1+67.7 1+73.1+ -5.7
1958 11,539.5 11,507.0 7,379.6 6,298.2 1,081.1+ 2,772.9 1,861+.9 908.0 3-, 351+. 5 32.5 17.8 11+.7
1959 l!+,02l+.3 13,131+.8 8,013.3 6,836.7 1,176.6 3,509.6 2,1+1+3.0 1,066.6 1,611.9 889.5 851.1 38.1+
TABLE l+( 2)







































































































































































1946 17.1 8.3 12.3
1947 43.4 21.3 31.2
1948 72.9 42,8 56.4
1949 85.5 58.0 70.4
1950 83.6 72.7 77.6
1951 96.1 101.5 99.1
1952 100.0 10C.0 100.0
1953 108.7 102.9 105.6
1954 113.8 96.8 104.4
1955 113.5 97.8 104.9
1956 115.0 108.2 111.3
1957 117.5 107.2 111.9
1958 117.2 98.8 107.1
Table 5
1. The fiscal year 1952 is often used as a base year.
This is because the post-war inflationary trend had
largely expired by this time.
Source? Recalculated from statistics based on the 1934-36
average prices, listed in National Income White Paper, 1958,
Reference Table f , p. 198.


























1950 82,900 55,2^0 36,160 35,720 17, if10 18,310 ifi+0 19,080 - -
1951 8^,300 56,260 36,600 36,220 16,170 20,050 390 19,660 1.7 1.2
1952 85,600 57, 0 37,750 37,290 16,370 20,920 i+70 16,690 1.5 3.1
1953 86,760 56,900 39 , 570 39,120 16,900 22,220 if 50 17'31+0 l.if e08
195^ 88,030 57,9^0 ^0,200 39,620 16,500 23,120 590 17,710 1,5
1955 89,060 59,060 ^l,56o *+0,880 16,860 2if,020 680 17,if30 1.2 3.^
1956 89,980 60,*+00 ^2,350 ifl,720 i6,i+5o 25,270 030 17,990 1.0 1.9
1957 90,760 61,950 ^3,360 if2, 8if0 16,070 26,770 520 18,330 0.9 2 .if
1953 91,580 63,070 ^3,680 if3,120 15,^70 27,650 560 19,320 0.9 0.7
1959 92, if 60 6^,570 Mf ,280 if3,700 15,370 28,330 580 20,210 1.0 l.if
i960 93,250 65,670 ^5,150 ifif ,720 1W,920 29,790 if30 20 ,i+00 0.9 2.0
1. Column 9 and 10 are my own calculation. TABLE 6.
Source: Statistics Bureau, Prime Minister's Office.
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Mortality and Birth Rates (per 1,000 population).
Year/Items Birth Rate Death Rate Natural Increase
rate.
19^7 35-.3 15-.6 19.7
195-8 33.5 11.9 21.6
19^9 33.0 11.6 31.5-
1950 28.1 10.9 17.2
1951 25.3 9.9 15.5-
1952 23.5- 8.9 15-.:5-
1953 21.5 8.9 12.6
1955- 20.0 8.2 11.9
1955 19.5- 7.8 11.6





1958 17.9 7.5- ... 10.5
19 592 17.6 7.3 10.2
TABLE 7.
1. Preliminary
2. Estimates based on Jan. - Sept. preliminary report by
the Institute of Population Problems, Ministry of Welfare.
Source: Vital Statistics Reports listed in Tachi, M.,
Population Trend and Economic Growth in Japan, Publication of
Institute of Population Problems, Ministry of Welfare.
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(A) Real Number (in million)
12201 27.0 14.4 5.6 6.9
19301 29.3 14.5 6.0 8.9
_Jd&L ^2 • 14.2 8.4 9.6
19472 33.5 17.8 7.4 8.1
19503 35.6 17.2
. 7.8 10.6
19554 39.3 16.1 9.2 13.9
!
I (B) Proportion
1920 100 54 21 26 ;
1930 100 49 20 30
1940 100 44 26 30
1947 100 53 22 24
1950 100 48 22 30
1955 100 41 24 35
ii
TABLE 8.
1. Por total employed.
2. Employed 10 years olu ana over,
3. Employed 14 years old ana over,
4. Employed 15 years old and over.
5. See Table 3•
Source: Population Census .Reports, listea in Tachi, h.,
ibid., See Table 7.
Index of Per Capita Gross National Product















Source: Calculated from Tables 1 and 6.
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Estimated. Population by Three Major Age Groups
(thousand)




Total 0-14 15-59 60< Total 0-14
i
15-59! 60<
1961 94,850 93,096 58,201 8,553 918
'
-759 1,410 267"" Y
rsn 59,611 8,820xyoti , / DC ^ I,;;I 876 -914 1,531 260
2121963 1 96,644126,423 61,142 9_j.080 829 -961 1,577
1964 T 97,473|25,462 62a719 9,292 772 -766 1,314 223













.?Oj 764 -438 934 268
r\^ ry r o 23,656 9,960/ i yjfivc 792 -272
■
804 261
11968 ! 100,554 23,384 66,960 10,221 825 -114 659 279L" ~~T , ,
2 3 ,i2 70 67,609 10,500jl9by j-ui, 3 n 837 -73 637
..
273
11970 102,216 23,197 68,246 ELO,773 4,111 349 2,4291 1,333
11975 106,327
...
12,1065 t i IV^b (b
23,713]72,801
3,361 167 2,126 1,068
11980 109,688 13,174 2,155 -467 1,119
. _ ' _ j 1,503. .jl985 111,843 23,246 73^920 14,677 1,100 -1,501 3^4;2,258
1990 112, 9431 21,745 ^74,264 16,935 350 -1,394 -618)2,361
1995 113,293 20,351 73,646 19,296 -240 -664 -1,521)1,945
12000 113,053^ 19,687
.
1 x , it j j *-.L, t4i -945 -213 —2,7 82 j2,050rv> oo [\J1 112,108 19,474^ 69,343!23,291
65,214;28,89L
1 861 -333 -4,129 2,600
|2010 110,247 19,141 -2,718 -728 -2,404' 415
12015I 107,529 18,413 62,810,26,306
TABLE 10.
Eource: Future Population Estimates for Japan by
Sex ana Age, estimated in June I960, Institute of Population
Proolems, Ministry of Welfare, Researcn Series, No. 138,
pp.8-9.
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tinue at a declining rate in subsequent years.
Thus, we know that the economy is not only growing but also
undergoing a structural change in its industrial composition and
in the age distribution of the population. In addition, a very
rapid rate of growth has been experienced without particularly a
significant rise in prices in recent years. Moreover, the economy
is still shoxving a very high rate even after production has recovered
to the pre-War level. What is the reason which caused this high
rate of growth?
In order to illustrate the point clearly, we will firstly set
out a Cobb-Douglas type production function. It is given as
P = a La K*3 (1 + Y)n
where P, L and K are indices for output, labour and real capital
respectively; a, 0, and a are parameters and (1 + r)f the
'trend factor'.^ The formula says that the rate of economic growth
is a function of supply of labour, supply of capital (including
land as capital), and technical progress.
It must first of all be mentioned that we are not goinf into
the calculation of values of this function. We are simply going
to treat it as a device of classification. An aggregate demand
•function' which determines whether production will be fully
utilized or not, must also be considered. However, this theoretical
presentation has the advantage that it provides a framework for
discussion of the problem of the effect of the Pension Scheme on growth
Commonly accepted explanations for the high rate of growth may
be found, in the following factors.
First, the supply of labour was abundant. In the transitional
1 An example of the use of these functions for the analysis of fiscal
policy is found in Peacock, A.T., In FISCAL PROBLEMS IN SOME AFRICAN
COUNTRIES. Conference on the Ecohomic Development of Africa South
of the Sahara, International Economic Association, July, 1961, p.15.
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period, immediately after the War, a large amount of unemployment
was created both amongst general workers and technicians. The
majority of them had reached a certain standard of education and
some had possessed high technical skills. Those were mostly ex-
soldiers, or civilians, who were deprived of their War-time Jobs,
many of whom had returned home from abroad after the end of the
War. Apart from these transient factors, the supply of labour
has been abundant because of the rapid rate of increase in the
working age population. (See Table 6). Moreover there existed a
2
widespread "concealed excess of employment," in agricultural
sectors, in small-sized industries and among self-employed or in
family workers. Therefore, production was not restricted by a
shortage of labour.
Secondly, the tempo of technical progress has been very rapid.
This has mainly taken the form of a high rate of utilisation of
technological innovations, developed in more advanced countries
during and after the War. The changes in the pattern of con¬
sumers' demand towards durable consumption goods has accelerated
the tempo of technical progress. At the same time, a high rate
of technical progress has stimulated a large demand for capital
equipment.
Thirdly, a high rate of capital formation has been possible.
In the earlier years, despite the War, some important factors of
production were relatively plentiful. There was an excess of
production equipment, technical and managerial skills, etc. Rapid
2 * This expression is very commonly used in Japan to indicate the
condition when labour force is utilized in a very inefficient
way.
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recovery was therefore possible. Aid from the U.S.A. was another
important factor. Japan was also able to call upon domestic
sources of savings, reflected in a very high savings ratio.-
Personal savings, as well as the government surplus were important.
Several reasons have been given for the high rate of personal
savings, such as a stable pattern of living or of consumption, in
spite of a rapid growth in personal income J and high incentives to
save, because of the demand for house construction, instability in
employment and insufficiency in social insurance services." A
high rate of return was offered by the increasing profitability of
business enterprises (shown in a sharp rise in the share index).
High rates of interest and a strong competition between banks in
raising loanable funds are additional reasons given.
The role of the government in increasing the supply of funds
was also important. Apart from the forced saving produced by in¬
flation immediately after the War, Post Office Savings and forced
savings via national insurance schemes as well as general taxation,
are also worthy of mention. A decrease in military expenditure and
partial substitution of it by an increase in public investment
caused an increase in capacity. In the supply of loanable funds,
the contribution made by Central Bank credit, was important.
Taxation policy also facilitated the modernisation of equipment
by means of generous depreciation provisions.
Turning now to the balance of payments position, an increase in
-
From Gross Savings Table and National Income Table, we can derive
that the savings ratio has been 28.6$ between 1951-1959 average.
National Income White Paper, 1959« p. 158 and p. 165.
4 " ■* See Hoshimo, S,, "Economic Growth and Employment Structure", in
Growth and Structure of the Japanese Economy, edit. Okita, ibid,,
p. 64.
21?
the competitive power of Japanese exports-' and, consequently, a
high rate of increase in exports must be mentioned. The increase
in exports has financed a growth in imports of raw materials, (and
equipment), which have added to available capital resources. A
decrease in the import ratio after the War may also be noted.^
This has caused an increase in the supply potentialities in the
sense that a higher rate of economic growth, without being res¬
tricted by international balance of payment difficulties, has
become possible, than would otherwise be the case. This has
furnished a condition for rapid growth by raising the ceiling of
the international balance of payments, which has often become a
bottle-neck in the Japanese economic growth. How efficiently
has this high rate of capital formation contributed to the
economic growth may be illustrated by the fact that the gross
marginal capital/output ratio is calculated as 3.3, 1949-1957
7
average.
The demand side must now be considered. A high rate of
economic growth has been made possible, because of sufficient
This is usually explained by the comparative stability of the
price level in Japan, (after the transition period), when prices
were rising abroad. Takahashi, T. ibid.., p. 40. Mr. Shinohara
however, emphasises favourable foreign exchange rate. See
Shinohara, M., Growth and Cycle of the Japanese Economy. Sobun
Co., June, 1961, p.
^
The import ratio after the War was about 155 (1953-1958 average)
compared to about 215 (1925-1939 average) of pre-War periods. The
Economic White Paper for the fiscal year 1961 (Economic Planning
Agency) points out a decline in imports of foodstuffs and a
decrease in the price of imported goods. A change in the production
structure towards heavy industrialisation and towards more round
aboutness is sometimes raised as one of several reasons which
caused a decrease in the imports ratio,
' See Long Term Forecast of the Japanese Economy, Committee for Long
Term Forecast, Economic Advisory Council; Economic Planning Agency,
Aug., i960, p. 832.
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effective demand. Following the termination of the War, a strong
reconstruction demand was observed. Moreover, consumption demand
remained high. Reform of agriculture and the development of trade
union movements have both usually been explained as important
systematic factors which have sustained consumption demand. This
has been explained by some as an enlargement of the home market.
The role of government finance in the growth of investment has been
very important and the increase in the burden of government expendi¬
ture has helped to maintain effective demand via an increase in
social services, etc. The rise in exports has also had an important
contribution towards an increase in demand, particularly between
O
1946 and 1950, reaching nearly 2% of the increase in total demand.
It has been pointed out that in the process of time the emphasis
has gradually been shifted from consumption and export demand to
investment demand. The increase in investment demand for production
equipment oxires to the effect of changes in the consumption patterns
(from foodstuffs and clothing to durable equipments, houses, and
sundry goods and expenses, observable since 1953) and particularly
to the effect of a high rate of technical progress on equipment
investment demand, most prominent since 1955. A high rate of
economic growth in itself, as well as a positive government attitude
(as was shown in the Ten Year Plan to double National Income) may
be a very important factor for demand increase.
Last of all, the combination of those factors of production in
the dual structure of the economy^"0 is very often explained to have
^ See Miyazaki, I., ibid., p. 30. Table 13.
9 Hoshino, S., ibid.. p. 61.
lC>For dual structure of the economy, see Further Explanations 1.
worked favourably towards the economic growth. The concentrated 219
development of large-scale capital intensive industries, combined
with highly developed techniques resulted in an effective utilization
of scarce capital towards a higher supply increase. The use of
abundant labour in small and middle-sized labour intensive indus¬
tries has enabled an increase in exports via cheap labour.1"1
We will consider here whether or not this high rate of growth
has taken place at a full capacity. If we consider unemployment,
we see that it is extremely low as slightly over 1% of the total
labour force (see Table 6), though, of course, this does not in¬
clude millions of disguised unemployment (or concealed excess of
1employment). Apart from these, therefore, labour force was nearly
fully utilized. The scarce factor of capital has been efficiently
utilized in a most concentrated manner in large scale capital in¬
tensive industries. It is extremely difficult to say whether or
not production equipment was working at full capacity. Nevertheless,
in view of the strong effective demand observable in the past, the
production equipment seems to have been working at a stage very near
to full capacity level in recent years. Therefore one might be able
to argue that the Japanese economy has shown a process of growth
12
which is nearly similar to the full capacity growth.
With this framework of economic structure in mind., we will go
on to analyse the effect of the National Pension Scheme on economic
11
Several other factors must be mentioned. Mr. Shinohara points
out the importance of the effect of strong incentives of entre¬
preneurs to invest and their desire and ability towards production
growth. He also points out that a long term cycle, of about 20 to
25 years, is observable in the pre-War Japanese economy and suspects
that a high rate of growth experienced after the War may have some
important bearings on an increasing trend of a long-term cycle,
Shinohara, M., ibid,, pp. 18-20, 22-23,
12
For more detailed discussions, see Okita, S. edit., Growth and
Structure of the Japanese Economy, ibid.; Shinohara, M., ibid.!
and also Growth of Japanese Sconomy. edit .CSkonomisuto Co0»




1. Dual Structure of the Sconomy
We will analyse a little further here the causes and the
features of the dual structure of the Japanese economy, in view of
its important relevance to the economic growth. As to the causes,
such factors as the excess supply of labour compared to scarcity in
capital, the government financial assistance to key industries in
the post-War critical periods, the giving of preferences in
financial loans to big industries, tax preference policies, and,
as a due consequence, a concentration of funds from banks to
established, efficient, developing, and financially sound, large-
scale industries can be mentioned.'1"" Thus the duality is seen in
sharp discrepancies in wage rates, in efficiency, and in productivity,
between modernised sectors and old-fashioned and traditional sectors,
between large-scale industries and small and middle-sized industries,
between the manufacturing sector and the agriculture sector, and
between capital-intensive sectors and labour-intensive sectors.
If seen from the side of the supply of labour, the excess
labour force has been absorbed in the dual structure of employment,
i.e. inefficient absorption of labour in traditional sectors, such
as, agriculture and family enterprises, and efficient employment
of the labour force in the modernised secondary and tertiary
■*"-J Mr. Shinohara describes the main characteristics of the duality
of the Japanese economy as a continuous decline in the wage rate
from large-scale to small-sized industries, caused by discrepancies
in productivity. The special connection between large scale in¬
dustries and banks has influenced capital equipment ratio and
hence productivity. Shinohara, M., ibid.. pp. 20-21.
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industries. This duality in the employment structure causes us to
be especially careful in treating the labour force as a factor of
production in our later analysis of alternative forms of investment.
Generally speaking, three possible cases may be classified in
analysing the supply conditions for labour. In the first the
Supply of labour Is elastic, and the choice of a method of pro¬
duction with more labour intensity means a significant increase
in the contribution of labour to output, since a choice of a method
with less labour Intensity implies unemployment. The second case
is applicable where a large supply of labour is absorbed In
inefficient sectors and a choice of labour-intensive methods means
a shift of labour from these sectors to the new Investment. In
this case, the net increase in the contribution of labour to out¬
put depends on the difference in productivity of two contrasting
sectors. The third case is seen when the supply of labour becomes
a scarce factor. Generally speaking, present-day Japan corresponds
more or less, to the second case, while the future direction is
14
towards the third.
If seen from the side of technical progress, a rapid tempo of
technical progress in large-scale, capital-intensive, modernised
14
It is interesting to note that Mr. Okita defines the condition,
of the supply of labour in around the present and the coming 10
years as "half restricted". He explains that the supply con¬
dition of labour is undergoing a long-term change from non-
restriction to restriction, due to a gradual fall in the in¬
crease in the new labour force and a high rate of capital for¬
mation. He explains that the supply elasticity of concealed
excess employment in the agriculture sector is only half elastic,
since several long-term frictions will be expected In the shift
of labour. Okita, S. "Will Agriculture Population Decrease
to 4Cf?'» Skonomisto. Oct. 11, i960. The analysis in this text
is more concerned with the effect of the dual structure of
employment on output growth In relation to the choice of forms
of investment.
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sectors, in contrast to slowness in that of traditional sectors,
is observable. This has caused a clear-cut distinction between
I1?
the stages of technical progress in these contrasting sectors. J
This feature of the pattern of technical progress suggests a special
care in treating technical progress as a factor of production. That
is to say that it may not be sufficient in our later analysis of
alternative forms of investment on economic growth to treat
technical progress as a mere, given, "trend factor". This is be¬
cause technical progress has shown different tempos in these con¬
trasting sectors, and the choice of forms of investment may affect
differently these tempos of technical progress - choice of capital
intensity will, in general, induce higher technical progress in
capital-intensive industries, and vice versa - and, as a whole, may
affect differently the tempo of the total trend of technical progress,
and its contribution to future increase in output. This structural
feature of technical progress attaches a special importance to the
choice of technique in the investment decision of a fixed fiscal
fund. Secondly, a pattern of technical progress may, in the long
ran, indicate a change in emphasis in methods of production. The
fact that technical progress in Japan has mostly been towards
I'd
The point I am making here is a discrepancy of technological
development between these two contrasting sectors. This may be
understood as a dual structure of technical progress. This is
mostly due to concentration of capital in large scale, capital-
intensive industries, since this has enabled the latter to import
developed techniques, and has also induced technological develop¬
ment in capital-intensive methods of production. Because of dif¬
ficulty in isolating the effect of technological development on
economic growth, this problem seems to be confused with the prob¬
lem of increasing trend of productivity in the line with the in¬
crease in capital equipment ratio. However, it seems to me that
this duality in the stages of technical progress is a very impor¬
tant point. Secondly, this is another aspect of the problem from
the general description, that quality as well as the acquired
technical skills of labour in Japan have been relatively high due
to a high rate of education.
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higher capital intensity suggests that the future direction of the
economy may also be more capital intensive. On the other hand, as
a short-teim effect, if a tempo of technical progress in one sector
has been artificially suppressed, this may cause a rapid progress
in that sector in the future. An artificial protection of large
scale industries has resulted in a high rate of technological
development in these industries, but, on the other hand, a low
rate in middle and small-sized industries. This may imply that
the latter could enjoy a high rate of technical progress, and
would achieve it if several Impeding factors are removed. In
very small sized industries, several impeding factors, such as
out-of-date management, unhygienic labour conditions, feudalistic
labour relations, etc. are still relevant. In medium-sized
industries, conditions for a higher rate of technological develop¬
ment are gradually appearing as the supply of cheap labour dwindles
away with the fall in the rate of increase in the labour force
and the need to face an increase in foreign competition following
the liberalization of foreign trade in addition to already severe
domestic competition. A gradual increase in capital for these
industries is now available. The importance of the role of the
government in facilitating the modernisation and development of
these industries by fiscal and financial measures will become
apparent, if the past pattern of technical progress is well
analysed.
From the capital supply side, the duality is most distinctly
seen in a concentration of scarce capital in large scale, capital-
intensive industries, accompanied by advanced techniques. This
duality in the allocation of capital has caused a distinct dif¬
ference in the productivity of labour between these contrasting
224
sectors, and has resulted in sharp differences in wage levels.
This, in turn, has enabled the unmodernised sectors to employ an
abundant cheap labour force towards an increase in production and
exports. The dual structure in the pattern of production growth
can be explained as due more to the increase in productivity than
to the amount of labour in the one sector, and as due more to the
increase in the quantity of labour rather than to productivity in
the other sector. The fundamental question is whether, if a long
run high rate of growth is the object, it is better to use fiscal
and financial policies to maintain, or accelerate, this duality
of the economy still in the future, or it is better positively to
try to adjust this duality, and, if so, in what way. One idea will
be shown in the last section in relation to the investment policy
of the pension scheme.
2. Future of Factors of Production
We will here analyse the future outlook of three factors of
production, and the problems they present. Let us start from the
supply of labour. As Table 10 shows, the future total population
growth and the growth of labour force will show a different pattern,
namely that the rate of total population growth is expected to fall
gradually, while the rate of the growth of labour force is still
expected to maintain a very high rate in the very near future, and
after a decade or so, begin to decrease sharply. This is because
the pattern of population growth is undergoing a significant change
towards "a decline in the birth rate and at the same time a decline
in the mortality rate", (See Mortality and Birth Rate in Table 7)>
and thus the population structure is changing.
The working population is expected to increase by over 1 million
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annually, until around 1966, and a sharp fall is expected after
that. Moreover, shortages in the new supply of labour have
already became apparent, in i960, as the result of a sharp increase
1 6
in demand, backed by an extraordinarily high rate of investment. '
Though there still exist millions of excess employees, in
agriculture, in small sized industries, in self-employed and
family enterprises - which still work as a structural barrier
against pressures to increase wages - due to the rapid economic
growth and a sharp fall in the birth rate, the condition of this
excess supply of labour is gradually being reduced. The supply
of labour is still abundant at present, compared to highly
developed countries, yet it gradually will become inelastic in
future, almost certainly in 10 to 15 years, if not in the next
5 years.3" Experiences in i960 raise several important points of
relevance to the formulation of future policy. First of all, the
insufficiency in the supply of technicians was revealed/0 The
need for an enlargement of technical education became apparent.
Secondly, labour shortages have caused wage increases in low wage
sectors. These have caused a decrease in the number of labourers
in very small sized industries and in home industries, and this
may be a future direction of the structural change. The increase
in wages has gradually made it more difficult for middle and small
sized industries to rely on cheap labour. This in turn has led to
16
Economic White Paper for Fiscal Year 1961, Economic Planning
Agency, the Government of Japan; Printing Bureau, Ministry of
Finance, Aug., 1961. pp. 42-44.




a need for an increase in productivity, or an increase in price.
The need for modernisation of middle and small sized industries
became apparent. The role of the government msiy have to be re¬
examined in this context. Thirdly, if the labour shortages have
come to affect the economy to such an extent even at the present
stage, the effort to increase the mobility of labour by removing
impeding factors must be intensified. Fourthly, in view of the
decreasing trend of the future supply of labour, measures to
increase the quality of labour, (rather than quantity), must be
strengthened. This leads to an increase in general education.
If we now turn to the supply of capital, it must, first of
all, be admitted that it is extremely difficult to forecast any
future trend. If, as a clue, the projection of the New Long-Range
Economic Flan Is introduced, this anticipates the annual rate of
growth in gross capital formation between the planning period
(1961-1970) to be as high as 8,2$. This means that gross capital
formation is expected to be 8.3 billion yen forcasted thus
180$ higher than 2,9 billion yen achieved in 1956-58 average.
However, actual experience in i960 and 1961 has shown a far greater
figure than was expected, due to an extraordinary increase in
equipment investment demand. If we reflect that this Is due rather
to structural reasons, than to accidental reasons, we may expect,
in view also of all other factors considered before, that a con¬
siderably high rate of capital formation is more likely to be
carried out in the future. Thus, a high rate of capital formation,
in contrast to, a gradual fall in the labour force, may alter the
comparative place of capital and labour, I.e. supply of capital
may become elastic, while supply of labour may become inelastic,
in the future. The role of technical progress, as well as the
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choice of forms of investment, may become still more important
in the future. Moreover the composition of capital, will have to
change since the inadequate stock of social overhead capital may
become more serious in the future as a high rate of equipment
investment in the private sector continues.
The past tempo of the technical progress has been very rapid,
due to a high rate of importation of techniques from more developed
countries in order to narrow a widespread gap in the level of
technique between Japan and those countries. Because of this, some
people fear that the future tempo of technical progress will be
reduced according as this gap narrows, while some others think that,
since the level of technique in middle and small sized industries
is still low, the tempo of technical progress as a whole will not
decrease in the future. I think that this is two sides of the
same phenomenon, and two points must be raised as to policy con¬
siderations. First of all, more effort will be needed to develop
technical progress, as this gap narrows. This indicates the impor¬
tance of investment in research. Secondly, sharp attention should
be given to the development potentialities of medium sized industries.
This involves an increase in government effort to facilitate the
development of those industries. The latter may be more important
for the short term, while the effect of the former may not appear
in this short run.
We have analysed the factors which have caused a high rate of
growth in Japan after the War in line with the factors of a Cobb-
Douglas production function. We have analysed the features of the
dual structure of the economy, the future trend of those factors of
production, and the problems they hold. By so doing, many of the
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factors which may limit the future economic growth of Japan were
revealed. We will simply add and stress two fundamentally important
possible limiting factors, i.e. the possible difficulty of the
international balance of payments, and the possible appearance
of insufficiency in social overhead capital.
3* Adequacy of the Assumptions on Demand
A consideration of the investment policy of the pension scheme
leads largely to, or becomes identical with, consideration of
total fiscal investment policy, because of its special institutional
characteristics. Therefore, the analysis of this section will
facilitate chiefly the analysis of the investment policy of the
pension scheme, i.e. the effect of the form of the investment on
economic growth, which will be dealt with in Section 4. However,
one point of the analysis of this section, related to the future
trend of demand, will directly facilitate the analysis in Section
3, of the effect of the pension scheme on investment and on
economic growth.
Here the analysis starts by employing a Harrod-Domar type
growth model, and explains how the scheme affects investment and
output from the supply side. However, we do not know exactly
how the demand side will react to it. We have analysed in Chapter
IVthat the impact effect of the pension scheme may take a positive
sign, at least, for the coming 20 years, but we are not exactly
sure that sufficient demand is always guaranteed to increased
capacity. The analysis in the text has revealed that effective
demand has been constantly high after the War. Above all, recent
equipment demand has been remarkably great. This has been caused
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by a high rate of technical progress, as well as by the structural
change of consumers' demand. The necessity for films to strengthen
international competitive power to prepare for the liberalization
of foreign trade has also been an important factor. These factors
suggest that the demand pressure is structurally strong and that
this tendency is not likely to be reduced so easily in the future.
If technical progress spreads to the middle sized industries,
equipment investment demand in these industries will be increased.
Trade union movements are expected to be strengthened. The supply
of labour will increase for some time yet, and wage rates will
rise as the result of a high rate of capital formation. An increase
in social services will be expected in the future, and the pension
payments may also contribute towards demand increases. Consumers'
demand is not likely to become insufficient in the conceivable
future. In view of the above, it may not be unrealistic to assume
that sufficient effective demand is more likely to be guaranteed in
the future for the increase in capacity financed by the pension
investment. In the following analysis of Section 3? it will be
assumed that restriction of capacity increase by insufficient
demand is not expected.
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Section 3. Effect of National Pension Scheme on
Investment and on Economic Growth.
The introduction of the National Pension Scheme will, first
of all, affect one of the three factors of production previously-
analysed, i.e. supply of capital. On the other hand, the scheme
as such will not initially affect other factors of production.
Then we can illustrate how the scheme raises the level of in¬
vestment, and thus affects the rate of economic growth, by
using a simple Earrod-Domar type of growth model. We can treat
this as a special case of a more generalised production
function, e.g. one of the Cobb-Douglas type.
It must, first of all, be made clear that the Harrod-Domar
type model is very simple. It is also assumed that fiscal and
monetary policies can be flexibly adjusted so as not to cause
inflation or deflation, and that no restriction of capacity
increase by insufficient demand is expected.
Now the introduction of the Rational Pension Scheme will
cause an increase in investment for at least twenty years to
come. (See Table 2, Ch. IV). This is obtained as the summation
of the increase in investment via surplus formation and a de¬
crease in investment via a decrease in undistributed profits
due to the interest payments from the private sector to the
pension scheme.' This will affect the output groxtfth. Let us
"*• Other factors such as psychological effects on peoples' incen¬
tives to save, and entrepreneurs' incentives to invest, etc., and
also the possible interference of public investment on private
investment, etc., are neglected. The effect of the collection of
social security tax, of a shift of a part of the interest burden
of the private sector to personal income, and of pension payments,
on savings, and on investment, are as well, neglected.
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analyse it by employing a very simplified investment function.
Let us assume that the level of investment in real terns is
given as
In-1 = b Yn?l (1)
p
where I is real net investment, b is a rate of undistributed
r 2
profit to real national product and Y is real national product.
Let us express the relationship between real national product
■R R
(Y ) and real net investment (I ) as
C (YnR - Yn-1) = In5. (2)
where o" is the incremental capital/output ratio. Then from formulae
(1) and (2), the general solution is obtained as
YnR = (1 + ^)n Yo (3)
If this is re-written in the form of the rate of growth,
£1* b (As
"v* - p <4)
The effect of the introduction of the pension scheme on the
increase of the growth rate of the output can be understood in the
same way as the increase in the investment ratio b in formula (4).
How far the investment will be increased can be analysed in the
following way.
p
This and subsequent growth models are based on analysis in
Peacock, A.T., ibid.. pp. 12-13.
o
J The reason why this simple assumption is adopted is because
it will facilitate clarification of the analysis showing how
the autonomous investment due to the pension scheme influences
the growth paths.
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The changes in investment via surplus formation of the pension
g
scheme (I ) are obtained as the excess receipts over expenditure,
i.e. the summation of social security tax (T) and the interest pay¬
ments from the private sector (R) minus pension payments (P)
In-1 = Tn-1 + Rn-1 - Pn-1 (5)
On the other hand, the same interest payments from the private
sector to the pension scheme cause a decrease in investment. If
the proportion of undistributed profits to real national product
is assumed to remain constant before and after the interest pay¬
ments, the level of real net investment after the introduction of
pi
the pension scheme (I ) is obtained as follows from formulae (1)
and (5) so that
/k, g
Ir-1 = b (yH-1 - Rn-1) + In-1
= b YnSl + Tn-1 + (1 - b) Rn-1 - Pn-1
= InSl + Tn-1 + (1 - b) Rn-1 - Pn-1 (6)
which may be written as
* In-1 = lR'n-l - In5. = Tn-1 + (1 - b) Rn-1 - Pn-1 (7)
where b is a rate of undsitributed profits to real national product,
R are interest payments from the private sector to pension schema,
Is is surplus investment, T is social security tax, P are pension
■p
payments and a ln is an increase in real net investment due to the
pension scheme.
As can be seen from formula (7), the increase in real net
investment due to the pension scheme in period (n-1) is a function
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of social security tax (Tn-1), interest payments from the private
sector ) and pension payments (Pn-1). However, as a flat
rate contribution system is adopted, these items of T, R and P,
are decided as independent of the level of real national product.
Let us treat, therefore, the increase in real net investment due
to the pension scheme as an autonomous function.
Aln2i = A InSj (= Tn-1 + (1 - b) Rn-1 - Pn-1) (8)
This implies that the investment function of the economy as
i
a whole is treated as the summation of the induced investment
which is obtained as a function of the previous level of real
national product and the autonomous investment which is decided
by the size and the composition of the finance of the pension
scheme.
Foimula (8) shows that the greater the social security tax
and the interest payments from the private sector to pension
scheme, and the smaller the pension payments, the greater will be
the increase in investment. If the formula is developed further
it can be seen that, at least for the initial years, the smaller
the rate of undistributed profits to real national product (b),
and the rate of interest payments from the private sector to the
total interest tevenue, and the greater the interest rate (r), the
T>
greater will be the increase in real net investment (^1 ),
As analysed in the fourth chapter, the above formula will be
positive, with an increasing rate, in the beginning years, and
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4
in later years will take negative values.
How far the rate of growth will be altered depends on how
great a significance the pension investment has in the total in¬
vestment of the economy. However, we cannot discuss this in
precise terms, since, first of all, so great an uncertainty sur¬
rounds the future. Moreover, we do not know exactly what will be
the amount of the future decrease in investment via a decrease in
undistributed profits due to the interest payments from the private
sector to the pension scheme. This is because we do not know for
certain how the future government will decide the distributive
ratio of the pension investment between the private sector and
the public sector, nor do we know what will be the future propor¬
tion of undistributed profits to national income. However, I am
of the opinion that this decrease will be mueh smaller than the
increase in surplus investment — at least, for the coming 20 years.
4
If the assumption is altered to the effect that the level of in¬
vestment in real terms consists of the Investment financed out of
undistributed profits and other autonomous investment,formula (1)
in the text is altered^to R
In-1 = b Yn-1 + In-l (1')
where b is a rate of undistributed profits to real national pro¬
duct and InBl is autonomous investment.
The changes in investment via surplus formation of the pension
scheme (Is) are obtained in the same way as in the text.
In-1 = Tn-1 + Rn-1 - Pn-1 (?')
where T is social security tax, R are interest payments from the
private sector to the pension scheme, and P are pension payments.
The leyel of investment after the introduction of the pension
scheme (Ifl )is obtained in the same way as formula (6) in the text.
In-1 = b (Yn^l - Rn-1) + In&L + in-1
= b Yn-1. + In-1 + Tn-3 + (1-b) Rn-1 - Pn-1
= InSl + Tn-1 + (1-b) Rn-1 - Pn-1 (6'). The changes in
investment due to the pension scheme are obtained as autonomous.
(The same as formula (B)),
A IA = AlnSl = Tn-1 + (1-b) Rn-1 - Pn-1 (8«)
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(We can illustrate this by statistical testing using projection
figures given in Chapter IVi) r' ::
Therefore, in order to get a rough idea on the scale of the scheme,
we will compare the amount of surplus investment with the scale of
the total Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme fund.
According to the government projection, the reserve accumulation
of the pension scheme is expected to increase for over fifty years to
come, particularly at a very high rate for the first decade or two.
(See Tablell). The annual rate of j crease will be as high as JlOf
for 1962/1961, 24f for 1966/1965, ■ for 1970A969, 2 9JT for
1975/1974, for 1980/1979* etc. Very roughly speaking, this
reserve accumulation is expected to exceed half a billion yen in
1970, and 1.3 billion yen in 1980, the latter nearly corresponding
to the total balance of the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account in
1958, which forms most (over 60^) of the total balance of the
Fiscal Investment and Loan Program fund in the same year.
The annual surplus formation is also expected to increase at
a very high rate for the first decade or so, making the average
rate of increase between 1961 and 1970 7»2^ per annum; it then
reduces to 2 to If for the next decade. (See Tablell). Roughly
speaking, the annual surplus in 1970 is expected to be about 29f,
and that in 1980 to be about 33^* of "the total Trust Fund Bureau
fund in 1958, (i.e. 0.25 billion yen), the latter exceeding half
(about 60f) of the total Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme fund,
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Reserve Accumulation and Net Increase of Reserve.















1961 39,003 100.0 39,003 100.0
1962 81,948 210 .1 42,945 110a
1963 128,999 330.7 47,051 120.6
1964 179,874 460.7 50,675 129.9
i 1965 233,191 597.9 53,517 137.2
1966 289,623 742.6 56,432 144.7
1967 350,263 898.O 60,640 155.5
1968 414,055' 1,061.6 63,790 163.6
1969 481,779 1,235.2 67,724 173.6
1970 554,481 1,421,6 72,702 186.4
1975 93S,010 2,405.0 80,721 207.0
1980 1,357,053 3,47°.4 85,077 218.1
1985 1,795,553 4,603.6 90,106 231.0
1990 2,260,026 5,794.5 92,752 237.8
1995 2,698,824 6,919.5 83,939 215.2
2005 3,412,786 8,750a 60,397 154.9
2015 3,604,650 9,242.0 -19,225 -49 0 3 !
2025 3,276,066 8,399.5 -29,497 -75.6
|1— —— — i
TABLE 11
1. Source* The Reference Material issued in conjunction with
the National Pension Bill, 1959, Ministry of Welfare.
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Xl.e. 0.43 billion yen)-, This means that the annual surplus in
1970 is about 17$> and that in 1980 is about 20$, if they are
compared with the total Fiscal Investment and Loan fund. How
much this surplus investment will correspond to the Fiscal Invest¬
ment and Loan fund in those years depends on the assumptions we
make about the manner of rate of this investment increase. If we
assume, for example, such a high rate of increase as 8.2$ per
annum, (which is the projected figure of the annual rate of
increase of the total gross capital formation in the New Long-
Range Economic Plan of Japan (1961-70)), the weight in 1970 will
be reduced to 7$ instead of 17$j and that in 1980 to 4$ instead
of 20$. If we assume a lower rate of investment increase than
that - such as 7.2/, 6.5$, %% 4$, or 3^ ~ the results in 1970
will be 7.4$, 8$, 9$, 11$, or 12$, respectively. The same
assumption will cause the same ratios for 1980 to be 4$, 5$, 7$, 8$
or 10$, respectively.
It cannot be over-emphasised that this is a very crude attempt
in order to obtain a very rough idea on the future scale of the
surplus Investment. Actual figures in the future may be consider¬
ably different. Even apart from the general problems of the
difficulty of projection, the estimates are based on rather rough
assumptions, such as: only 70$ of the compulsory entrants are
able to contribute and only 85$ of these are collected, which
c
y Public Finance White Paper for 1959, Research Section, Ministry
of Finance, July. I960, p. ;-;p ■. TaDie 7. The figure of the
Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme fund corresponds to about
one fifth (18.6$) of the total investment for lv58, i.e. 2.8
billion yen. See National Income White Paper for 1958.. Economic
Planning Agency, Feb. I960, p. 13, Table 5. As to the mechanisms
of the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account and also of the Fiscal
Investment and Loan Programme, see Chapter 2.
238
seems to be too low as long term figures. This is because, if
the economy grows at a considerable rate in the future, the
present rate of contribution of 100 yen (2 shillings) or 150
yen a month is more likely to become a very negligible amount.
Moreover, in view of this low contribution rqte, and also a low
pension payments rate, it is more likely that the amount of
pension payments, as well as the contribution rate, will be
increased in the future. The magnitude of the surplus invest¬
ment may be considerably increased as the scale of the pension
scheme increases. The coverage of the scheme may also be in¬
creased. The interest revenue, based on the assumption of
the 5.5# per annum rate, may be increased in practice, at least
7
for the near future. In view of all these, it is more likely
that the future place of the pension scheme in the economy will
become greater than was analysed in figures. At any rate, we
have seen that the future surplus investment may not.be a
negligible amount. Moreover, this is the fund which the govern¬
ment can use according to its policy considerations. However,
the figure does not show that the surplus investment of the
National Pension Scheme as such will have a predominantly impor¬
tant place in the total economic growth. If, however, the surplus
from other public pension schemes is taken into consideration,
The scheme covers only those who are not covered by other public
pension schemes at present, but aims at a universal scheme in
the future. See Chapter 2.
7' The interest rate for the fund of the Fiscal Investment and Loan
Programme has been around 6.5'f in recent years, and no sharp de¬
crease is expected'in the near future. However, in the long run
analysis, whether or not this interest rate is maintainable raises




then the importance of these may be increased. Moreover, the most
important factor of the effect of the National Pension Scheme is
that the increase of its place in the Trust Fund Bureau fund,
together with other public pension schemes, are affecting the total
policy consideration of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme.
Why it is so, and how it is so, we will analyse in the fourth
section.
Before going into the next stage of the analysis of the
effect of forms of investment, a slight modification of the previous
model will be introduced. This is to illustrate one aspect of the
effect of the pension scheme on growth with the aid of this simpli¬
fied model and to discuss the problems it raises. As we have seen,
the introduction of the National Pension Scheme will cause an
Increase in public investment via its surplus formation for a
considerable while, (over thirty years to come by the government
projection), of the transitionary periods of the scheme. On the
other hand, the interest payments from the private sector to the
pension scheme will cause a decrease in private investment via a
decrease in undistributed profits. The collection of social
security tax, the psychological influences on the people's in¬
centive to save, etc., may still reduce private investment. Thus
one clear cut aspect of the effect of the pension scheme on in¬
vestment is seen in the form of an increase in public investment
g
on the one hand, and a decrease in private investment, on the other,
o
Public investment, distinguished from private investment, is used
here in a very wide sense. This is because a part of the surplus
Is loaned to the private industries via government financial in¬
stitutions, etc., though, of course, this part is subject to the
government fiscal policies. If, however, we include this in the
private investment, the private investment may be increased as
well.
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We will analyse it with the aid of the following model.
Let us assume this time that the level of investment in the
real terms consists of government investment which is a fixed
proportion of government (tax) revenue, and of private invest¬
ment, which is equal to undistributed profits after the
o
deduction of taxation at a proportional rate.' Then
Infl. = b Y n3i (l - t) + g t Yn^l (9)
where b is a rate of undistributed profits to real national product,
t is general tax rate, g is a rate of government investment to
R R
government (tax) revenue, Y" is real national product and I is
real investment (net), b, t, and g < 1.
Within the framework of this investment function, the shift
of investment from the private sector to the public sector implies
a decrease in the first item of the right part of formula (9)>
i.e. b Yn-1 (1 - t} and an increase in the second item of the
right part of the same formula, i.e. g t Yn-1.
In order to isolate and examine the effect of the shift it¬
self of investment from the private to the public sector, let us
assume a simplification in the financing mechanisms of the
National Pension Scheme, viz., that the scheme causes a rise in
the general tax rate from t to t^, by the amount of At. The
government revenue, and consequently, the government investment
will be increased by the same shift. If new level of real net
Peacock, A..T., ibid., pp. 12-13.
The following growth model building is the introduction of
Peacock's analysis with a slight alteration in the treatment
of government investment. This alteration of the assumption




investment is expressed as Irr-l, this will be expressed, from
formula (9)» as
In-'l = bYn^l (l - t1) + g Yn2l
= bYrJ-1 (1 - t - At) + g (t +At) Yn-1
= bYnSl (1 - t) + g t Yn^L - b YnSu^t + g.At YnSl
= In-1 + (g - b) n.Yn-1
In-'l - In-1 = (g - b)At Yn-1 (10)
From formula (10) the changes in investment due to the shift
of investment from the private sector to the public sector are
the multiplication of (1) the change in the general tax rate .at,
(2) the difference between the rate of government investment to
government revenue and the rate of undistributed corporate profit
to real national product (g - b), and (3) the level of real
R
national product Y •
If g^b is satisfied, (which seems realistic in the Japanese
case), the above shift of investment causes an increase in real
net investment, and consequently, in a real national product. The
size of the effect depends on the size of this shift, and conse¬
quently on the size of the finance of the pension scheme. The
effect of this shift on the rate of economic growth is obtained
as a function of the multiplication of (g - b) and At. The last
point will become clearer if the investment function is built Into
the growth model.
Let us express the relation between real national product
R P
(Y ) and real net investment (1 ) as
CT (YnR - Yn?l) = In$l (11)
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where C is the incremental capital/output ratio.
From formula (9) and (11),
YnR = fl + ~ (ba-t) + gt^n Yor (12)
\ (1 " t) + gtj (13)
= \ ($ + (g - b) 9 (13,)
The shift of investment from the private sector to the public
sector alters the composition of the items in the parenthesis of
formula (13) and thus affects the rate of growth. If the shift is
understood as a simple increase in the general tax rate (At),
then the effect of the shift on the rate of growth is obtained
from formula (13') as ^ (g - b)*t, if the incremental capital/
output ratio (C) is assumed not to be affected by the shift of
investment
The above analysis is just an attempt to illustrate one
specific aspect of the pension scheme in a modified growth model,
with great simplifications. However, if the complicated character¬
istics of each transaction of the pension scheme are introduced,
It is possible to introduce a further modification in the in¬
vestment function by introducing the private investment financed
by borrowings. If we assume that this is a fixed function of
personal income (defined as real national product minus undis¬
tributed profit) after the deduction of taxation at a proportional
rate, and if we assume that other things are unchanged, then the
new investment function is obtained, instead of formula (9) in
the text,as
In5l = b Yn&.(l-t) + a Yn5l(l-b)(l-t) + gt YnSl (9')
where the first item in the right part of formula (90 is private
investment financed out of undistributed corporate profits, the
newly inserted second item is private investment by borrowings,
and the third is government investment. As to the symbols of
the second item, a is the rate of private investment by borrowings
to personal income, (1 - b) is the rate of personal income to
real national product, t is general tax rate. Other symbols are
unchanged. If other things are unchanged, growth foimula is
obtained as
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the model may not be sufficiently useful to explain the effects.
If the surplus of the pension scheme is all invested, the rate of
government investment to government (tax) revenue (g) in formula
(9) will be increased, if other things are equal. This will
increase the effect of the pension scheme on the rate of economic
growth in formula (12), Moreover, if we consider that the levy
of a flat rate contribution from a certain range of workers will
10 (Contd.)
YnR ajjL + i[ b(l-t) + a(l-b) (1-t) + g~l|n Yo (12)
This may be rewritten as
■ ^.(b (1-t) + a(l-b) (1-t) +gt} (13)"
= \ [{b+a (l-b)}-+|g-(b+a (1-b))] t (13)m
The shift of investment from the private sector to the public
sector implies decreases in b (1-t) and a (1-b) (1-t), and an
increase in g t in formula (13),*? assuming C remains constant.
If it is simplified as an increase in general tax rate t by the
amount of-at, the effect of this, shift on the rate of growth is
obtained from formula (13)"', as £g - {b + a(l-t®A t. Inhere
b and (1-b) are the distributive ratios of undistributed profits
and personal income to real national product, while 1 (unity) and a
are the ratio of investment to a unit of undistributed profits and
a unit of personal income, respectively. Consequently, (1 b + a(l-b)
shows the rate of private investment to a unit of real national
product after deduction of taxation..^ g is the rate of public
investment to government revenue, tfieTitem in the greatest paren¬
thesis of formula (13)"'i.e.» {g - (b + a(l-b))f, shows the dif¬
ference in the rate of investment of a unit of revenue between the
public sector and the private sector. If the public sector is
assumed to have a greater propensity to invest than the private
sector, i.e. g>b + a(l-b), (which seems realistic in the case of
Japan), then the shift will in this way accelerate the economic
growth. In the same way it is possible to introduce a modification
by assuming that private investment financed by borrowings is a
fixed function of real national product. The result will be
^ jj(b + a') + (g - b)t J (13"") where a' is the rate of
private investment financed by borrowings to real national product,
other things being equal. However, because of the speciality of
each transaction of the pension scheme, these elaborations may
not be so useful.
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rather not affect the potential level of investment, or if we want
to introduce the decrease in investment due to the interest pay¬
ments from the private sector to the pension scheme - which is a
function of the total surplus accumulation, interest rate, and
the distributive ratio of the accumulated surplus investment be¬
tween the private and the public sectors, and not a function of
national income - then we must conclude that a further analysis
will only be possible if we treat the pension investment as an
autonomous factor. This we did in the previous analysis, as well
as in the expenditure model analysis.
In spite of all these qualifications, one point is clear.
This is that the introduction of the pension scheme will cause an
increase in public investment. Therefore, we will briefly discuss
the general problems of the increase in public investment with
special reference to the economic, administrative and political
conditions of Japan.
First of all, the increase in public investment enables the
government to allocate a greater part of the investment fund of
the economy to those sectors, the development of which the
government regards to be essential. In an economy like that of
Japan where historical and environmental conditions necessitated
a rapid development in a shorter period than those of more
developed countries, and some imbalance of economy gradually
emerged, the increase in public investment may be in itself a
desirable factor. This is because the government can, if it
wisely utilizes the increased public fund, develop those sectors
which are left behind in the process of a rapid economic expansion
and remove some of the possible obstacles to further development.
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The government can contribute more by strengthening social over¬
head capital, by advancing the quality of labour by technical
and general education, by accelerating the technical progress by
research investment, and by improving the environmental and
social welfare facilities. The government may also be able to
furnish more stable long term investment funds, with possibly
at interest below market rates to the new equipment investment of
key industries.
The increase in the proportion of government investment of
the total investment also means that in the controlling power of
the government on the economic activity. The government may, if
it wisely operates public investment, be able to reduce economic
fluctuations. These effects of the shift of investment may work
favourably towards higher economic growth.
However, lack of sufficient competition in public investment
and lack of willingness to invest in projects designed to foster
economic growth may result in productivity increases which are less
would otherwise be the case if investment were in private hands.
This inefficiency may become apparent when the above factors are
combined with the inefficiency of bureaucratic control and political
and social pressure on the distribution of funds. Even apart from
the inefficiency of complicated procedures of paper administration
of huge bureaucratic organizations, the inefficiency may also be
noticeable in the production processes. A typical example is the
road improvement work by daily workers organized as one of the
policies of the Government to counteract unemployment. Daily
workers sometimes even intentionally worked inefficiently so as to
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postpone the completion of the work, for the completion of the
allocated part of the road improvement sometimes meant their
return to unemployment. Fixed wages, without consideration of
efficiency, reduce the willingness of workers to work, and reduce
productivity. This type of evil influence on productivity may
appear, if sufficient care is not given, in public investment
at large, particularly in those investments carried out by the
government as its general policy in the government general account.
Even in the case of government affiliated organizations, the
guarantee of status or jobs of staffs, inflexibility of wages, the
government subsidies, and sometimes the guarantee of the status
of monopoly, may reduce productivity by reducing the incentives
to work of workers, and by hindering serious attitude of entre-
preneurship. As the choice of the method of production is decided
by the allocation of the budget, not always by the efficiency of
technique, productivity may be sacrificed.
It is also worth pointing out that the productivity of
public investment may be greatly affected by the way in which
the fund is distributed and allocated. This point is particularly
serious when the political or social pressure is too strong and
the public investment is divided into too small units in order to
satisfy all needs, and as a result productivity may not increase
appreciably. To a certain extent, this has been the case in
Japan. It may lead to procedural problems which are involved in
decision making of public investment. The present situation,
where a large measure of the investment policy is in practice
decided by the Ministry of Finance in the name of the government,
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may involve some risk of bureaucratic inefficiency. Interference
by the ruling party, which has become more common in recent years
than heretofore, may accompany the representation of diverse
pressure groups. This may again lead to the distribution of funds
in too small units. The participation of private enterprise or of
experts in professional fields is in theory guaranteed by the
councils system, but in practice has little effect; and this may
need improvement. This procedural problem may lead us to discuss
the possible forms of public investment. However, as the adminis¬
trative details are out of the sphere of present analysis, and as
some analysis of the mechanism of public investment has already
been given in the second chapter, further remarks will be omitted
at present.
The role of the government has been very great in the economic
development of Japan. Partly because of this, the economic policy
of the government has had a strong effect on private industries.
Entrepreneurs were, in many cases, too sensitive to the government
policy. In view of this, the policy formation needs to be carried
out very carefully in Japan. The increase in the ratio of public
investment may accelerate this tendency of too much sensitiveness
of entrepreneurs to the government policy.
At any rate one thing is quite certain. It is that the increase
in the weight of public investment increases the meaning and effect
of the choice of public investment. It will become essentially
important to examine the economic effect of different forms of
investment, and to formulate a correct investment policy. The
effect of forms of investment on economic growth will be analysed
in the fourth section.
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Section 4, Investment Policies of the National Pension Scheme and
the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme.:
The aim of this section is to analyse the investment policies of
the pension scheme, and of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme,
mainly in the light of the effect of the forms of investment on
economic growth. Before going into policy discussions, we will analyse
why and in what way, the investment policy of the National Pension
Scheme is institutionally so closely related to the general policy
of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme. We will start it by
introducing general controversies held in Japan relating to the in¬
vestment of the surplus of the National Pension Scheme.
2
Prior to the start of the new National Pension Scheme , there
had been strong controversy as to whether the fund should be operated
uniformly with other funds in the Trust Fund Bureau, or independently
by itself, separated frcm other funds. The former is the opinion of
the Ministry of Finance. This opinion holds that the utilization of
the fiscal funds should as a rule be planned and operated by the
Exchequer. It may be justifiable under the situation where the
operation by an independent pension fund nearly meant the separation
of the pension fund from the control of the Ministry of Finance.
However, at least theoretically, the pension fund may well be operated
in an independent fund, if a special consideration has to be given
to the nature of the fund. The crucially important point is that the
. Programme
As to the Fiscal Investment and LoaiV, see Chapter 2,
2
Mostly in 1959 and i960.
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fund should not be operated in separation from general employment
policy. This implies that it must be as a rule controlled by the
Ministry of Finance.-' This argument for the uniform operation of the
fund also adds that the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme has a
greater tendency towards public investment which strengthens social
overhead capital, such as the strengthening of a basic structure of
the economy, construction of houses, improvements of welfare and
livelihood circumstances, etc. It may be desirable for the fiscal
fund to be utilized in a field not so competitive with private invest¬
ment. However, the direct utilization of the pension fund for welfare
facilities, etc., may not be a suitable long term policy for the
welfare of the insured. In addition this view also states that the
demand for the fiscal fund is very great, so that the new National
Pension Fund is needed as a fund in the Fiscal Investment and Loan
Programme, and, in view of the above tendency of the Fiscal Investment
and Loan Programme, this is quite suitable for the welfare of the
people as a whole. This part may sound a little too easy-going,
partly because of the general opinion that the original objective of
the introduction of the pension scheme is not to supply the govern¬
ment with fiscal funds, but to increase the welfare of the aged, and
partly because the welfare of the insured is not so clear as it looks,
and the investment policy of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme
may not always be satisfactory. However, this opinion may be more
reasonable than the following.
The claim to utilize the pension fund independently separated from
other fiscal funds is, first of all, presented from trade union circles.
3 As to the controls by the Treasury in the United Kingdom, see Peacock,
A. T. The economics of National Insurance. '.Jilliam Hodge and Company Ltd.,
pp. 44-45.
250
They argue, that, as the National Pension Fund is composed of con¬
tributions compulsorily collected from self-employed of small firms,
poor farmers and employees of small firms excluded from other public
pensions, these contributions should not be used for the Fiscal In¬
vestment and Loan Programme which only benefits the big monopolistic
capitalists and leads to the strengthening of rearmament under the
new peace treaty conditions. This is more in the nature of political
propaganda and we may omit further comment.
A further urge for an independent utilization of the fund comes
from the government departments. First of all, the Ministry of
Welfare claims that as the fund is composed of small compulsory
contributions of people at large, it should be operated for the
welfare of the people by the same Ministry. Secondly, the Local
Government Agency presents the same sort of claim that, as most
welfare administration is actually enforced by local governments,
the fund should be used by the same Agency. Both of them are rather
political claims to enlarge their own powers. These show the worst
part of Japanese bureaucratic sectionalisms. However, the more
dangerous point is that the problem of the welfare of the insured is
apt to be judged so short sightedly as meaning only a direct return
to the contributors.
It will be interesting to introduce recommendations or opinions
on the utilization of the fund presented nearly at the same time in
the midst of these controversies, by three different government ad¬
visory councils. The first of these is the "Proposals on the operation
of the Trv' und Bureau Fund" by the Trust Fund Bureau Council on
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14th September i960. " This says that "the National Pension Fund
should be deposited in the Trust Fund Bureau and be operated uni¬
formly in the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme, and that this
suits the welfare of the people at large, consequently also the
welfare of the insured." This proposal is nearly the representation
of the opinion of the Ministry of Finance and therefore the
appraisals and criticisms listed previously are applicable. However,
the proposal continues that, "at the same time, a part of the annual
increase of the deposit of the National Pension Scheme to the Trust
Fund Bureau can be utilized for the improvements of those facilities
as are suitable for the objectives of the National Pension Scheme
within the limit of 25 per cent of all." This is a product of a
political compromise between two opposite opinions and furnishes a
way for the utilization of the fund for the welfare facilities. How¬
ever, as will be discussed later, this Council ought to have given the
indication that the direct loan for welfare facilities should be more
or less limited in the transitory periods. This is because, as
Professor Suzuki rightly points out, such items as social welfare
facilities should fundamentally be met by current government general
<
expenditures.-' At any rate, this proposal proved to be exactly the
line which the government adopted later.
The second is the "Report on the Operation of the National Pension
Fund" by the National Pension Council on 16th September 1960.t; This is
4 The Trust Fund Bureau Council is set up in the Financial Bureau of the
Ministry of Finance to discuss the operation of the fiscal funds of the
Trust Fund Bureau. Prime Minister is the Chairman, and the Minister of
Finance is the vice-Chairman of the Council.
Suzuki, T. "Public Pension and Fiscal Investment". Municipal Prob¬
lems . The Journal of the Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research. Vol, LI,
No. 12, December i960, p. 10.
^ The National Pension Council is set up in the Ministry of Welfare to
discuss the problems related to the National Pension Scheme.
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an interim report and says that "in view of the speciality in the
nature of the National Pension Fund and of the tendency that the Fiscal
Investment and Loan Programme will be decided politically, it will be
inevitable that the Fund should be separated and operated independently
from other fiscal funds." However, political influence on the Fiscal
Investment and Loan Programme may be to a certain extent inevitable
so long as parliamentary democracy is maintained. The main point is
whether the actual investment policy formulated under the influence
of political pressures helps the development of the national economy
or not. Moreover, even although a separate fund is established, it
should be put under the control of the Ministry of Finance, if harmony
of the investment policy of the fund with the general employment policy
is to be maintained. If this condition, i,e. the control by the
Ministry of Finance, is guaranteed, the political influence will again
become more or less inevitable. The report also recommends that "the
fund should be operated as profitably as possible, so long as the
finance of the fund is kept safe and sound." However, it is rather
dubious to stress profitability so much. It is true that if the
interest revenue of the fund increases, the rate of contribution or
the Exchequer Supplement may be reduced, or the pension payments
could be increased. However, the increase of the interest rate on the
loan to unprofitable - but necessary - government enterprises or public
works may simply mean 'in increase in taxation. Moreover, if the pur¬
suit of "profitability" contradicts with private investment so as to
effect a reduction of expansion in Industries, and consequently the
slowing down of the rate of economic growth, or if inflation is caused,
the result will be disastrous. It is also dubious to stress safety and
soundness in social insurance. Fundamentally, the finance of social
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insurance is based on the real national product of the period and on
the taxation authority of the government. The harmony with general
economic policy may be more important, hence if inflation is caused,
it can easily upset actuarial soundness.
The third is the "Demand on the Operation of the Public Pension
Fund" by the Social Security System Council on 6th October I960.''7
This says that "all the social insurance funds should as a rule be
controlled and operated as one fund." "However," it says, "as a
transitory measure, the funds can be deposited in the Trust Fund
Bureau, but a special legal guarantee is necessary so that the fund
may be operated in a special account, separated from other fiscal
funds, in order to achieve the objective of social security." This
also is not so helpful in developing the discussion as it does not
o
clarify what actually is the welfare of the insured.
Most of these discussions were of a mere political nature.
Interest has been fccussed on the distribution of powers in the govern¬
ment departments and no sufficient economic analysis has been given.
Nevertheless, this record shows in what kind of political controversy,
as well as pressures of the public opinion, the present institutional
framework has been realized. As a conclusion to these controversies,
the government has decided the way of treatment of the investment of
the National Pension surplus in line with the proposal by the Trust
Fund Bureau Council mentioned above. That is to say that a part (25$
for 1961) of the surplus of the National Pension Scheme is utilized
^ The Social Security System Council is set up in the Prime Minister's
Secretariat to discuss the problems related to the social security
systems at large. Scholars, members of Parliament, government officials,
representatives of interested groups, are represented. As the problem
of the operation of the National Pension Fund relates to these three
government advisory committees, they all made their recommendations
independently.
O
Detailed explanations on these recommendations are given in Suzuki, T.
ibid., pp. 8-9.
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for investment in welfare facilities, while the rest is totally
deposited to the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account and is operated
with other fiscal funds in the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme.
Regardless of whether we approve this treatment to be a desirable
solution to the problem or not, if we are to analyse the investment
policy of the National Pension Scheme under this institutional set
up, we have to consider it in a wider field of fiscal policies than
a mere pension investment, i.e., the investment policies of the Trust
Fund Bureau Fund, and of the total Fiscal Investment and Loan Pro¬
gramme. These are crucially important. (See Chapter II, Section 4).
Moreover, this should not be taken to mean that the new reserve for¬
mation of the National Pension Scheme simply implies an increase in
the total supply of funds, whose investment policies are, as a whole,
already fixed or very inelastic. If It were so, the consideration of
the total investment policies of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Pro¬
gramme would be completely outside the scope of our present analysis
of the investment policies of the National Pension Scheme reserves.
We would have been left here with minor problems of the investment
policies of an exceptional part (i.e. 2% in 1961) of the pension
surplus, (i.e. whether hospitals should be increased more than
recreation centres, etc.), and whether or not this 2% rate is
adequate, as distinct from the fundamental problem as to whether or
not this exceptional treatment is a desirable solution. Nevertheless,
in practice, a significant change in the composition of the source of
the Trust Fund Bureau fund, as well as in the total Fiscal Investment
and Loan Programme, will inevitably affect the direction of the total
investment policies of the Trust Fund Bureau fund, and of the total
Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme. Moreover, the controversies
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previously mentioned have aroused a keen interest in the public as to
the way in which the pension investment will be utilized. This is
acting as a pressure on the decision making body of the investment
policy of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme.
The government explanation is that the introduction of the National
Pension Scheme and the increase in the source of fund are affecting the
total policy considerations of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme
in such a way that more emphasis has come to be given to welfare con¬
siderations, such as housing, environmental improvements, welfare
facilities, etc. It says that, moreover, this is accelerating the
changing trend of the total investment policies of the Programme by
shifting emphasis from the supply of funds from industrial developments
q in
to the sectors with social and public interest. '
Moreover, in view of an increasing pressure, the government has,
out of political considerations, introduced an alteration in the
management of the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account. Namely, the
government has adopted a method from the fiscal year 1961 budget, to
show a classification of the Trust Fund Bureau fund by use with one
sub-division of the source of the fund. Thus we have come to be in¬
formed of the use of the pension schemes, etc., and of the other group
of funds such as Post Office Savings, etc. We are not yet informed of
the use of funds corresponding to the National Pension Scheme surplus
as such. Therefore, we have, at any rate, to consider the investment
(( &
Suzuki, H, New Direction of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme.
Fiscal ana Financial. 'Statistics Monthly, edit, ux Finance,
Printing Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, No. 116, April, 1961, p. IS.
Mr. Suzuki holds the post of chief of Fund Section^Financial Bureau,
Ministry of Finance. The formation of the Fiscal Investment and Loan
Programme is handled in the same section.
10 As for the changing trend of the total policy of the Fiscal Invest¬
ment and Loan Programme, see Chapter II, Section 4.
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of the National Pension Scheme in a greater scale than a mere National
Pension Scheme surplus. Nevertheless, the new treatment may be a sig¬
nificant change, since not only were we not informed of the use of the
funds, but the difference in the source of funds within the Trust Fund
Bureau were not considered in the allocation of the funds previously,
in view of the uniformity of the Trust Fund Bureau fund. This may
gradually alter the nature of the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account in
the future.
In the short run, however, it may not be correct to argue that,
since the government began to reveal the sub-division of the use of the
fund, the nature of the Trust Fund Bureau and its operation are imme¬
diately changed. The alteration seems to be of a more political nature,
rather than of an economic. This is because the government was urged
to make some gesture to the public in order to show that the National
Pension Scheme surplus is being used satisfactorily for the welfare of
the insured. If the true object lies more in the political gesture
rather than in the economic consideration, the alteration of the treat¬
ment may not produce any substantial change in the policy formation.
This is because the government can, after forming the total Programme,
distribute a large proportion of one group of funds, (i.e. those re¬
lated to pensions, etc.), to the welfare facilities. This may give
an outlook to the public that the pension reserves are very adequately
utilized. But the government may be easily able to compensate it by
another group of funds. As a matter of fact, the government classifi¬
cation of the use of funds of the group related to pensions showed a
heavy concentration on welfare facilities, construction of houses,
medium and small sized industries, etc. But a heavy concentration in
industrial development and encouragement in exports is observable for
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the fund from the Post Office Savings, etc. We can add that we can
sometimes alter the emphasis of a scheme hy altering the items of its
sub-division. Even though the sub-divisions of the use of funds are
shown, the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account is still operated as one
Account. This suggests that, even though a new treatment is adopted,
we have still to consider the problem of the investment of the National
Pension Scheme Surplus in close relation with the Trust Fund Bureau
funds and with the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme. We do not
necessarily need to commit ourselves to the government explanation
that the funds corresponding to one group are operated in such and
such purposes. Nevertheless, it may be fairer to understand that the
increase in the National Pension Scheme surplus will, by one way or
the other, affect the total policy considerations of the Trust Fund
Bureau, and of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme. We can
understand that the new treatment will accelerate this effect.
The introduction of the National Pension Scheme and the increasing
importance of its surplus will thus bring us to re-examine the total
Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme. These impetus towards re-examina¬
tion may be a desirable thing, because more careful analysis must be
given to this crucially important tool of the fiscal policies in view
of the changing pattern of the economic structure of Japan (as we
partly saw in Section 2).
We have started our analysis on the function of the National Pension
Scheme by way of extracting it from the total Fiscal Investment and
Loan Programme. Now we must end by discussing the effect of forms of
investment from the point of view of the total Fiscal Investment and
Loan Programme. Hence, the speciality, as well as the importance,
of the investment policy of the National Pension Scheme surplus in
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Japan lies in this close inter-relationship with the total investment
policies of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme.
In view of all we have said, we shall start from a general dis¬
cussion on the effect of forms of investment on economic growth, with
the structural framework of the Japanese economy in mind.
Assume that the Harrod-Domar type of growth model, introduced in
the previous section, which is based on the assumption that the level
of the real net investment is a fixed function of real national pro¬
duct, is kept in mind. Then it follows that the smaller the incre¬
mental capital/output ratio, the greater will be the output, and hence
the rate of growth. The analysis is carried out by considering how
this ratio may be affected by the combination of factors of production.
The amount and composition of capital, (including land), the quantity
and quality of labour, and the trend and structural pattern of
technical progress will be considered as factors of production. The
size of industry will be given special attention in discussion.
As to the relationship between capital and labour, it can be
argued, in the crudest way, that in developing countries with a
sufficient supply of labour and with scarce capital, the labour in¬
tensive method of production may be preferable; while in developed
countries with an excess capital and with scarce labour, the capital
intensive method of production may be suitable. As to the choice
of a given amount of investment, if the supply of labour is assumed
to be elastic and if the increase in employment is assumed not to
affect the price mechanism, and if the condition is always satisfied
that the increase in input of labour increases output, then the more
labour is employed, the greater will be the increase in output. It
follows that more attention should be given.-to the use of labour in
a development programme of countries with elastic supply of labour. 1
Admitting the importance of the point, the degree of applicability
of the above proposition depends also on the economic structure and
the stages of development of the country concerned. If the features
of technical progress in Japan, i.e., the clear cut distinction between
the stages of technical progress between modernised (generally more
capital intensive) sectors and un-modernised (more labour intensive)
sectors, as well as the importance of technical progress in deciding
economic growth, are introduced in the analysis, the result of the
choice of the labour intensive method of production rather than that
of the capital intensive method may not generate so great an increase
in output, as compared with the latter, such as is the case in countries
where such a sharp duality of technical progress does not exist. Thus
attention must be given to the importance of comparative efficiencies
of technique according to the methods of production. This considera¬
tion is important in deciding the types and the sizes of industries to
furnish the government investment fund.
-
2
Very small sized industries of Japan are very poorly equipped
with capital, and typically inefficient. The ratio of labour is
extremely high compared to capital. From the point of a formal dis¬
cussion of the greater labour input to a given capital, the loan for
these small sized industries may seem to be a very promising choice
for a higher growth. However, due to extreme inefficiency in most
cases, these may not be a suitable choice. The problem of very small
sized industries also relates to the general problem of optimal size
See Peacock, A.T., ibid.. p. 19.
2
Very small sized industries referred to here roughly imply those
firms with workers of less than 50.
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of industries. However, the latter will not be discussed as such in
this paper. The low quality and lack of entreneurship of
entrepreneurs, lack of accumulation of techniques, lack of accumulation
of experience of labourers, instability of employment, low wages,
extreme negligence of labour conditions due to lack of understanding
and intelligence of entrepreneurs and also lack of sufficient in¬
struction by the government, feudalism in the labour relations - all
these factors typify the difficulties of very small sized industries,
and show the conditions which cannot fully be explained in a simplified
production function. However, the stress on the inefficiency in
technique may make it easier to understand this situation that very
small sized industries, however labour intensive they may be, are
in most cases not a suitable choice for fiscal fund, if higher growth
is the aim. The problem of very small sized industries will reappear
in the later stages of discussion as one of other criteria for fiscal
investment, i.e. in improving social security and improving labour
and hygenic conditions of these industries. This is a more social,
rather than an economic consideration.
The problem of an individual choice of capital-labour ratio for
a given increase in investment may be different from the problem of
the choice of c^apital-labour ratio for the ecohomy as a whole.
Suppose that greater use of labour for the economy as a whole, for
a given capital, always produces greater output. If a choice of
capital intensive method of production, for a given increase in
government investment, induces greater labour in labour intensive
affiliated industries, and thus increases the total use of labour
for the economy as a whole, more than the case in a choice of labour
intensive method, then the capital intensive method will become
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preferable. In the economy where the rapidly developing large scale,
capital intensive industries are based on labour intensive, middle
and small sized industries, this consideration of the spreading
influence of employment generation may be an important factor. In
the same way, the individual choice of a labour intensive method of
production may not cause so great an increase in employment oppor¬
tunities in the affiliated industries, or it may accompany invest¬
ments of very capital intensive nature such as house building for
workers, road construction, etc. These may absorb a large amount of
a scarce factor - capital - of the economy with a small amount of
labour. Thus, in total, the use of labour for the economy as a
whole may become less than in the case of the individual choice of a
capital intensive method of production. If this happens, the capital
intensive may become preferable as an individual choice. However, it
will be extremely difficult to imagine that the individual choice of
capital intensive method for a given capital will induce, in general,
a higher rate of employment for the economy as a whole, than the
choice of a labour intensive method. On the contrary, under the
present assumptions where the individual choice of labour intensive
methsfid for a given investment generates in general a greater output
for the individual industries than the choice of c^apital intensive
method, the former is more likely to induce higher rate of employment
for the economy as a whole than the latter, unless otherwise
proved. It follows that as the supply of labour In present-day Japan
Is still abundant compared to more developed countries, the use of
labour may have to be given more attention thati it is given now.
Moreover, the choice of a capital Intensive method may evoke some
balance of payments problems, which will be expounded later.
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As to the problem relating to the difference between the individual
choice of capital or labour intensity and the consequence of this
choice on the capital-labour ratio of the economy as a whole, apart
from consideration of any possible divergences of multiplying influences
of employment, the supply conditions of the labour force needs to be
examined. This is because if the dual structure of the labour force
in Japan is introduced, the analysis may have to be affected. The
most typical example of the elastic supply of labour is the case where
a large unemployment pool exists. In this case, the choice of a capital
intensive method of production simply means that less labour power will
be utilized than would otherwise be the case. The significance of the
increase of the contribution of labour on output growth by choosing
labour intensive method may be great in this case. However, under the
specific features of Japan, it may be more practical to assume that
the choice of capital intensive method will leave behind more labour
in inefficient sectors, rather than in an unemployment pool. The
labour in inefficient sectors, however, is contributing towards the
increase in output via cheap labour, though in a very unsatisfactory
way. The individual choice of a labour intensive method may increase
the contribution of labour of the industry towards the economic growth,
but the contribution of labour in inefficient sectors may be decreased.
In other words, the choice of a labour intensive method may have a
smaller incremental capital/output ratio for that investment and has
a greater effect on growth than the choice of a capital intensive
method, but may cause more increase in the incremental capital/output
ratio in inefficient sectors and thus accompany a greater negative
effect on growth than does the latter choice. In total the meaning
of the choice of a labour intensiveness rather than a capital inten-
siveness, for the sake of growth, may be greatly reduced due to the
supply conditions of labour. These features are yet different from those
case of more developed countries where labour is a scarce factor. If the
supply of labour is very inelastic, a shift of labour may appear more
obvious. In the case of Japan, the effect mentioned above, of the
choice of method affected by the dual structure of labour may not be
seen so clearly as the shift of labour in the case of more developed
countries with scarce labour, but yet may be rather differeht from
the case of less developed countries with abundant labour and with a
very scarce capital. These analyses suggest that the fiscal invest¬
ment policy of Japan must be based on the specialities of the struc¬
tural features of the economy, and hence cannot follow blindly the
policy recommendations of the more developed countries and still
less cannot automatically adopt the propositions for less developed
countries,
The analysis so far developed is based on the assumption that
the level of real net investment is a fixed proportion of real national
product. So the analysis has been limited to the examination of the
effect of the choice of forms of investment on the capital/output
ratio. However, if this investment function itself is affected by
the choice of forms of investment, then further consideration is
needed. The choice of a labour intensive method and more use of
labour, will, under usual conditions, increase the share of earnings
of wage (including salary) earners to real national product more
than in the case of the choice of a capital intensive method. Other
things being equal, the increase in the share of wages will cause a
decrease in the share of undistributed profit. If the level of
real investment is, one way or another, a function of undistributed
profit, or, more precisely speaking, if it is a negative function of
the distributive share of waxjes, the choice of a labour intensive
method, via a greater increase in the share of Xi/ages, may reduce the
level of real investment of the economy rather than in the case of
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the choice of a capital intensive method. (Graphically this can he
understood as a downward shift of an investment function). In such
a case, even though the choice of a labour intensive method generates
a greater increase in output than the choice of a capital intensive
method for an immediate period, the latter may cause a greater rate
of growth than the former in the long run. How far will the invest¬
ment function be affected by the choice of a labour intensive method
rather than the choice of a capital intensive method is also
influenced by the supply conditions of labour. This is because the
effect on wage shares may be different according to the supply con¬
ditions of labour, let alone the distribution ratios of other shares.
If, again, the unemployed workers have been receiving unemployment
benefits, the net increase in the distributive share of the working
population may be less than in the case where no such system exists.
The wider the applicability of the unemployment benefit and the
smaller the difference between the wage level for increased labourers and
the level of unemployment benefit, the less will be the difference in
the schedule of the investment function based on the capital intensive
method and the labour intensive method. If the choice of a labour
intensive method causes a scarcity of labour in some sectors and thus
causes an increase in the wage rate, the increase in the share of
wages may become greater than the increase in the numbers of employment,
in labour alone indicates. If, by one way or the other, the supply of
labour is not sufficiently elastic, this may be the case. The con¬
dition of elasticity of the supply of labour may be more significantly
affected by several systematical factors and social conditions, rather
than by the absolute amount of the existing labour force. Such factors,
as persisting feudalistic human relations in small and middle sized
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industries, family systems in agriculture sectors and others, regional
imbalance in the pattern of industrial development, transportation and
housing problems, etc., may hinder a swift and elastic supply of the
existing labour. In the case of Japan, the choice of more labour
intensive methods for fiscal investment may cause some scarcity of
labour, though it might be temporarily, in some of the small and
middle sized industries, and may have some inflationary effect.
However, this may have, to some extent, an adjusting role of the dual
structure of wages in improving the condition of cheap labour in
inefficient sectors, though this is a consideration more social than
economic. If the increase in the wage rate of some sectors spreads
to other sectors, and to the economy as a whole, this inflationary
effect may have significant bearings on the determination of the
schedule of the investment function. The use of more labour may also
via reducing the existing pressure of inefficient cheap labour against
wage increases, cause an increase in the share of wages.
Relating to the effect of the choice of a labour intensive method
on the wage rate, the difference in the types of labour, i.e.;new
labour force and the existing old labour force, apart from the dis¬
tinction between skilled and unskilled, may need to be considered.
In Japan, a life employment system is prevailing, i.e., workers usually
work all their lives in a one and only firm, and the needs of the
individual are the important determinants of wage rates, (the aged
workers receive higher wages in general than the younger workers), so
the new labour force of graduates from universities, schools, etc.,
which can be employed comparatively cheaply due to age, can be trained
easily, can be used longer, and has better quality, is much preferred
to the existing un- or under-employed labour force. The choice of
labour intensive methods for fiscal investment may cause a scarcity
for this type of new labour force, and hence cause an increase of
wage rates of this type. This may achieve a role in affecting a wage
determination system towards payment by quality, rather than towards
payment through age and necessity. This, in turn, may affect the
elasticity of a supply of labpur.
It is extremely difficult to say how far the choice of labour in¬
tensive rather than of capital intensive method of production will
affect the investment function and thus the rate of economic growth.
In the case of Japan, some shift of labour from inefficient sectors
to new investment, as well as the unemployment benefit system, though
not yet sufficient, may also mitigate the different impact of the two
contrasting choice of production methods on investment function. A
high rate of savings, and also a high rate of investment financed by
private savings, may work in the same direction. On the other hand,
the gradual shortages of a new labour force may cause a higher increase
in the wage rate for this type of labour, in the case of the choice of
labour intensive method than the capital intensive method, and thus
increase the share of wages towards the slowing down of the rate of
growth. The gradual decrease in the rate of increase of the supply
of labour, together with a high rate of capital accumulation,
may gradually reduce the elasticity of the supply of labour
in the future. Thus as an investment choice in the future, when the
supply of labour is gradually coming to be a scarce factor, a more
capital intensive method, than otherwise, will become preferable.
However, in view of the commonly accepted policy considerations, i.e.,
a high rate of; yet balanced, economic growth, and also in view of the
present conditions of factors of production, too great an inclination
towards capital intensity and towards the protection of large scale
industries, may not avoid criticisms.
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It is generally understood that, in view of the past trend, and
also of the experience of other developed countries, more attention,
than now, should be given to the capital intensive methods, with,
emphasis on the heavy and chemical industries in the development
plan of manufacturing industries. The emphasis is, in general,
attached more to the development of large scale, highly capital
intensive methods, than to others, with a view to increase in these
sectors international competitive power with more developed countries.
However, as an investment criterion of a given amount of fiscal in¬
vestment, a further consideration may be necessary in view of the
speciality in the stages of structural development of the economy,
technical progress, and the supply conditions of labour.
As has been explained before, the development of capital inten¬
sive large scale industries with high technique has been partly a
result of an intentional lead by government policies. Because of this,
a large amount of the fiscal investment fund has been used in these
li
sectors. As a post-war policy, this may have been a wise method.
First of all, capital was extremely scarce. This scarce factor
needed to be concentrated in an essential sector, i.e., in key industries.
Secondly, technical progress in middle and small sized industries was
very low and management was not modernised. Loss of scarce capital in
inefficient sectors needs to be evaded. Thirdly, employment of cheap
labour in un-modernised sectors also contributed to the production
increase. Thus the maintenance of a low wage rate, though socially
undesirable, has helped towards rapid recovery of the economy.
"Exports of labour intensive commodities, such as sundry goods and
textiles, which are based on cheap labour, furnished a source of
imports fund for raw materials and machineries needed for modernised,
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capital intensive sectors." However, capital accumulation has since
taken place. Due to a high rate of savings, it is increasing with
high speed. The scarcity of capital has decreased its degree, and
it is expected in the future that it will he replaced by the scarcity
of labour. The economy has grown rapidly and now can supply a large
amount of investment fund to large scale, capital intensive sectors,
which could not previously develop without government help. Amidst
these conditions, a very interesting trend of the economy has been
pointed out relating to recent employment demand. As a government
economist has explained, "a gradual trend of an intermediate or a
balanced growth in employment, different from the development in
the two extremes of capital and labour intensive sectors, is obser¬
vable for recent years." "Enterprises are in the process of com¬
petitive growth, namely, growth in oligopoly in large scale sectors
14
and growth in excess competition in middle and small sized sectors. J
This can be seen as one of the signs that the economic develop-
VS"
ment, particularly that related to middle sized industries, is gradual¬
ly reaching the new stage, different from, say 5 to 10 years ago. A
high rate of capital accumulation and a high rate of economic growth
are gradually inducing middle sized industries towards more modernisa¬
tion, rationalization, higher efficiency of technique, and, in most
cases, more capital intensivity, amidst severe competition. In a very
crude way, the middle sized industries can be said to be less equipped
with capital than very large scale, very capital intensive modernized
sectors. This, in turn, means that a greater contribution from labour
13. Edit. S. Okita, Growth and Structure of Japanese Economy, p. 78,
Shunjyp Sha. 1961.
14» Ed. S. Okita, ibid.. p. 79• Mr. Okita holds the post of Director
of General Planning Bureau, Economic Planning Agency, the Japanese
Government.
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on output may be obtainable from these middle sized industries, than
very large scale, capital intensive sectors, as a choice of a given
investment. The desirability of the development of middle sized
industries has been acknowledged both by scholars and by the govern¬
ment, but the interest seems to have been limited only in correcting
the dual structure of the economy and inequality of wage levels. The
view point has been rather more social, than economic. Due to these
considerations, the importance of the development of middle sized
industries seems not to have been sufficiently understood. The place
of this problem seems to be a subsidiary one in the government policy,
which seems, in many senses, to be still looking towards very large
scale, very capital intensive industries. Yet, the development of the
middle sized industries may indeed be very important, politically and
socially. First of all, it will help towards full employment of
labour and adjustment of inequality of wage levels, and thus improve
the standard of life of low wage earners and bring about social
stability in low class populations. Secondly, it may help in establish¬
ing a stronger and wider range of middle classes than now, without
which social and political stability and soundness may not well be
secured. At the same time, the development of the middle sized indus¬
tries by a stronger lead from the government than has been given so far,
may also be economically important due to a more efficient utilisation
of a still comparatively abundant factor of labour. If the development
of these industries is achieved, the abundant labour will come to be
equipped with a much higher efficiency than now and will contribute
towards a higher rate of economic growth.
1 c Middle sized industries referred to here roughly imply those firms
with employees between 500 to 100. The fostering of comparatively
efficient firms of those may be needed. The problems related to the
organisations of some of related industries, and the combination of those
with large scale industries, specialization, other administrative prob¬
lems, etc., are omitted.
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Relating to this point, it is very interesting to observe that
the government has adopted a step, though as a subsidiary or tentative
step, as one of several items of policies for redressing the deterior¬
ating international balance of payments, in the end of September, 1961,
which is explained as, "financial assistance in smaller industries to
encourage more exporting". Too much equipment investment demand,
given a lead by large scale, capital intensive industries, backed by
the general government policies, caused a sharp rise in imports, and
hence, the international balance of payments difficulties. If an
extreme poorness in natural resources, the narrowness of balance of
payments ceilings with development, the outlook of foreign trade in
the near future (in that a greater increase with developed countries
than with less developed countries is anticipated), a comparative
abundance of labour, etc., are considered, the government policy may
need to be given further reflection. The past trend in technical pro¬
gress, eminent in divergence in two extremes, may not reflect a proper
trend, i.e^may be a result of a distorted policy, and, if due con¬
siderations are given, the development of technical progress may show
a faster rise in middle sized industries, than large scale industries.
As to the future outlook, even though some capital saving nature of
innovations may take place, due to the trend of the supply of capital
and of labour, the trend of technical progress, and also the trend of
the world trade structure, the economy will move more towards capital
intensivity than now in the long run. Some of the efficient middle
sized industries, if they could develop in the nearer future, may in¬
crease capital-intensivity in later years, according to the increase in
the supply of capital, and thus contribute towards higher growth again.
Even admitting this future trend, in view of the stage of capital
accumulation, the modernisation in management and technical progress in
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middle sized industries, the recent trend in the economy, foreign
trade outlook, and all other factors discussed, the development of
the middle sized industries may have to be given much greater attention
at present than in the past, in relation to the analytical proposition
of the choice of forms of fiscal investment in the light of the
capital output ratio.
The analysis thus far developed stressed the importance of tech¬
nical progress, and yet it was treated in the analysis as a given
factor for given forms of investment at a given time. However, tech¬
nical progress may be affected by the rate of economic growth, which
is affected by the choice of forms of investment, which again may be
affected by the direction of demand. Above all, the tempo of tech¬
nical progress will be significantly affected by the investment for
technical innovation, i.e.^research investment. The role of technical
progress in determining the economic growth in Japan is very important,
and it will be particularly so in the near future when the supply of
labour is gradually becoming less elastic. The problem of research
investment arises because, in spite of its essential importance, it
may not be fruitful or profitable in the short run, and particularly,
in many cases, it is not economical to be carried out by individual
enterprises. This is because, due to the nature of the investment, a
large amount of fund is needed to supply modern and efficient equipment.
Here arises the need for the government to give an initiative in an
enlargement of research investment. However, the government effort in
this field has been extremely limited and industrial scientific research
has been mainly carried out individually by large scale industries.
The importance of research investment has recently been heard in
industrial sectors more than heretofore, and the government has indeed
slightly increased its effort. However, the government effort is still
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too little compared to the urgency of the problem. A large scale
national scientific research institute may need to be established,
as soon as possible, in full co-operation with private industries.
A large part of defence expenditures of developed countries is
spent for scientific research. Lack of this, with still little
effort by the government, may present a very serious problem in
the economic development of Japan amidst technical innovations
in developed countries. Moreover, a large part of technical pro¬
gress could until now take the form of importation of advanced
technique from developed countries. However, a once widespread
■ap in technical progress between Japan and more developed
countries is narrowing, thus reducing an easy going convention
of importation of technique; and a due contribution of Japan to
the world technical progress will come to be expected in the
future. The need for research Investment via the fiscal fund
will be very significant for further economic growth.
Relating to this point, a higher technical progress will
require a higher technical skill of workers which may require an
enlargement and an improvement of technical education. A higher
development of technical education is urgently needed in view of
a high rate of industrialization. The role and the importance of
the government investment in this field will still be increased
in the future when higher techniques will be utilized and also when
t'he supply of labour is gradually becoming comparatively a scarce
factor. The higher technical education will, via improving the
quality of labour, contribute towards the increase in productivity
and towards a higher growth. The development of technical
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education will inevitably involve a problem of the educational
system. In spite of an over abundance in the number of universities
and university-colleges, science education is very insufficient.
Partly due to the unification and standardization of the education
system after the Second World War, and partly due to the practical
negligence of the government in the adjustment of the education
system according to the need of industries, technical education
has been extremely neglected. It is only this year (1961) that
an introduction of a new "Industrial Special High School System"
has been decided upon. The new system, which covers five years of
technical education, corresponding to the years of high school
and the two-year-course university-colleges, is designed to fill
partly this demand of industries. This is a very important
decision and the development of the system is desired. However,
the decision to introduce the new system is just a start. The
maintenance of a high level of technical education , and for that
purpose, the guarantee of a sufficient amount of high quality of
teachers, are the crucial points. Increase in the number of science
students, the improvement in research equipments, improvements in
the status of scientific research workers and teachers, may be
needed, as well as an improvement of the systems. Moreover, if
consideration from government finance, or from the availability
of qualified teachers strongly suggests that radical reforms,
then transformation of some of the existing colleges into
technical colleges or into special technical high schools together
with the majority of staffs of them may be required. In view of
the shortages of science teachers at present, this may be a most
suitable policy in the short run. This again may remedy some of
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the outstanding deficits in the Japanese university education
system, in that the divergence in quality of education among
different universities and university-colleges is too great,
most distinctly due to a careless and over abundant establishment
by transferring some of the old system high schools into new
universities or colleges in the post-VJar period. This again may
stimulate the improvement of general education by efficient use
of the government fund and by enlargement of necessary branches
like science education.
Relating to the last point, the improvement of general educa¬
tion via fiscal investment, to improve a quality of labour, is
also very important, and will be still more important when the
supply of labour becomes short in the future. The government
effort to improve the mobility of labour, by reducing several
impeding factors, will become a more important policy in the
future. The spread of education, particularly a modernisation
of a feudalistic idea in agriculture and small sized industries,
may be needed. Regional economic development will be an impor¬
tant factor. The development of middle sized industries may play
a desirable role. The improvements of transportation and housing
may still become very important.
The last point leads to the general argument of the role of
fiscal investment in increasing social overhead capital. A very
rapid economic expansion of Japan has left behind a fragile struc¬
ture of social capital, which has sometimes hindered smooth economic
development. The social overhead capital is those fundamental
capital assets, such as, roads, harbours, railways, waterways,
government planned house buildings, schools, hospitals, etc. which
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form the basis of national life and on which bases production is
smoothly carried out. The benefit of those assets goes to the
economy or society as a whole, rather than to individual firms
or persons. In many cases, these social overheads are nearly
impossible for individuals to supply, and, even when possible,
cost too much if individually planned. In most cases the enlarge¬
ment of these is not profitable, hence cannot usually be expected
from private enterprises. This social overhead capital can be
classified into three according to the difference in the function,
i.e. the first to "strengthen the industrial bases", the second
to "expand bases for living", and the third to "strengthen
16
facilities for land conservation." Primary importance is
attached by the government to the first category, which may, as
a whole, be a proper direction, since insufficiency of industrial
facilities is becoming a very important bottleneck in economic
growth. The improvement in transportation and communication
facilities, more particularly, the improvement in road, harbour,
and industrial water supply, seems to need special attention. As
to the second category, apart from general policies for housing,
sewage, water supply, hospitals, etc., special attention should be
paid to the improvement of working conditions in small sized
industries, towards a healthier and more hygienic stage. This
may not be achieved effectively without efficient administrative
guidance by the government labour authorities and also through
control of financial organisations, in close co-operation with
local governments. The problem of small and middle sized industries
relates also to the modernisation of agriculture, the correction of
The same classification is seen in the New Long-Range Economic
Plan of Japan (l?6l-1970)« Economic Planning Agency, Japanese
Government, The Japan Times, Ltd., pp. 34-35*
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regional imbalance in the industrial development, and may not be
separated from future local city plannings. /Is to the third cate¬
gory, forest plantations may need special attention, as well as
water control. The former may involve administrative problems on
the reformation of the forest ownership system.
The choice of forms or types of investment may also be strongly
affected by the direction cf final demand. The pattern of con¬
sumption, partly affected by the stages of development, may need to
be considered. The recent shift of emphasis from foodstuffs and
clothing to durable consumption goods, housing, and miscellaneous
expenses, has affected the pattern of investment. The direction is
towards more capital intensitivity than otherwise. The pattern of
external demand, i.e. the future outlook in world trade, may need
strong attention. The tempo of industrialization, as well as the
rate of economic development, in less developed countries need
very great attention. In the more distant future, more heavy
industrialization may be needed. For the nearer future, it is
anticipated that trade with developed countries will be expanded
17
more than with less developed countries. ' The comparative abun¬
dance in labour with a yet comparatively cheap wage may be an
important feature of international comparison with these countries.
In view also of the stages of industrialization of less developed
countries, the proper direction of investment form for the nearer
future may be slightly different from that for the longer future.
Relating to the problem of demand, the guarantee of sufficient
effective demand for production increase must be given special
attention in the future. According to the higher accumulation of
^ Export target in New Long-Range Economic Plan is based on this
anticipation.
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capital, the gradual decrease in the rate of increase in the supply
of labour and the improvement in the standard of life, this con¬
sideration will become more important than now. The improvement
in social services, particularly that of pension payments may
come to have a very important role in the future. The previously
mentioned development of middle sized industries, and a more
efficient and abundant use of labour than now, may become very
important from the point of view of a guarantee of future demand,
as well as in the maintenance of full employment as a social and
political requirement.
We must add here that it is not fair to say that the govern¬
ment is not at all giving attention towards these policy considera¬
tions. Contrarily, the importance and the need for improving
social overhead capital is strongly expressed in the recent "Ten
Years' Economic Plan", etc. We have also seen that the government
has gradually shifted its emphasis of policy considerations of the
Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme from the supply of funds to
the development of key industries to that to the sectors of social
and public interest according to the economic development. As a
whole, the government policy seems to be indicating a right
direction. Nevertheless, there still remains the problem which among
several alternatives to emphasise, and in what proportions.
We have emphasised the importance of research investment,
technical education, and the development of middle sized in¬
dustries more than the probable line of government policies,
although admitting that the government is also showing considerable
efforts towards those directions. As to the development problem
of middle sized industries, we have emphasised it more from the
economic side, rather than, as is more commonly accepted in the
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notion of small and middle sized industries, from the social con¬
siderations. Therefore, as to the proportion of the Fiscal In¬
vestment and Loan Programme, we are inclined to suggest that the
proportion of funds directed to the middle sized industries (about
11f in i960 Programme, see Table 7, Chapter II, Section 4) should
be much increased, while loans to large scale key industries (17$
as Industrial Development alone and 23$ if Encouragement of
Exports are included, for i960) may have to be reduced. (It must
be admitted here that a large part of Industrial Development is
occupied by loans for electricity, and this part may not have to
be reduced. This is because, on the one hand, the government is
controlling electricity price, and, on the other hand, supply is
insufficient while demand is increasing). The loan to the
agricultural sectors, etc. (7.7$ for Agriculture, Forestry and
Fishery in i960) seems to me rather out of proportioh, in view of
the past record of the economic growth according to industrial
sectors, (i.e. the primary industry has shown a very slow progress),
and the possible direction of the future economic structure. It
seems to me that this proportion of allocation may even reduce the
tempo of modernisation of ecohomic structure, though political
considerations of the condition of the backward agricultural
sectors, and, particularly of the direction of "vote", is imaginable.
The improvement of transportation and communication facilities may
be urgently needed. Yet, it may not always be correct to approve
it unconditionally. This is because the improvements of some of
those facilities by fiscal funds may, via a distortion in the price
mechanisms, serve for the benefit of specific sectors of the economy.
There are cases where we may suspect that large scale Industries
may be benefitting roost^, The final burden may have to be borne
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by tax payers, particularly by those wage and salary earners, who
are subject to the most thorough levying of taxes by taxation
authorities. Further analysis may have to be developed in this
way, if fairer understanding of the social overhead capital is to
be required.
Discussions of some of the other industries, some of the com¬
ponents of social overhead capital, detailed classification of
types of investment, three sectoral classification of industries,
(i.e. primary, secondary and tertiary), etc., have been omitted.
However, a large field has been covered in the discussion.
The problem of the choice of forms of investment has thus been
shown to accompany so many specific considerations due to fiscal
investment. This involved several administrative and systematical
problems, and required social and political, as well as economic,
considerations. To satisfy these, such as that of the increase in
social overhead capital, may mean, in many cases, a heavily capital
intensivity. These choices required for higher growth may thus
increase the capital/output ratio and so contradict the notion of
a high rate of growth derived from a narrow adaptation of a Harrod-
Dormer type of growth model analysis. Thus in the practical choice
of forms of fiscal investment, there exist so many specific factors
to affect the investment decision. It suggests that the problem of
the choice of forms of investment cannot be answered by a mere
application of one abstract economic principle. However, this
floes not mean that the problem is outside of the sphere of economic
principles. We can treat it still in the wide field of economic
theory.
We can now finish our analysis, since we have placed back the
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pension surplus into the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme
and have considered the investment policy in a wide field of the
same Programme. Hence, this is the very institutional framework
on which the National Pension Scheme operates.
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Chapter VI. OTHNR STUnlho OF THN FUl'UiiE OF PENSIONS
IN JAPAN.
The object of this chapter is to appraise tne
conclusions of the previous studies related to our
subject by comparing theia with our own.
First of all, some conclusions of the Kimura Study
are scrutinized." In the concluding part of the
analysis, tne Kimura Study states: "The annual increase
in national income during five years immediately after
the start of the scheme will be within the upper limit
of aoout ¥700 thousand million, and lower limit of
about ¥300 thousand, million (if the marginal propensity
to consume of pensioners, c, is unity), while about
¥230 thousand million (if both of the marginal
propensities to consume of the economy as a whole, c,
p
ana of pensioners, c, are equal to 0.75)." In a
similar way, it analyses the annual increase in investment
and in consumption in absolute magnitudes by a calculation
based on specific assumptions about the magnitude or the
range of the magnitudes of the coefficient. loreover,
it compares the magnitude of the changes in investment/
"*"'For the Kimura Study, see Introduction.
2
'(See) Kimura ana Others, ibid., p. 56.
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investment and in consumption with the probable total
investment ana consumption in a particular future year
aria estimates the percentage increase in investment
and consumption. As the Study states, "in order to
get a rough iaea what these values mean, assume that
"the Pension Commissioners Plan"^ is enforced in I960,*1
and personal consumption and investment in 1955 are
projected by the estimated rate of growth of 7.5 per cent
per annum. Then estimated personal consumption
expenditure for 1959 is about ¥6.5 billion, while
domestic capital formation is ¥2.8 billion.
The annual increase in investment is calculated
as about ¥100 thousand million, ana the annual increase
in consumption is calculated as the upper limit of about
¥600 thousand million, as the lower limit of about ¥200
thousand million (where c = 1), and about ¥150 thousand
million (where c = 6 = 0.75). Therefore the rate of
increase in the investment demand as against the previous
year is 3.5 per cent, while the corresponding rate of
increase in consumption demand will be within the upper
limit of over 9 per cent and the lower limit of over
3 per cent (when c = 1), and over 2 per cent (when c = 6 =
0.75). If the rate of increase due to the 6.5 per cent
*5
This is one of the tentative plans proposed in the process
of the formation of the iMational Pension Bill, ana is
different as we show later, from the National Pension Bill
actually promulgated.
4.
The Kimura Study took place early in 1958.
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rate of increase of the national income is added to these
increases, the rate of investment increase as against the
total investment demand of the previous year will be
10 per cent, while that of consumption will be between
15*5 per cent ana over 8.5 per cent^etc." It may be
clear alreaay from the conclusions I have derived that I
cannot approve this type of calculation. As I mentioned
in my tentative conclusions, X have intentionally avoided
this type of calculation of absolute magnitude, (though
it has been very tempting), since I fully realised the
difficulties associated with it.
The Kimura Study seems to neglect the multiplier
time-lags in the analysis of this "Pension Commissioners•
Plan," (which is a funding scheme). It calculates
the possible range of thexchanges in national income
which are likely to be caused by the introduction of the
pension scheme a3 if the multiplier effect will be
realized instantaneously in these particular years, and
it shows these changes in income through years in a
diagram.° Since no adjustments are made in view of the
multiplier time-lags in the diagram, and no mention is
given, one might be able to argue that the Kimura Study
5
Kimura and Others, ibid., pp.58-59.
C.
J* See Kimura and Others, ibid., p. 91, niagram 1.
treats in this case the multiplier effect as being
realized instantaneously within the jesr. The only
explanation that one might be able to give as a defence
of this treatment is that, if the impact changes through
years are nearly the same, the leakage to later years
of the multiplier effect (caused by the impact effect of
the year) and the leakage succeeded from previous years
of the multiplier effects (caused by the impact effects
of the previous years) may cancel out each other. In
consequence, the total changes in income calculated as
if the multiplier effect will be realized instantaneously
may concur with the summation of the effects which will
actually be realized within a particular year, i.e. with
the actual accumulated multiplier effects of the year.
However, it will be very difficult to prove this for all
the periods of the Kimura Study shown in the diagram.
I do not quite understand why the Kimura Study was
careful to mention the multiplier time-lags only in the
analysis of a pay-as-you-go plan, anddid not mention it
at all in the analysis of a funding system. In the case
of the pay-as-you-go plan, which the Kimura Study also
analysed, the impact changes in the initial year is
expected to be very great. Therefore, the consideration
of the multiplier time-lags may be more significant in
the /
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the case of the pay-as-you-go plan than in that of
the funding scheme. Nevertheless, the multiplier
time-lags must be duly considered in the case of a
funding scheme as well.
In the case of the analysis of the pay-as-you-go
plan, the Kimura Study explains, "the whole of the
multiplier process will not be instantaneously realized."
However, it argues, "Yet, if the income velocity of the
Japanese economy is 4, (i.e. if the multiplier time-lags
is 3 months), ana the marginal propensity to consume is
0.68, then, aoout 90 per cent of the total multiplier
7
effect will be realized within the initial year."
I find some difficulty in this explanation, not to
mention tne difficulty in assuming this particular value
Q
for the future marginal propensity to consume.0 That is,
the reason why the multiplier time-lags of 3 months for the
Japanese economy are not explained in the analysis.
Moreover, this calculation explicitly assumes that all
the transactions of the pension scheme of each year
take place in the very beginning of that year. If this
assumption, which is very convenient yet not practical,
7
See Kimura and Others, ibid., p. 52.
O
* The year to be examined is concerned with the I960,
while the value of the marginal propensity to consume
above mentioned is obtained from data in 1955.
is removed, the results may not oe so simple as are
calculated. Thus the explanation, based on these
calculations of the absolute magnitude, involves some
difficulty. In view of all tnese comments, one might
be able to argue that the Kimura Study was not sufficiently
careful in the treatment a£ the multiplier time-lags.
However, it may not be fair to say that the Kimura
Study was not at all aware of the difficulty associated
with the future forecast. It implicitly emphasised
the difficulty in assuming a constant consumption
coefficient in the long run. It also emphasised that,■
because of this difficulty, the reliability of the
calculated results are extremely reduced in the long run.
These are very important points. Thus the Kimura Study
was indeed aware of some of the difficulty of the problems
involved. Nevertheless, my aforementioned criticism
on the method of analytical approach of the Kimura Study-
seems to me still to remain valid.
Though ratner a small point, I am inclined to think
that the Kimura Study is rather unsatisfactory even as
an econometric analysis. This is because it does not
give sufficient attention to the range of possible values
of the future consumption coefficient, nor noes it
give an analysis of the length of the multiplier time-lag;




magnitude of the changes in income. As to the future
values of the consumption coefficient, it simply makes
use of the result of the previous study by other members
of Tokyo University. It seems to me that sufficient
reasons are not given for this. It may state that
the result which shows a possible range of the consumption
coefficient, i.e. between 0.75 to 0.9» is convenient.
However, whether it is convenient, and whether that
particular result of the estimate is reliable, are
different questions. This is important since the
reliability of the result will greatly depend on the
adequacy of the estimates, if the calculation of the
magnitude of the changes in income is required, let alone
on other difficulties. I am not, of course, admitting
that these calculation results are valid, or that the
calculation of the magnitude is a good approach. I am
simply adding my criticism that, even though this type
of calculation be admitted, yet the analysis will still
be under criticism. Nevertheless, the Kimura Study is
rignt in emphasising the difficulty in assuming a constant
consumption coefficient in the long run.
Secondly, the Kimura >.tudy emphasises the difficulty
of finding sufficient investment opportunities for the
pension fund, particularly in those fields where
competition with private investment does not occur, and
yet /
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yet where a rather high profitability is guaranteed.
This may be particularly important when the surplus
formation increases in the future. The Kimura Study
states "If the ratio of the investment realization of
the pension surplus is 90 per cent, the increase in
national income will be 14 per cent less than woula
otherwise be the case. In addition, if tne actual
interest rate on the reserves becomes one per cent less
than is expected, the increase in national income will
be in total about 15 per cent less. If the investment
realization ratio or actual interest rate becomes
extremely low, the national income level may even decrease
compared with the case where no pension scheme is
introduced. Even though it is an extreme case, it seems
to be in general rather difficult to find investment
opportunities not in competition with private investment"
and yet to guarantee a high interest return to the reserve
q
fund. As I naturally find difficulty in that part of the
explanation given in terms of the actual magnitude of the
changes in income, I do not go into the calculation details
but simply discuss the points raised in the terms of
simple economic analysis.^'"*
q
Since the original expression, i.e. "yet to raise high
profits," is not so clear, I expressed the content as shown
in the text. ibid.. p. 58.
A similar point is raised in Kubo, M., "Probler3 of the
National Pension System", Municipal uesearon. Vol. LI, No. 12,
>ec. I960, p. 42. It states, "It will be very difficult to
realize high interest returns of a large amount of fund by
operating it safely." "Therefore, it is better not to have
a fund at all."
Though very important, it seems to me that there
is a confusion in the analysis of these two different
points, namely; that the investment realization ratio
and the profitability, or, more accurately speaking, the
interest rate on reserves, are two different problems.
First of all, the investment realization ratio is indeed
crucially important. This is because, whether or not a
funding system means the accumulation of reserves in the
real sense as the national economy as a whole, depends
on whether or not the capital investment in real terms
is increased more than would otherwise be the case.
I have also shown in my analysis the alteration of the
effect if the investment realization ratio (X ) is
introduced.11 However, this has not been emphasised as
much as in the Kimura Study, - not because I have regarded
*
it as a minor problem, but because I have considered that
it is not so unrealistic to assume, as I have done, that the
ratio is unity, (or very near to it). Such economic
conditions as a strong demand for loanable funds for
investment (observable in the past), a strong necessity
for the state to increase social overhead capital, (as
I have analysed in Chapter V), may partly explain that
my assumptions are not so unrealistic. The members of
the Japan Development Bank, which is the most important
government financial institution and deals with the
important /
II * See Further Complications 1. The Surplus-Investment
Ratio, in Chapter III, Section 2.
29 0
important part of the actual management of the loan of
fiscal funds to inaustries, have expressed a similar
optimistic view on the investment opportunities of the
fiscal funus. They say, "Regardless of the future
growth rate of the Japanese economy, so long as the
present economic system is maintained, the demand for
loanable funas of the Fiscal Investment and Loan may
12
increase," and are not likely to decrease. "In
many cases, the investment is decided solely by the
government economxc and industrial policies." "It may
be possible to think rather that the Fiscal Investment
and Loan Programme will be decided by how much the source
of the loanable funds of the Fiscal Investment and Loan
Programme will be increased.* I do not
need to commit myself to every single word of the quoted
opinion, - particularly the part which says "regardless
12 *
The original expression, i.e. "yet will not decrease",
may not be adequate, so the contents are expressed as is
shown in the text.
15
See Economic Effect of Rational Pension System, Special
Research Section, Research division, the Japan development
Bank (Internal Print), 1959» P« 78.
^T* The above research was made according to the enquiry
of the Ministry of Welfare to the Bank on the economic
effect of the National Pension System. The main part is
devoted to the income redistribution effect of the System,
but some analyses of the effect on growth and the investment
policy of the reserves are shown. It contains a few
interesting points such as those quoted afeove which are
based on the practical experience of the management of the
Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme. However, as I hold so
many doubts on the analysis, and as I think the value of the
study, in that part of the analysis concerning the effect on
growth,iS less than that of the Kimura Study, (it was also a
mere magnitudalcalculation), ana in view of the limit of tne
space, I would rather not discuss this analysis as a whole,
except to mention in later paragraphs a few points it raised
relating to the investment policy of the pension scheme.
of the future growth rate" may hold seme difficulty
- yet this opinion, I think, shows one aspect of the
true picture of the increase in fiscal funds. This
is, above all, valuable as the opinion of those practically
engaged in this management of loans. Moreover, I have
not been particularly in favour of high profitability,
since 1 am strongly aware that social insurance is quite
different from private insurance and should be examined
15
in the light of quite different considerations.
However, I may have to be sympathetic to the special
difficulty wnich the Kimura Study had to face. This is
that the tentative plan which the Kimura Study analysed
expected 7.5 per cent per annum interest rate and planned
that the difference between the actual interest rate and
the thus expected interest rate should be subsidized
by the Exchequer. Because of this expectation of an
unusually high interest rate, the Kimura Study naturally
became very pessimistic on the availability of sufficient
investment opportunities in the field "not competitive
with private investment, and yet with high profitability.1?"^
Out of two reasons above listed, the former, i.e. a consider
ation of investing fiscal funds so as not to intervene in
15
See Peacock, A.T., The Economics of National Insurance,
ibid., pp. 41-50. and see also Section 2, Chapter I,
16~
Kimura and Others, ibid., p. 58.
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the private investment, is a very important point.
Hence, if this consideration is not given, the level
of capital investment in real terms may not be increased
by the funding scheme.
However, the problem of the profitability involves
more difficult considerations.
I am very much inclined to suspect that most of the
arguments which emphasise the profitability of the
surplus investment are still based on the concepts of
"private" insurance, or, at least, are "analogising" the
function of the social insurance from the principles of
the private insurance. Even in the analysis of the
Kimura Study, one part explains that the funding
system is, "as it were, a huge state-managed insurance
company and it is convenient in many points to compare
17it with (private) insurance." I am not referring
here to the fact that the Kimura Study made some mistakes
in the explanation following the passage above quoted.
I am simply referring here to the fact that this type of
analogy, however convenient it may look, is very dangerous
17
ibid., p. 72. The word "private" in parentheses is
inserted by the present author. The original expression
i.e. "to analogise (the function of the social insurance)
from (the function of) the (private) insurance" is not so
clear, so it is translated as is shown in the text for
clarification.
and. may lead to a significant mi sunderstanding of
so.ue crucially important points. One of these
points, I think, could be the discussion on the
profitability of the pension surplus.
Having encountered the difficulty of the high
interest rate foreseen in the tentative plan, the
Kimura Study emphasises the difficulty in finding
sufficient investment opportunities on these conditions.
If the actual interest rate falls short of the expected
rate, it is argued, the increase in the Exchequer
Supplement to fill this difference may cause some
serious difficulty in the future.
Though this is an interesting point, the argument
following may not be so sufficient. It emphasises,
therefore, the main problem of the 'tentative plan' in
the long run, (such as later than 10 years after the
enforcement of the scheme), lies in whether or not it is
possible to operate the scheme satisfying the conditions
which the "Plan" laid down, i.e. to operate the surplus
in fields not competitive with private investment, but
guaranteeing a high rate of interest returns to tne
surplus fund." It seems to me that this analysis is not
sufficient.
If I were in the position of the Kimura Study,
encountering /
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encountering by the same difficulty in guaranteeing
a high interest return, I would go on to criticise
the adherence of the "Plan" to high interest returns
on pension surplus, which apparently the Kimura Study
did not emphasise. My argument will be this, that it
may not be therefore, so adequate a policy to adopt such
a strict regulation of the interest rate on reserves
of the state social insurance scheme. Hence, the
crucially important point is whether or not the
investment of the scheme is maintained in harmony with the
general employment policy of the government, and whether
or not the capital investment in real terms is increased
as an economy as a whole. It is rather dangerous, and it
may not be adequate, to be too impetuous in requiring a
high interest return since it may contradict the general
employment policies, I can discuss several consequential
problems why the contradiction to the general employment
policy is dangerous.
However, the Kimura Study did not analyse in this
way, i.e. to criticise the fundamental ideas of the
planners of the tentative plan from the view point of the
economic analysis of the pension scheme. Instead, it
simply considered only in the framework of the tentative
plan, and pointed out the difficulty in the operation.
One /
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One might be able to defend the Kimura Study in this
context by saying that, in view of tne object of the
Kimura Study to analyse the effect of the tentative plan,
its adherence to the plan is justifiable. However, the
lack of criticism in the way (as I have shown) may be
apt to give an impression tnat the difficulty analysed
by the samejstudy is the general difficulty in any funding
scheme, unless the exceptional feature of the plan is well
clarified. Moreover, though the Kimura Study emphasised
the serious danger that the scheme may cause if this
expected interest revenue (based on the rate of 7#5 per
cent per annum) is not guaranteed, the government has
adopted, within a very few years after this remarks of
the Kimura Study, the present National Pension Bill,
which does not hold such an exceptional condition.
It is very interesting to see the new government
projection based on the 5.15.per cent per annum interest
TO
rate, ap.d which does not seem to involve a particular
financial difficulty in foreseeable periods. Phis is
a very interesting example showing how social insurance
can be flexioly adjusted according to general policy
considerations. It might not be so correct to discuss
the problem with too much adherence to the framework of a
"L '*
See Table 9 of the Section 5, Chapter II.
specific plan.
Furthermore, the Kimura Study adds "Moreover,
if the real value of the reserves i3 reduced, and the
increase in the Exchequer Supplement or in the
contribution rate is caused, "the principle of a funding
system, in that it is an insurance relationship by each
19
inuividual contract, has already collapsed." This
expression is not appropriate, since the principle
of a social insurance scheme with a funding system
is not at all an insurance relationship by each
individual contract. This can be explained by those
factors such as: that no risk adjustments are made
in deciding the contribution rate, the finance of the
scheme is subsidized by the Exchequer Supplement ana
fundamentally guaranteed by the tax collecting authority
20
of tne government, the scheme is compulsory, etc.
In other words, even though the scheme could be operated
as the planners of the "Tentative Plan" envisaged, the
social insurance is not an insurance relationship by
19
ibid., p. 62. It must be mentioned here that the
Pension Commissioner's Plan did not contain the Exchequer
Supplement in the normal sense, apart from the Exchequer
Supplement to fillthe gap of the expected interest rate
and the actual interest rate on surplus fund.
2u* See Section 2 , Chapter I.
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each individual contract.
Trie point which tne Kimura Study raises here, i.e., the
difficulty in maintaining the real value of the reserves in
the long run, is very important. Nevertheless, one might
suspect that, behind these expressions, the Kimura Study
still contains some misunderstandings, or, at least, some
conceptual ambiguity on tne nature of social insurance.
This conceptional ambiguity, if present, may have some
important bearing on the treatment of the interest revenue
in the Kimura Study.
As explained, the tentative plan which the Kimura
study analysed anticipated a special Exchequer Supplement to
fill the gap between the actual interest rate and the expected
rate. It was quite natural that the Kimura Study analysed
this part of the interest revenue as an Exchequer Supplement.
However, the effect of the main part of the interest revenue,
wnich we have very carefully analysed in Chapter III, was
simply neglected by the Kimura Study.
Because of this, such remarks as I have quoted previously
follow, "If the actual rate of interest falls short of the
expected rate by one per cent the growth in national income
» 21 ail 22
will be reduced by about one per cent.
__
"Kimura and Others, ibid.,p. 58 for actual wording see
corresponding quotation of footnote 9* Corresponding decrease in growth
in national income seems to be about If in the quoted period.
However, since no sufficient explanations are given, I am
not yet convinced why the decrease in the rate of increase in
national Income will be If.
22."For the neglect of the treatment of the interest revenue
in the Kimura Study, see also Further Complications.
2. Tne Interest Burden paid by the Private Sector, Sec.2. Ch.III.
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However, it does not seem to me that this is correct.
I can visualize the impact of the increase of the interest
rate in the flow of funas diagram which is presented in
Chapter II, The increase of the interest rate on loans
to the Exchequer will mean an increase in the amount of the
transfer of funds from the Exchequer to the pension scheme.
Similarly, the increase of the interest rate on loans to
private industries will simply mean an increase in the flow
of funds from the private sector to the public sector.
The changes in the interest rate will inevitably accompany some
changes of the Exchequer Account or the Business Acoount. We
can criticise the treatment of the Kimura Study by a
very simple example. As found in the detailed
analysis of Chapter II of the use of the Fiscal Investment
ana Loan Programme funas, a large amount of the funds are
financed to local governments. Now a large part of
these funds are received in the General Account of the
Local Government, and the interest is paid out of
23
general taxation from the same Account. Now assume
that the interest rate on loans supplied from the Trust
Fund Bureau Special Account, (solely to which Account, the
__
•^'Administrative details are supplied from the Ministry
of Finance, by Air. Kitaaa.
24
pension surplus is deposited), is kept one per cent
lower than the expected rate, and that this part is
filled by the Exchequer Supplement. By the
treatment of the Kimura Study, the increase in national
income will be reduced by about 1 per cent compared to the
case where the interest rate is kept at the expected
25
level. Now assume that the interest rate on loans
from the Trust Fund Bureau is kept at the level of the
expected rate, and that the Exchequer has to increase
the subsidy to the local government, so that the local
government can finance the increased interest payments
to the Trust Fund Bureau. I can visualize that the
previous flow of funds diagram will present the same
form, since the difference is only whether the general
taxation to finance the interest payments goes directLy
to the Trust Fund Bureau Special Account, or whether it
goes through the Local Governments. In our analysis,
the effect on national expenditure is naturally identical
in these two cases. However, in the treatment of the
Kimura Study, a difference in the total national income
level results. I am rather inclined to suspect that this
' *
For detail, See Section4, Chapter II.
* See footnote, 21.
negligence of xhe interest burden may have some
important bearing on the lack of sufficient economic
anal/sis of the structure and the function of the
pension scheme, which I have analysed in ver^ great
retail in Chapter II. So far as our analysis is
concerned, the function of the pension scheme has been
analysed very thoroughly, and, by a simplifying assumption
on the way in which the pension fund is allocated and,
consequentially, the interest burden is distributed, it
was possible to depict the impact of the pension scheme.
On this framework, an analysis of the factors composing the
scheme was given, with the aid of the social accounting
representation. On this framework, the model was built,
wnich includes business savings. All our analyses form a
continuous line of thought which is fundamentally based
on trie simplifying assumption on the allocation of the
pension surplus. However, in the Kimura Study, no such
analyses are given. After a short legal or systematical
explanation of plans, the Kimura Study went directly into
the model building, econometric analysis, etc. I am
inclined to think, that, even though the Kimura Study was
aware of the 1 eed to introduce interest revenue, it would
have been very difficult for it to find proper treatment
for /
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for the main part of the interest revenue. Moreover,
this proper treatment of the interest revenue(as in this
thesis)would have added extreme difficulty to the
analysis, if the Kimura Study still aims at magnitudal
calculation. I do not think, as already mentioned,
that it is adequate to say that by neglecting this
effect a part of the induced effects are built into the
p/Z
analysis, by being taken into the production effect.
I can add that, because of the neglect of the interest
revenue, the result of the Kimura Study may be an
overestimate; though, of course, the tentative plan is
different from the acxual National Pension Scheme which
was analysed.
Among many points which the Kimura Study raiseu,
the following one is also of interest "In the long run,
it will be difficult to evade the changes in the real
27
value of the reserves by economic fluctuations. " This
point is interesting, since I consider that this is iaucn
more important than the mere profitability argument.
However, the passages following this in the Kimura Study,
cannot be accepted for the reasons which are already
p C
"See Further Complications 2. The Interest Burden by the





mentioned, i.e., "If the increase in the rate of
contribution, or the Exchequer Supplement, is required,
either may unbalance the relationship of receipts and
expenditures of each individual contract." The Kimura
Study explains that, because of this need to raise
contributions for the Exchequer Supplement in inflation,
a funding scheme comes to show several resemblances
to a pay-as-you-go plan. However, I am inclined to say
further that the crucial point is that, because of the
possible significant effect of the inflation on the
finance of the pension scheme, the investment policy of
the pension scheme should be very carefully directed so
as not to cause inflation, even if not primarily to
28
overcome the inflation. This is one of trie points
illustrating why the investment policy of the pension
scheme should be operated in harmony with the general
employment policies. The reason why I do not so much
emphasise the interest rate on surplus is because I
am strongly aware of the problem that even though a high
interest revenue is obtained, if it contradicts the
OQ
" * The development Bank Study advocates more than this, in
one part, namely, that the fund 3houlu be operated positively
to overcome inflations, "Economic effect oi the National
Pension System", ibid., p. 75* 1 am not inclined to
emphasise this much.
general employment policies, the result may be dangerous.
The case of inflation is a very important example.
These are general criticisms of the analysis of the
Kimura Study. However, it must oe mentioned that the
criticisms are given solely from the point of view of our
analysis. Because of the limit of space, ana the object
of the analysis, we do not give a full appraisal of the
Study; nor do 1 think that 1 am qualified to co so. 1
will simply ada that, in spite of all the criticisms raisea,
the Himora Study is still a very important stuuy, ana as
mentioned in tne Introduction, I am much inaeoted to its
contriDutions. Moreover, it must oe conceded that the
Kimura Study is not a published work, but an internal
publication of the j inistry of Welfare; it is also merely
an intermediate report ox tne full study. Therefore, to
criticise it as if it were a finished -work may not be fair.
Another important study is "Problems of the national
29
Pension System", of Mrs. Kubo. Among several points
she raisea, the following are important.
In criticising the funding, she argues, that one of
the reasons said to be why the government aaopts a funding
29
There is another paper given by Mrs. Kudo of a more
analytical nature, but is mainly concerned with the
introduction ana appraisals of the Kimura Study. The
majority of the discussions related to the Kimura Stuuy are
applicable. We will not discuss the paper here.
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system is because the burden of the insured can be
reduced by the interest revenue. However, she says,
as the contributions of the individuals ana the Exchequer
Supplement are calculated with a compound interest rate,
it is natural that this i^profitable for the insured,
but it only means that this is profitable as an insurance
and nothing more. Her point does not seem as clear to
me. However, she goes on to discuss that, when the
pension payments start, pensions will be paid out of
contributions of the current working population, the
Exchequer Supplement, ana the interest revenue from the
funa, but the fund itself will not be run down.
It seems to me that there is a slight confusion of three
different, but closely related arguments. Let these
be analysed in order. The first point relates to the
problem whether or not the fund will be run down in the
future. The last point of the quoted part of her
discussion is very important. This is because one is
apt to be lead to misunderstand that the contributors can
araw the money which they need in the future as pension
payments from the fund they accumulated. This can easily
be caused if one considers the function of the social
insurance from the principles of private insurance, since
the word "funding" is rather ambiguous. Therefore, the
point /
point Mrs. Kubo raises, that the fund will not be run
down, is important for removing such misunderstandings
as are mentioned above. However, it may be that the
fund can be run down by a deficit^ financing, if the
circumstances require this method.
Secondly, though I am not so sure of the logic of her
argument, I may be able to use it to assist in arguing
that the interest rate does not really matter despite the
view of others. I am using, or possibly changing, her
analysis, in such a way that a high interest, and a
consequently high proportion of interest revenue, may
be profitable, if we consider it as if it were a private
insurance; but in essence, in social insurance, these
are more the problems of distribution of burdens. If
this line of argument causes some reflection on the
general arguments which still stick to the profitaDility
consideration rather too much, this argument is important.
Thirdly, there remains a problem whether or not the
funding system reduces the future burden of the economy.
This comes back to my analysis that the point which
fundamentally matters is whether or not capital investment
in real terms is increased as an economy as a whole,
if the rate of economic growth is increased..due to the
funding scheme, then tne increased level of national
economy /
economy may make it easier to finance the future burden
of pension payments, tnan would otherwise be the case.
Taxation revenue may be increased without altering the
tax code; and this may make it possible to reduce
the contribution rate without reducing the pension
payments rate. This process of analysis may be more
useful in clarifying the real issue, than that given
by Mrs. Kubo. Nevertheless, if one considers that all
the old age people should be given payment of pensions
without delay, then funding may become unsuitable. The
suggestion of Mrs. Kubo, tnat the postponement of payments
of pensions by social insurance is not adequate, is an
interesting point, though perhaps this function of
assistance to "poor" old people, will be satisfied by
the enlargement of assistance services.
Writing about the utilization of the pension
fund in welfare facilities, Mrs. Kubo adds, "It will be
unsuitable if an interest payment is required to those
30
(insured) who utilize welfare facilities." Mrs. Kubo
criticises the practical aspect in that it is difficult
to make facilities which farmers, self-employed, and
workers of small firms scattered all over the country
can easily utilize, and moreover they will not have time
30.
Kubo, M., ibid., p. 43•
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to use them. This is an interesting remark, but ma^
be slightly unfair, because the majority of these welfare
facilities are workers houses, hospitals, etc. and not
mere recreation centres. These arejpf course, very small
points, but are useful to derive the following discussion
of a more general nature.
The utilization of a pension surplus is indeed
conventional. However, although many people think
otherwise, this may not be a suitable investment policy
of the pension fund; particularly so in the long run.
This is dangerous, since it is apt to be accepted too
easily that it is suitable for the welfare of the insured.
The "welfare" of the insured is also a vague concept.
If the utilization of the fund in welfare facilities i3
the only method or the most suitable method to guarantee
the welfare of the insured, Mrs. Kubo may be right in
saying that the welfare of the insured may be enhanced
by not collecting contributions compulsorily from small
income receivers. The crucial point is that the
operation of the fund must be considered in terms of
general employment policy. Such items as social welfare




Professor Suzuki also mentions this last point of finan¬
cing welfare facilities by general government expenditures.
See Suzuki, T. "Public Pension and Fiscal Investment",
i unici pal Problems. The Journal of the Tokyo Institute for
Municipal Research, Vo. LI, No. 12, December, I960, p. 10.
See also footnote 5, Sec. 4, Chapter V.
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Relating to this point, Professor Suzuki points out
that the welfare of the insured is guaranteed by the
sound operation of the pension finance for a long time,
and a sure enforcement of pension payments in the future.
For that purpose, he says, it is necessary to operate the
fund profitably so that, if possible, a reduction of the
contribution rate or an increase of the pension payments
32
may be realised in the future. This remark is right
in trying to see the welfare of the insured from a wider
viewpoint than merely a direct return to the insured.
Nevertheless, the part which says that the profitable
utilisation of the greater part of the fund is the most
suitable way of operation, raises some doubcs. If
economic growth is hindered because of the pursuit of high
interest return in the operation of the fund, the result
may be worse than a low-interest revenue. Professor
Suzuki sharply points out the dilemma between an increasing
demand for a low interest rate of fiscal fund ana the
necessity to raise the interest rate^n the loan from the
Trust Fund Bureau. However, it may not be necessary to
expect high interest returns on the pension funds, if it is
guzuki, T., ibid., p. 10.
used well in harmony with the general policy of
increasing economic growth,as has been discussed. It
may be much more dangerous to try to achieve high interest
returns witnout giving careful consideration to the
economy as a whole. If for example, inflation is caused
or accelerated by the investment of the fund, this may
be disastrous. Moreover, the economic effects of the
investment of the fund may differ according to the types
ana forms of investment. It is quite dangerous to form
an investment policy based on a high interest return or
on tne other hand to ignore the investment opportunities
of the fund without careful consideration of the different
effects of several possible investment forms. A flexible
examination of the investment policy is essential.
Finally, Mrs. Kubo says, "The rate of economic growth
is sufficiently high in Japan, as to make unnecessary
the accumulation of capital by compulsorily ^collecting
Fiscal Investment ana Loan funds from low income strata
by cutting down their consumptions." This is a very
acute point. However, the criticism of this inevitably
involves value judgement. Mrs. Kubo recommends,
instead, an income proportional contributory non-funding
33
insurance scheme. ^
Mrs. Kubo made a recommendation of a pay-as-you-go plan
type pension scheme. A Tentative Plan for an Old Age
Pension Scheme for the entire Population, printed in
Ministry of Welfare, May 1957.
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She strongly maintains that a noil-funding scheme
works as a very effective built-in stabilizer against
economic fluctuations. vVhether or not this is accepted,
it is an interesting point. Since the stabilization
aspect is outwith the scope of this thesis, I will only
briefly present some of my doubts. I doubt whether this
type of pension scheme always and very effectively
works as a built-in stabilizer. Even admitting that
the pay-as-you-go plan reacts more flexibly to business
fluctuations than the funding scheme in general, there
are other factors to consider. First of all, the
existence of time lags between changes in income and
changes in business activities, between changes in
consumption and changes in income may offset the
34
stabilizing effects.
Examples from the past experiences of Japan may
also be given. The experience of 1958 is an interesting
example showing that the income changes and consumption
changes may take place witn certain time lags of changes in
34 *
Mr. Pearse has concluded that, in view of the
multiplier time lags, and also in view of the sharp
fluctuations of "undistributed profits, the British
income tax system has a destabilizing function. See
Pearse, P. Automatic Stabilization & British Taxes on
Income. (Ph.±>. thesis - prepara tion.).
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business activities, in the direction contrary to the
35
business fluctuations.""
Secondly, if economic growth is taken into consiaeraiion,
the stabilizing effectiveness of this type of built-in
36
flexibility may have to be modified. Having thus
shown some of the difficulties associated with the
stabilizing effectiveness of the pay-as-you-go plan
pension scheme, I argue tnat much more analysis is needed
before it can be said that the scheme will work very
effectively against business fluctuations. moreover,
perhaps this may not be so important to uirect the policy
of the pension scheme to fulfill this objective alone.
Hence, there are other, and possibly more effective,
instruments which can be usea by present-day government.
35J See National Income /hite Paper. 1956. Economic
Planning Agency, p. 27.
36 *
The modification of the analysis due to the economic
growth is shown in Peacock, A.T. "Built-in Flexibility and
Economic Growth," in Stabile Preise in Wachsenden
Wirtschaft (Gottfried Bombach, Editor), J.C.B. j\ohr, Tubingen.
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